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ABSTRACT

G RACIOUS DISCOVERIES:
OF JONATHAN EDWARDS'

TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY,

AND AN ASSESSMENT OF HIS PLACE

IN THE

HISTORY OF AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY

by

JAMES G. BLIGHT

Historians who have dealt with the psychological
thought of the colonial period,

and with Edwards in particular,

fall into two general categories.

On the one hand there are

the historians of the discipline of psychology who,
Edwin G. Boring,

following

have deined the history of psychology as

that stream of historical thought which proceeded toward,
through,

and beyond Wilhelm Wundt,

psychologist.

the first

sidered Edwards and colonial psychology,

however,

history of psychology not as an ideational
Wundt,
nature.

"experimental"

The other group of historians who have c o n 
define the

journey through

but as the record of man's thoughts concerning

human

Since Edwards and his colleagues had much to say

about man's

nature,

this approach

at least allows a good deal

of colonial thought to enter the history of psychology

as an

xiii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

object of serious thought.
it has been,

Yet this study,

is just too broad and unwieldy a term.
sions

serious though

has also been remarkably barren.

"Human nature"

What are the d i m e n 

of man's nature?
The "Prescriptions" of Robert

"Fundamental

I. Watson and the

Issues" of Michael Wertheimer

are adopted as

useful criteria regarding the dimensions of human nature.
They are used principally to elaborate the profound paradoxes
and complexities in Edwards'
held that man is

psychological theory.

(a) a rational-emotive unity,

proactive and reactive.

and

Edwards
(b) both

It is demonstrated that this Sy n 

thetic viewpoint implies that man is

somehow both free and

determined,

and he possesses

rational and irrational,

of other combinations
be polar opposites.

of attributes which

a host

are usually held to

Until recently, whenever the synthetic

view has been advocated,

as it has by Augustine,

and the American functionalists,

Edwards,

the question of how such

complex man might function has been left unanswered.

a

The

synthetic theorists have lacked a model of the mind which
can accommodate all the diverse characteristics which they
attribute to it.

Recently,

constructed such a model,
to the rational-emotive

however,

cognitive theorists have

information p r o c e s s i n g , which holds

and proactive-reactive principles of

Edwards.
In spite of a number of obvious differences,

Edwards

and many information-processing theorists have asked the
same basic psychological questions and given answers which
xiv
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differ only in clarity.

What,

they have asked,

of m a n ’s relationship with the environment?

is the nature

The unified,

rational-emotive nature of the mind is described by Neisser,
a leading information-processing theorist,
cessing."

All purposeful,

it is held,

goal-directed,

as "multiple p ro
conscious activity,

is actually an elaboration of unconscious,

emotionally-laden information.

Information-processing theory

represents man's relationship to the world as a cybernetic
feedback loop— the TOTE unit.
by a sense of incongruity,

Once a person is moved to act

he is said to X es't-.0.Pera'*:e- Z es't:-

Exit from the loop.
Human activity as automatic and mundane as getting out
of bed and as difficult and complex as composing a poem can
be neatly described with information-processing concepts and
terminology.

Proactive planning,

selecting and execution is

interspersed with reactive reception of needed insights from
somewhere on the fringes of the stream of thought.
creative discoveries,

great and small,

These

are the product of both

activity and inactivity and of a unified rational-emotive
process.
The information-processing
Edwards.

In Edwards’ view,

model is then applied to

the cognitive jaunt through the

conversion loop consists mostly in two vigorous and tortuous
periods of planning,
restful,

the convert.
heard;

scheming,

and evaluating surrounding a

reactive oasis in which God
First,

"discovers" Himself to

the scriptures are read and sermons are

the individual perceives that he is in n e e d , and he
xv

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

attempts to move sequentially and methodically toward his
goal of salvation.

The actual

requires more than conviction,
to seek God.

of grace,

however,

After the period of "reasoning," of fretting

planning to seek the light,

Lord shouts,

as it were,

and

the weary seeker must lay his

plan aside and cease to seek.

5pirit,

"discovery"

more than a conscious effort

He receives the light;

and he listens.

the "vital indwelling principle,"

the

It is then that the
is fused to the mind

of the convert.
After traversing these stages,

the concerned seeker

quite naturally wishes to know whether his experience has
been a genuine conversion

or merely a work of the devil.

reverts to what Edwards called

"reasons," or sequential,

He
goal-

directed thought as he attempts to evaluate the validity of
what he hopes has been a valid
reasons,

however,

even his own,

conversion.

For a variety of

Edwards believed that no conversion,

could be evaluated with

not

any degree of confidence,

though he did describe the saintly life of the converted per
son with great clarity.
Finally,
of Edwards'

an effort is made to briefly trace the fate

psychology through James.

his doctrine of a unified,

It is contended that

rational-emotive mind was gradually

but decisively overthrown by a coalition of American and
European positions.

His proactive-reactive position,

was clarified and elaborated,

and it provided

James,

however,
Dewey,

and the other "functionalists" with an American precedent for
their "new" psychology.
xvi
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"Time," Emerson wrote,
the solid angularity of facts."

"dissipates to shining

ether

One of the principal func

tions of historical scholarship is,

I believe,

some semblance of "angularity" to the

past.

to restore

In intellectual

history this means that we must sharpen our conception of
what was s a i d , but more importantly,
best we can what was m e a n t .

we must interpret

as

Often, what was said appears

either irrelevant or absolutely inscrutable,

or perhaps both.

This is especially true in the history of psychology where
the timeless issues have,
other contexts:
medical.

until recently,

philosophical,

religious,

been embedded in
political,

Discussion of these issues is polluted with

and
surplus

and obscure meanings which help identify their historical
context,

but which

also make it difficult

to see valid his

torical relationships.
The application of a contemporary model to historical
data,

as has been increasingly done with psychoanalysis,

promising method of focusing the past so that we,
present,
tice,

can find intelligible meaning in it.

much

"psychohistory"

p sychoanalysis

is a

in the

Yet in pra c 

is simply bad history and worse

The vagary and uncertainty of historical

data is often compounded with a nebulous neo-Freudian model
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and a lot of catchy,

idiosyncratic jargon.

While most h is

torians still reject the conscious application of models onto
history,

many of those who endorse

p sychological terms distasteful.
entitled

"psychohistory" often find
For example,

in an article

"The Use and Abuse of Psychology in History,"

Manuel has stated that he finds psychological jargon
ugly" for direct application to history.^
subtle use of psychological

concepts.

Frank

"too

He favors a more

His Portrait of Isaac

Newton is a typical product of the prudent imposition of the
psychoanalytic model onto history.
normally an admirable trait,

2

Prudence,

however,

has in this area led to c o n 

fusion over the meaning and appropriateness of psychoanalytic
terms,

and a certain suspicion that the model,

might be defined,
haphazard

however it

has been applied in a very selective and

fashion.

Because of the imprudence contained herein,
reader may find this

the

study of Edwards and colonial psychology

"too ugly" to qualify as decent history.
smack of rank scientism,

a harbinger,

It may appear to

perhaps,

of the

impending positivistic overthrow of the historical profession.
Two points should be kept in mind,
radical conclusion is drawn.

life-long task of Perry Miller,
historian of ideas,

was,

however,

First,

1 D a e d a l u s . Winter,

1971,
1968.

Mass.,

a

America's greatest literary

as he put it,

^Cambridge,

before such

recall that the near

pp.

to examine "certain

187-213,

p. 207.
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3

basic continuities

[which] persist in a culture."^

The

great business of intellectual history is, in his view,
as far as possible beyond the information given;
size the underlying themes.
torian,

as

Likewise,

the scientific his

I redefine that term in chapter two,

apply a contemporary model to history,

to go

to syn t h e 

he who would

must implicitly accept

this basic contention of modern American historiography's
most illustrious

literateur:

there are basic unifying c on

tinuities which exist beneath or beyond the facts as they are
known.

The "scientist"

other words,
Peirce's

and "artist" of history differ,

in

only in the extent to which they accede to

admonition that they make their ideas clear.

5econd,

the humble working hypothesis contained in the following
pages was born of necessity.

The whole enterprise began a

couple of years ago in response to my utter frustration as a
historian of psychology interested in the American origins
of American psychology.

My good friend and teacher Rand B.

Evans has called this the "indigenous American psychology."
It seemed clear that the most important figure of this early
period was Edwards;
psychology must,

any comprehensive

therefore,

ately after undertaking
became clear that

study of the indigenous

begin with him.

Almost im m e d i 

an intensive study of Edwards it

I was confronted by a psy c h o l o g i c a l ,thinker

who was half modern,

half medieval,

and wholly i n c omprehen

sible to generations of psychological commentators.

I

3

Errand

Into the Wilderness

(New York,

1964),

pp.

1 84-1 85.
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simply could not understand Edwards or his interpreters.
was,

I

as Edwards described his parishioners just before c o n 

version,

"brought to the borders of despair."

My choice,

I saw it, was to forsake the whole blooming mess or,
natively,
Edwards,

to search
the

as

alter

for an entirely new way to approach

"indigenous American

psychology," and ultimately

the entire history of American psychology.

I may yet regret

choosing the latter.
There is a curious
this book

similarity between the format of

and that of an experimental report.

normally proceeds from the introduction
rationale for doing the study),
design,

apparatus,

discussion,

to the method

and procedure),

conclusions,

A report

(which contains the
(including the

to the results,

to the

and suggestions for future research.

In chapter t w o , therefore,

the previous work is reviewed.

Historians who have dealt with the psychological thought of
the colonial period,

and with Edwards in particular,

into two general categories.

historians of the discipline of psychology who,
Edwin G. Boring,

fall

On the one hand there are the
following

have defined the history of psychology as

that stream of historical thought which proceeded toward,
through,

and beyond Wilhelm Wundt,

psychologist.

Since,

the first "experimental"

as far as I know,

no aspect of Wundt's

system can be said to have originated in the American
colonies,

Boringian

historians of American psychology have

reduced the psychological thought of Edwards and the other
colonials to the status of a superfluous novelty.

"What
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possible rel e v a n c e , ” they have implicitly asked,
barely coherent Puritan chatter about devils,

"can the

angels,

God,

and conversion have for contemporary conceptions of ps y 
chology?"

Their answer,

also implicit,

is "nothing whatever!"

The other group of historians who have considered
Edwards'

and colonial psychology,

however,

define the

history of psychology not as an ideational journey through
Wundt,

but as the record of man's thoughts concerning human

nature.

Since Edwards and his colleagues had much to say

about man's nature,

this approach at least allows a good deal

of colonial thought to enter the history of psychology
object of serious study.
has been,

Yet this study,

has also been remarkably barren.

just too broad and unwieldy a term.

serious

as an

though it

"Human nature"

is

In the relatively undif

ferentiated form that has been adopted by some historians,
the history of the psychology
human nature)
diffuse,

almost incoherent.

"Calvinists," with
measure,

(of speculations concerning

of Edwards and the colonials is exceedingly
Most are lumped together as

a couple of Lockeans thrown in for good

who offered psychological contributions to Perry

Miller's mythical,
What,
Edwards?

then,

colonial m onolith— the New England Mind.
were the psychological views of the great

We simply have not known because his interpreters

have either cared deeply about modern psychology but not
about him,
vaguest

or have studied

him intensely but armed with the

imaginable view of psychology.
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Chapter three contains theoretical

and empirical

j ustification for the novel method which follows.

The

principal difficulty with previous analyses of Edwardsean
psychology is the unreasonable

demands they make on the

intuitive powers of the reader.
Edwards'

thought,

Historians have left either

or "psychology," or both confusingly vague.

In an attempt to correct this situation

a case is made for

the usefulness of a revised concept of "scientific history."
Since history,

like science,

highly selective endeavor,
scientist,

is an intensely personal and

the historian should,

like the

publicly display his theoretical assumptions.

Boring certainly was "scientific"
was of experimental psychology,
development

of a method.

in this sense:

his history

the history of the origin and

Unfortunately

for historians of

psychology whose interests take them outside the Wundtian
mainstream,

those who approach the history of psychology as

the study of human nature rather than a method,

the task of

being "scientific," or clear about one's assumptions,
so easy.

What are the dimensions of man's

things can a man be?

Many,

obviously.

nature?

is not

How many

The two most success

ful attempts made by historians of psychology to distribute
man's essence into a manageable yet useful scheme of c ate
gories have been made by Robert
Wertheimer.
extent,

I. Watson and Michael

Their views are described,

and adapted in chapter three:

assumptions

combined to some
they become my public

regarding the dimensions of human nature.
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The "Prescriptions"

of Watson and the "Fundamental

Issues" of Wertheimer are useful principally in elaborating
the profound paradoxes and complexities
l ogical theory.
emotive unity,

in Edwards'

Edwards held that man is
and

p s ycho

(a) a rational-

(b) both proactive and reactive.

demonstrated that this Synthetic viewpoint,

It is

as I call it,

implies that man is somehow both free and determined,
rational and irrational,

and he possesses a host of other

combinations of attributes which are usually held to be polar
opposites.

Until recently,

been advocated,
American

whenever the synthetic view has

as it has by Augustine,

functionalists,

Edwards,

and the

the question of how such a complex

man might function has been left unanswered.

The synthetic

theorists have lacked a model of the mind which can accommo
date all the diverse characteristics which they attribute to
it.

Recently,

such a model,

however,

cognitive theorists have constructed

Information Pro c e s s i n g , which holds to the

rational-emotive and proactive-reactive principles of
Edwards.
In chapter four the "apparatus," the synthetic model,
is described in its contemporary form.
of obvious differences,

In spite of a number

Edwards and many information pr o 

cessing theorists have asked the same basic psychological
questions and given answers which differ only in clarity.
What,

they have asked,

is the nature of the human mind

and

what is the nature of man's relationship with the environment?
The unified,

rational-emotive nature of the mind is described
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by Neisser,

a leading information-processing theorist,

"multiple processing."
scious,

"sequential"

as

While we are only aware of our con

stream of thought,

there is a good deal

of "parallel," or illogical and usually unconscious activity
occurring at all times.
scious activity,
this

unconscious,

All purposeful,

it is held,

goal-direct,

con

is actually an elaboration of

emotionally-laden information.

Information-

processing theory represents man's relationship to the world
as a cybernetic feedback l o o p — the TOTE unit.

Once a person

is moved to act by a sense of incongruity he is said to X 63^"
Operate-Test-and Exit from the loop.
oscillating

He engages in an

give-and-take encounter with the information at

his disposal:

he receives information but he also selects

those aspects of the information which he perceives to be
most relevant to his purposes and plans.
We shall see in chapter four that human activity as
automatic and mundane as getting out of bed and as difficult
and complex

as composing a poem can be neatly described with

information-processing concepts and terminology.
planning,

selecting,

Proactive

and execution is interspersed with

reactive reception of needed insights from somewhere on the
fringes of the stream of thought.
great and small,

These creative discoveries,

are the product of both activity and inac

tivity and of a unified rational-emotive process.
The procedure follows in chapter f i v e : the model is
applied to Edwards.

Armed with the TOTE unit and multiple-

processing concepts we plunge into E d w a r d s ’ psychology and
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try to describe it in contemporary terms.

In so doing we

undoubtedly lose a little of the historical Edwards along the
way,

but we gain,

I believe,

ing of his marvelous

a much more explicit understand

intuitive insights

into the nature of

the human mind and its relation to behavior.
In Edwards'

view,

the cognitive jaunt through the

conversion loop consists mostly in two vigorous and tortuous
periods of planning,
restful,

scheming,

and evaluating surrounding a

reactive oasis in which God

the convert,

A mostly conscious,

in the developing

"discovers" himself to

rational process is involved

sense of spiritual inadequacy.

an incongruity between a person's perceived status
ideal converted
and which

status that is mulled over,

There is
and an

worried about,

serves as an impetus to the design of a plan to

seek salvation.

The scriptures are read,

sermons are heard;

the individual perceives that he is in n e e d , and he attempts
to move sequentially
salvation.

and methodically toward his goal of

The actual

more than conviction,
God.

"discovery" of grace,
more than a conscious

however,

After the period of "reasoning," of fretting

to seek the light,
and cease to seek.
as it were,

requires

effort to seek
and planning

the weary seeker must lay his plan aside
He receives the light;

and he listens.

period of preparation,

It is then,

the Lord shouts,

after the intense

that the discovery of the divine light

may occur.

It is then that the Spirit,

principle,"

is fused to the mind of the convert.

instantaneous phase is totally reactive;

the "vital indwelling
This

man receives,
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beholds,

and relishes the divine beauty and perfection of God

with a transsummative

"sense of the heart."

After traversing these stages the concerned seeker
quite naturally wishFs to know whether his "experience"
genuine conversion or merely a work of the devil.
to what

Edwards called

"reason," or sequential,

is a

He reverts

goal-directed

thought as he attempts to evaluate the validity of what
hopes has been a valid conversion.
however,
own,

he

For a variety of reasons,

Edwards believed that no conversion,

not even his

could be evaluated with any degree of confidence,

though

he did describe the saintly life of the converted person with
great clarity.
Since there are no objective tests to determine the
extent of the fit between history and a model,
usefulness of the attempt,
clusions.

or the overall

chapter six contains no firm con

The question is asked,

"what happened to the psy

chological theory of Jonathan Edwards?"

Some preliminary,

impressionistic hypotheses are offered.

Edwards' doctrine of

a unified,

rational-emotive mind was gradually but decisively

o verthrown by a coalition of American and European positions.
The Americans usually either objected to his ruthless det e r 
minism or did not grasp the subtlety of his arguments.
Scottish
hand,

and Kantian

"faculty" psychologies,

provided papular alternatives to Edwards.

reactive position,

however,

it provided James,

Dewey,

The

on the other
His proactive-

was clarified and elaborated,

and the other "Functionalists"

and
with

an American precedent for their "new" psychology.
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In a sense,

then,

this monograph has to be "ugly."

For though absolute beauty may be,
unity in variety,

as Coleridge suggested,

one's initial esthetic response is usually

a function of familiarity.

And there will be hardly a reader

who does not have to struggle a bit with

some unfamiliar

aspects of this little enterprise.

is an unavoidable

That

consequence of interdisciplinary research.
long,
some

in my estimation,

But we have too

sacrificed our ambition to provide

"solid angularity" to history in favor of an unfortunate

devotion to a stylistic,
primarily on inertia,
cases laziness.
Edwards'

skin-deep beauty which

and in some

This is certainly the case in studies of

psychological thought.

years of scholarly debate,
trying to say.

is based

departmental provincialism,

In his

After two hundred thirty

no one is yet sure what he was

"Editor's

greatest psychological work,

Introduction" to Edwards'

the Religious Aff e c t i o n s . John

E. Smith has remarked:
. . . the Affections has been praised in vague d e scrip
tions; it must now be read and analyzed in a way that is
consistent with a work of its stature.
The highest
praise of a book should proceed not from uncritical
acceptance but from a willingness to treat it as i m p o r 
tant enough to be argued about.^
Let the arguments over Edwards'
chology begin here.
his ideas
about."

place in the history of psy

He thrived on controversy and many of

are still controversial and they are being "argued
The purpose of this book,

in a sentence,

is to demon

strate that these ideas were also the ideas of one Jonathan

^New Haven,

1959,

p. 10.
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Edwards.

"Gracious discoveries given in conversion,"

said over and over again,
heart."

Edwards

"are grasped with a sense of the

This doesn't sound very modern.

Edwards'

laboratory

was a raucous frontier hotbed of fundamental religion,
comparable

to the hermatetic,

e x p e rimental psychologists.
larger -laboratory,

hardly

gadgeted cubicles of modern
But Edwards

also operated in a

an abstract one that all great p s y c h o l o 

gists eventually inhabit:

that mystical melding of o b s e r v a 

tion and imagination known as the study of human n a t u r e .
is toward

an interpretation of "gracious discoveries"

It

and a

"sense of the heart" for modern psychological sensibilities
that this study is directed.
hope,

The reader will discover,

I

that the implications of this interpretation require a

significant reconsideration of the standard conception of the
history of American psychology.
But what about the phenomenon
Is he not,

it might be asked,

of Jonathan Edwards?

a very special case,

whose olympian uniqueness makes studies
equally unique?
drop a few hints,

Possibly,

but

I doubt it.

here and there,

entire history of American

which

in the door;
detailed

with profit,

be

But the foot is hardly

this general history cannot

investigations

I have tried to

suggest that the

p sychology can,

viewed through the synthetic model.

a genius

such as this one

be written until

are carried out within a context that

accommodates the data and permits

historical comparisons.

study attempts only to establish

an oasis of coherence around

Edwards,

This

the most important but most misunderstood thinker in
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America before James.

Robert Lowell said it simply but

eloquently in his poem,
chusetts."

Edwards,

"Jonathan Edwards in Western Ma s s a 

he lamented,

. . . stood on stilts in the air.^
We shall now attempt to provide some "solid angularity"

to

what the historian of psychology A. A. Roback has called
"the nebulous colonial days" by trying to determine just what
Edwards was trying to say;
strating,
trivial,

by removing his stilts and de m o n 

that scientific history need not be dry,

or unnecessarily confusing.

good art,
tainly,

I hope,

After all,

and good history are none of these.

good science,

Neither,

cer

was Jonathan Edwards.

^In

For the Union Dead

(New York,

1956),

pp. 40-44.
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CHAPTER

II

TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO PSYCHOLOGICAL
THOUGHT IN PURITAN NEW ENGLAND

We live in an age whose thinking is dominated by
scientific psychology.

Modern children

are said to expe r i 

ence oedipal complexes and stages which may or may not be
subject to various conditioning techniques.
and the nature of man,
partitioned

The will of God

as they were formerly known,

have been

into countless psychological lieutenants which

are discoverable only through
times nervously)

a process confidently

referred to as "science."

(or som e 

There is a strong

feeling prevailing among psychologists and historians of psy
chology that the human mind and human behavior represent a
m icrocosm of the Newtonian
revealed only through

and Baconian induction.
Boring,

universe,

whose laws may be

experimentation,

statistical analysis,

This view holds,

that all psychological

following E. G.

thought which did not lead

directly to Gustav F e c h n e r 1s application of psychophysical
methods to the mind-body problem and Wilhelm Wundt's first
experimental psychology laboratory shall be conceived as a
sort of John the Baptist,
scientific psychology.^

preparing the way for the advent of
As one contemporary historian of

See Edwin G. Boring, A History of Experimental Psy
c h o l o g y . 2nd ed. (New York, 1950).
Chapters 14 and 16 for
Boring's influential assessment of the importance of Fechner
and Wundt.
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psychology has put it,
surrendered

"The working psychology of today has

its philosophical heritage in fact.

It is time

to surrender it in voiced principle a l s o . P h i l o s o p h i c a l
thought beginning with Locke,

or perhaps

physiological investigations,

especially those of Johannes

Mueller,

Hobbes,

and early

are seen in this perspective as two tributaries that

led inevitably into a common stream of thought which

culmi

nated in the founding by Fechner and Wundt of psychology as a
science.^

These events,

physical methods
chology,

the invention of Fechner's p s y c h o 

and W u n d t ’s "founding"

of experimental p s y 

symbolize psychology's birth and are said to obviate

the 2,000 year European tradition of philosophical

psychology

that came before.

The History of Psychology in America
The dominant view of the history of European psy
chology may thus be characterized for the most part as
apocalyptic

and progressionist.

The history of American

psychology is usually viewed in a slightly different way.
is apocalyptic,

without a doubt:

It

American psychology is

usually thought to have been born with the publication of
William James'

York,

Principles of Psychology in 1890.^

2Duane P. Shultz,
1969), p. vii.
^See Boring,
4

It is

A History of Modern Ps.vcholoq.v (New

H i s t o r y , Chapter 2.

William James,
(New York, 1890).

Principles of P s y c h o l o g y , 2 Vols.
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hardly progressionist,

however.

James,

though

an American,

is usually characterized as European in spirit and as the
American popularizer,
(chiefly German)

critic,

and integrator of the European

experimental work prior to 1890.^

quite safe to assume,
temporary American

in fact,

that many,

It is

perhaps most,

con

psychologists would be incapable of iden t i 

fying a single person or publication of psychological i m por
tance in America in the two hundred sixty years of American
thought before James.

Pre- J a m e s i a n , or pre-"scientific"

psychology in America is thought of,

if at all,

as a myth.^

Reasons for the unwillingness of historians of p sy
chology to consider pre-Jamesian American psychological thought
(assuming,

for the moment,

that such a phenomenon

exists)

are

It is slightly odd that James should continue to
occupy so prominent a place in the history of American p sy
chology.
Although he did apparently found America's first
experimental psychological laboratory, almost incidentally as
it were, and he is also responsible for the most comprehensive
survey of the "new psychology" to 1890, he personally cared
little for the fledgling discipline.
He hated tedious labora
tory work, and once characterized the new field as a "nasty
little science."
He held many of the German practitioners of
laboratory psychology in utter disdain, once claiming that
the only virtue of "brass instrument" psychologists like
Fechner and Wundt was their affinity for tedious, boring,
tinkering in labs.
See R. B. Perry, The Thought and Character
of William J a m e s . 2 Vols. (Boston, 1935).
^0f the recent general histories of psychology, only
two give more than the merest mention of American p s y c h o 
logical thought before James and the importation of the "new
psychology" in the 1880s:
Virginia Sexton and Hendryk Misiak,
History of Psychology:
An Overview (New York, 1966), and
Gardner Murphy and Joseph K. Kovach, Historical Introduction
to Modern P s y c h o l o g y . 3rd ed. (New York, 1972), each devotes
approximately two pages to American psychology from 16301880.
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abundant.

First,

eighteenth,

American thinkers of the seventeenth,

and nineteenth centuries were not psychologists.

Most were theologians whose discussions

of psychology were

ancillary to other theological purposes and issues.
psychologists look
whose

"naivete"

inclined them to utter dependence upon their

conception of God.
historians,

Modern

askance at the thinking of a quaint age

American

Except among theologians and church
colonial theology appears to be a curio

worthy of only a certain antiquarian respect.

The p r o b a 

bility that colonial theologians could have inherited,
devised,

issues seems remote to historians of psychology,
attention thus far afforded the colonials.
between them and the present;
language,

altered,

revised and fought over timeless psychological
based on the

A barrier exists

a barrier of assumptions,

and purposes that is formidable.

5econd,

the the o 

logians of America's first two and a half centuries were not
scientific in the sense that psychologists from Fechner to
the present have defined

"scientific."

late explicit psychological theories,
eses,

Most did not f o rmu
generate testable hypoth

isolate salient independent variables in experimental

situations,

or attempt to state general laws of thinking

behavior based on experimentation.^

and

Many of them simply but

carefully observed the conversion experiences of themselves

"^This was reinforced by the development of logical
positivism bequeathed to psychology from late nineteenth and
early twentieth century physics.
5ee Herbert Feigl and May
Brodbeck, e d s . , Readings in the Philosophy of Science (New
York, 1953).
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and their parishioners

and tried to explain what happen in

mind and body during a visitation of the Spirit.
these explanations,

A few of

such as that of Jonathan Edwards,

were

developed into elaborate theories of the mind and human nature,
while others remained only intellectual exercises of curious
ministers.

A third reason for contemporary ignorance of pre-

Jamesian American psychology is that American theological
thought was not an obvious contributor to either the European
philosophical or physiological traditions which are generally
believed to have led directly to Fechner,
The usual interpretation of Wundt,

Wundt and beyond.

who is usually given pri

mary credit for establishing experimental psychology as an
independent

science,

is that of an industrious German physiolo

gist whose life's ambition was to discover the elusive mental
elements of the British Empiricists from Locke to James Mill.
Implicit in this view is the notion that America was a psycho
logical backwater whose stagnation was relieved only after
the Americans,
others,

G. Stanley Hall,

James McKeen Cattell and

escaped to Europe in the 1880s and later imported the

new German psychology.
The dominant progressionist or vertical timeline
approach to the history of psychology successfully condemns
pre-Jamesian American psychology to a status of non
existence,

or at least superfluousness.

Clearly,

and Wundt could have claimed if they had wished,

Fechner
that the

psychophysical methods would have been discovered and experi
mental introspective psychology founded even if America had
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still been populated e x c l u sively by food-gathering tribesmen.^
It is literal science-fiction to claim that German e x p e r i 
mental

psychology would

hardly have been the same without

Cotton Mather or Jonathan Edwards.

In fact,

the narrow p r o 

gressionist view of the history of psychology condemns to
oblivion

all thinking

that cannot be inserted

as a causal

link in the chain of s cientific progress that led through
F echner and Wundt to the present.
Augustine,

Aquinas,

The ancient Greeks,

and numerous others are given

schrift because the extent of their "influence"
and Wundt is too amorphous
view,

short

upon Fechner

to be accurately assessed.^

though chiefly associated with Boring,

dominant one held by contem p o r a r y psychologists toward
history of their discipline.

This

is by far the
the

It is no doubt reassuring to

t wentieth-century psychologists,

whose scientific status

has

An apocryphal story, however, attributes Wundt's
staggering productivity to his discovery of the American
typewriter.
Boring's (H i s t o r y . p. 322) authoritative denial
of this claim destroys America's only apparent opportunity to
d emonstrate that the new German psychology was somehow
indebted to her.
g
Boring's H i s t o r y . in addition to a number of his
other historical papers, demonstrates a 'consuming interest in
influences, i.e., who was so-and-so's student and who were his
students, etc.; cf. Edwin G. Boring and Mollie D. Boring,
"Masters and Pupils among the American Psychologists," Am e r i 
can Journal of P s y c h o l o g y . 1 948, _61_, 527-534.
The subject of "influences" was sufficiently i n t e r e s t 
ing to Boring that discussions of professionalgeneaology often
spilled over into non-psy c h o l o g i c a l subjects.
He lists, for
instance, the twenty-five most illustrious students of G.
5tanley Hall, and points out that "Hall's executive personality
made him a practical psychologist, and thus an educational psy
chologist, and thus a president.
Do pupils take after their
"master?"
Boring asks.
"Well," he replies, "the foregoing
list contained in 1929 four college presidents, four college
deans, and one superintendent of s c h o o l s — a third altogether."
(Boring, H i s t o r y . p. 546).
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often been held suspect

by scientists of older disciplines,

to believe that one's professional roots are deeply and
exclusively embedded in a consciously
Curiously,

p hilosophers of science
chology as an inexorable
discipline.

"scientific" tradition.

only professional psychologists

quest for a separate,

scientific

Asked to name history's greatest p s y c h o l o g i s t , a

person from outside the formal discipline
reply Plato rather than
Wundt.

and a few

are apt to view the history of p sy

Freud;

It might be contended,

Thomas

of psychology might

Aquinas,

for instance,

rather than

that Plato's

analysis of good and evil is at least

as profound as Freud's

while the Thomistic view of the mind,

or soul as he

preferred to call it,
Wundt's.

is more succinct

(Thomas)

and believable than

While an open-minded contemporary psychologist

or

historian of psychology might be inclined to agree that p e r 
haps Plato and Thomas may have surpassed
certain respects,

Freud and Wundt in

he would still be disinclined to revise

his approach to the history of psychology.
though interesting,
him.

Plato and Thomas,

must remain professionally irrelevant to

Neither did laboratory experiments,

even described clinical cases.

handled data,

or

Neither contributed to the

e stablishment of an independent discipline of psychology
which might be defined by a body of subject matter and
methods of inquiry peculiar to itself.
It is obvious that those who claim to compare Plato
with Freud

and Thomas with Wundt

"Psychologically" do not

view the history of psychology as a teleological

progression
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toward contemporary
broader,

"scientific"

syntheses.

This other

more interdisciplinary approach to the history of

psychology is associated with G. 5. Brett,
view which has been

and it is this

adopted in this study of Edwards.

three-volume History of Brett,

a philosopher,

under the assumption that psychology should

10

The

was conceived

not be defined in

terms of the subject matter or methods of twentieth century
psychology,

but rather as a series of questions about human

nature which have grown out of a variety of traditions of
inquiry.
medical,

He loosely divided these traditions into religious,
and philosophical.

This approach might be called the

human nature of conceptual approach to the history of p s y 
chology and man,

not a discipline,

is the principle object of

its inquiry.
Human nature is an immense topic to
undifferentiated
psychology.

Man,

obviously,

free will or he does

not;

rational or irrational,
including Brett,

hoard in an

form under the umbrella of the history of
is or is not many things:

he is good or he is evil;

etc.

he has

he is

Few historians of psychology,

have attempted to clearly delineate the

types of questions which constitute a religious,
philosophical inquiry into the nature of man.

medical,

or

Few attempts,

^ ^ G . 5. Brett, History of P s y c h o l o g y , 3 Vols. (London,
1912-1921).
Brett's monument has been compressed into a v a l u 
able one-volume abridged edition by R. 5. Peters (Cambridge,
Mass., 1965).
An enlightening introduction to and defense of
Brett's human-nature approach to the history of psychology may
be found in Peters' introductory chapter, "Theory, Policy, and
Technology" (Peters, ed., pp. 25-36).
The "Human Nature"
approach is also taken by Robert I. Watson; see The Great Psy
chologist:
Aristotle to Freud (Philadelphia, 1972).
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that is,

have been made by historians of psychology to iden-

dify the dimensions of human nature.
psychology written

11

Thus,

much history of

from a human-nature point of view,

liberal to the point of transparency.

is

It becomes impossible

to differentiate the history of psychology from the history
of all thought,
fusion.

a situation which can lead to extreme c o n 

A progressionist historian like Boring knows that

psychology is whatever seems to flow through a historical,
intellectual hourglass at whose narrow neck stand Fechner and
Wundt.

The added breadth of the conceptual historian is p u r 

chased at a price.
cally,

Neither he nor his reader knows, spe c i f i 

what he is talking about when he speaks of psychology.

Psychology on the Periphery of the New
England Hind;

Perry Miller

The dilemma of the conceptual historian of psychology,
of he who views psychology as a series of questions about
human nature,

is that it is extremely difficult to be h i s 

torically accurate and comprehensible to historically-minded
behavioral scientists.
exhaustive

Ideally,

the historian should have

knowledge of his era of special interest and good

facility with the contemporary psychological jargon and usage

^^The most important exception is Robert I. Watson,
"Psychology:
A Prescriptive 5cience," American P s y c h o l o g i s t ,
1 967, 2_2, 435-443.
Many of the prescriptions which are said
to characterize psychology represent various dimensions of the
rather amorphous "human nature" studied by Brett.
See Chapter
2 for a detailed summary of prescriptive theory and a d e m o n 
stration of its usefulness in the study of Jonathan E d w a r d s ’
psychological theory.
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of his readership.

Unless

some agreed-upon conceptual scheme

exists which can accommodate the historical theory and the
modern viewpoint,

the conceptual historian should be capable

of providing the framework on his own.

5ince at present no

widely-accepted conceptual scheme exists for the
psychology,

historian of

the burden of striking a balance between anti

quarian irrelevance and contextual larceny rests on the
shoulders of the individual historian.
perhaps not surprisingly,

views of American Puritanism,
emerged,
Some,

Puritans

but

the tradition from which Edwards

do not satisfy these rigorous

like Perry Miller,

Unfortunately,

interpreters of the psychological

and diverse requirements.

were intimately familiar with the

and Puritanism but blissfully ignorant of modern psy

chology and terribly sloppy in their usage of psychological
jargon.

12

Others,

such

as A. A. Roback,

have been competent

professional psychologists who apparently never read a word
written by a colonial Puritan.

13

Still another,

J. W. Fay,

seems to have understood little about the Puritans and less
about contemporary psychology.
must be reviewed briefly,

14

This

unfortunate situation

not out of malice toward those

brave scholars who have ventured wholeheartedly but half
informed into American Puritan psychology,

Century

"*^Perry Miller,
(Boston, 1961).
13

chology

James

but because most

The New England Mind;

Abraham Aaron Roback,
(New York, 1964).

The Seventeenth

A History of American Psy

^ J a y Wharton Fay, American Psychology Before William
(New Brunswick, N.J., 1939).
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of the deficiencies of Puritan psychological scholarship
generally are also present in the more extensive work on
Edwards.

This review represents the beginning of a d e mon

stration that a new approach to pre-Jamesian psychology in
America is needed,

and especially with regard to Edwards,

its

most important and provocative theorist.
It has been remarked

that the historian cannot

to get inside the "mind" of the Puritans.
events are caused by atoms,
Egos,

molecules,

and other unseen substances.

on the other hand,
archangels,

15

cells,

gravity,

devils,

saintly intervention,

of other causal c o n s t r u c t s . ^

Ids,

The New England Puritan,

attributed events to God,

animal spirits,

hope

We believe

angels,

and a host

Probably no man ever succeeded

in entering the forbidden ground inside the Puritan mind to
extent that Perry Miller did.
gantly,

to have read,

He claimed often,

and arro

digested and integrated everything of

importance ever written by Puritans on both sides of the
Atlantic.

His books and articles are the starting point for

every aspiring Puritan scholar;
tion,

complexity,

insight,

they are monuments of e r udi

creativity,

and frustration.

density of his convoluted style has much
expository form of Finnegan's W a k e .

1958),

^ H e r b e r t W.
pp. 3-7.

5chneider,

The

in common with the

Thoreau described Miller

The Puritan Mind

(Ann Arbor,

^ S e e Arthur 0. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being
(Cambridge, Mass., 1936), for the definitive summary of the
medieval world view which was inherited by the New England
Puritans.
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perfectly when he issued his dictum that a reader should take
as long to read a book
reading Miller's

as it took the author to write it.

In

New England M i n d , one simply must follow

Thoreau's advice or drown in a sea of beautiful words.
Miller's analysis of Puritan psychology is confined
principally to a chapter on "The Nature of Man" in the New
England Mind:

The Seventeenth C e n t u r y .

generally speaking,
soul,"

"the method of grace"

There were no psychologists

England.

Psychology,

is for Miller "a certain method of the

used to elucidate

version)

17

There were,

however,

inventive

(i.e.,

in Puritan

con

New

scholars who were

willing to employ a scholastic faculty psychology to explain
the dualistic dilemma inherent in the conversion experience.
Miller summarized the

19

Puritan notion of the mechanics of con

version in a manner that is more fanciful,

yet also more con

cise than typical Puritan expressions of the topic:
If original sin is a dislocation of the faculties, then
regeneration must set them right again.
If in nature
the original sequence of sensation, common sense, fancy,
reason, memory, will, and affection is now broken, it
follows that in a converted nature the reflex must be
reconstructed.
When conversion was described in the
v ocabulary of psychology it became in effect a r e align
ment of twisted pulleys and tangled ropes, permitting the
blocks once more to turn freely and the tackle to run

^ Seventeenth

C e n t u r y , pp.

239-279.

1 B Ib i d . . p. 239.
19

See J. Rodney Fulcher, "Puritans and the Passions:
The Faculty Psychology in American Puritanism."
Journal of
the History of the Behavioral S c i e n c e s . 1 973, 9_, 1 23-1 39, for
an account, derived largely from Miller, of the scholastic
origins of seventeenth-century Puritan psychological views.
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smoothly, in accordance with the first plan of the
r i g g i n g .20
God was said to work through
the mechanical organization

"means," i.e.,

of the faculties;

through

and most

importantly the work of regeneration consisted in a re g e n e r a 
tion of the rational faculty.
capable
God,

A regenerated reason would be

of rationally comprehending

of course,

remained

the will of God,

sovereign and need

intentions even to a converted man.
important

because the will,

although

not reveal His

Reason was vitally

the passions,

and all the other

numerous faculties attributed to man were said to follow,
the most part,
Miller would

the dictates of the rational faculty.

hold that the "vocabulary of psychology,"

called the various hypothetical faculties,
cerning

human nature,

for

Thus
as he

and views c o n 

were inextricably intertwined.

A

theorist who emphasized the importance of the faculty of r e a 
son in the conversion experience would necessarily hold that
man is primarily a rational creature.

A divine who claimed

that the reorientation of the will and affections

(or emotions)

was central to conversion might be said to view man as p r i 
marily emotional or irrational.
In holding that psychology is concerned with questions
of human nature,

Miller followed Brett. ^

It is unfortunate

that Miller did not go beyond Brett to provide an explicit
20

Miller,

Seventeenth

C e n t u r y , p. 2B0.

^ M i l l e r probably derived his implicit view of p s y 
chology directly from Brett.
Miller's chapter on "The Nature
of Man" contains more references to Brett than to any other
secondary source.
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conceptual

scheme with which to define and interpret p s y 

chological views of human nature.

With rare exceptions,

Miller was content to quote and catalogue each theorist's
arrangement of or comments upon the faculties.

The mind is

portrayed somewhat like a jigsaw puzzle with hundreds of sets
of directions.
construct,

The

"New England Mind,"

is complex,

in remarkable detail.

like any conglomerate

and Miller described

that complexity

Yet we normally do not need a guide to

inform us that there are many trees in the forest,

all

slightly different from each other.

We would rather be shown

a path that leads through it.

one must ask after read

What,

ing Miller's long chapter on "The Nature of Man," is_ the
Puritan conception of the nature of man?
Instead of providing a synthesis of Puritan p s y 
chology,

Miller preferred to offer speculations concerning

why the Puritan treatises were not very psychological in
nature.
" . . .

This may appear odd since Miller also claimed that
in Puritan writing there are almost enough passing

allusions to each part of the p sychological reflex to furnish
the material for extended c h a p t e r s . Y e t
Miller's forte,

speculation was

and his treatment of Puritan psychology is

riddled with the implication that certain "unconscious"
motives

dictated the alledged scanty volume of Puritan p s y 

chological

inquiry.

"vague sense"

He indicates that the Puritans had a

of the incongruities in their system,

“^ M i l l e r ,

especially

Seventeenth C e n t u r y , p. 245.
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r egarding the manner in which the conversion experience could
be both

"an irresistible seizure and a rational transaction."23

Miller asked,
. . . was it possibly because they sense, however obscurely,
that there were further difficulties within it [their
psychology] which, if exposed too openly, would raise
uncomfortable queries in more important r e g i o n s ? 2 4
Was it,

in other words,

some vague sense of insecurity which

held the Puritans at arm's length from the systematic and
careful investigation which characterized most of their
i ntellectual endeavors?
Miller's flights of fancy into the unconscious m o t i 
vations of the Puritans

are both literarily effective and

i ntellectually frustrating.

His detours far beyond the

available evidence often are stimulating and productive of
further i n v estigation.23

The frustration occurs,

however,

when one attempts to evaluate the validity of some of his
claims.

There are two sources of frustration.

case of Puritan psychology,

23 I b i d .,

p.

287.

24 I b i d .,

p.

267.

First,

in the

the object of inquiry lacks even

25
Cf. my own response to Miller's innuendoes about an
alleged "unconscious" conflict between Increase Mather and
Salomon 5toddard in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth
centuries:
James G. Blight, "Solomon Stoddard's Safety of
Appearing and the Dissolution of the Faculty Psychology."
Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sc i e n c e s . The usual
interpretation of the antipathy between these two patriarchs
involves their differing views over church polity, with Mather
characterized as the old, hard-line Bostonian and Stoddard
the rebellious frontiersman who was willing to let almost a ny
one join his Northampton congregation.
Miller contended that
the conflict went deeper, down to the frightening (to Mather),
irrational conception of man sketched in Stoddard's treatise,
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a simple definition.

How can psychology,

own admission is concerned with

defined as a "certain method of the soul?"
dimensions of human nature,

which by Miller's

"The Nature of Man," be
Neither the

nor the explicit relationship

between human nature and the "method" is revealed.
flights of fancy,
embark.

then,

The

have no firm base from which to

When we are told that the Puritans unconsciously

refrained from indulging in detailed analyses of psychology,
we do not know what it was that they weren't doing.

The

second source of frustration is Miller's fertile imagination.
He was attempted a sort of psychohistory devoid of the t heo
retical framework of psychoanalysis

(or any other structure).

Miller knew the New England mind better perhaps than anyone
will every know it again.

Yet Puritan psychology remains

mostly shrouded in mystery because he lacked a conceptual
scheme which could define psychology in a way that bridges
the gap of centuries.
than to them.

He talked around the issues rather

Some structure certainly would have helped

prevent excursions

into a historical Alice-in-Wonderland

where nobody says what he thinks he said and no one's co n 
scious motives

are the functional o n e s . ^

The 5afety of A p p e a r i n g . In my view, there is much evidence
which supports Miller's interpretation.
^ □ n e of Miller's most brilliant, and controversial
students is Alan Heimert.
In Religion and the American Mind;
From the Great Awakening to the Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.,
1966), Heimer, like Miller, often prefers to record and int e r 
pret what he feels historical figures "meant" rather than what
they said.
This approach strikes some historians as a pe r 
version of historiography, and one critic's evaluation of
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The New England Mind on the Periphery of
Psychology;

Roback and Fay

Prior to the revival of interest in Puritanism early
in this century,
notation,

the very word "Puritan"

even among s c h o l a r s . ^

had an unsavory co n 

Puritans were those nasty,

narrowminded forebears of ours who attached scarlet letters
to the chests of passionate young women,

executed so-called

"witches,"

a lot about whether

dressed in black,

and worried

or not they were going to heaven.
nacle was reached,
worth's

Their intellectual p i n 

it was often thought,

abominable poem,

with Michael Wiggle-

"Day of Doom," which described the

road to hell as paved with the skulls of young children.
Perry Miller and his colleagues rejected this simpleminded,

vindictive approach to the Puritans and attempted to

meet them on their own terms and treat them as complex ind i 
viduals who grappled with some of the most important int e l 
lectual issues of their day.

If Miller's analysis of the

Heimert might easily be applied to Miller, his mentor.
The world he offers us has been constructed by reading
beyond the lines of what men said; and what he finds
beyond the lines is so far beyond, so wrenched from the
context, and so at odds with empirical evidence, that his
world, to this reviewer at least, partakes more of fan
tasy than of history.
From Edmund 5. Morgan in William and Mary Q u a r t e r l y , 1967,
24, p . 459.
^ T h e recent rejection of this view of the Puritan
heritage began with Kenneth B. Murdock's Increase Mather;
Foremost American Puritan (Cambridge, Mass., 1925), continued
through the many works of Samuel Eliot Morison, and culminated
in Miller.
See Edmund S. Morgan, "The Historians of Early New
England," in Ray Allen Billington, ed., The Reinterpretation
of Early American History (New York, 1968), pp. 41-63.
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psychological system of the Puritans is of limited usefulness
to a historian of psychology,

it is because his approach

lacks perspective and structure,
perceived

not because Puritanism is

as a psychological wasteland,

devoid of raw

ma t e r i a l .
No such claim can be made for the two remaining
analysts of New England Puritan psychology whose work will be
reviewed in this section:
these writers,

A. A. Roback and J. W.

Fay.

the Puritan revival never happened;

To

the

colonial New England intellectuals are objects of subtle
scorn and curious amazement rather than serious scholarship.
This is unfortunate because,

unlike Miller,

knowledgeable about modern psychology and,
taken the Puritans seriously,

Roback was very
had he therefore

he might have provided the co n 

ceptual bridge which could have clearly elaborated

Puritan

psychology and presented it in a form comprehensible to con
temporary

historians.

Roback's attitude toward Puritan psychology is best
described

as shallow,

condescending

amusement.

There is no

indication that Roback ever read anything written by a colonial
Puritan.^

He mentions

seventeenth

century which,

digest,
facts,

a few theses done at Harvard in the

are said to contain

along with William Brattles'

logic

"a sprinkling of psychological

as they were then known."

29

Just what these

"facts"

^ R o b a c k selects most of his information about Puritan
psychology from the secondary accounts of 5. E. Morison.
29

Roback,

H i s t o r y . p. 35.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

32

are,

however,

and what makes them "psychological"

remain unknown to the reader.
Puritans

unfortunately

His chief argument against the

seems to be that they were religious,

and that they

therefore must have possessed an inferior system of psy
chology.^

Speaking of the colonial Puritans,

he wrote:

If psychology is handed down to us on a golden catechistic
platter, then what need is there for seeking more infor
mation?
The definitions, vague and hazy, as they were,
made sense to the students of the time, and saved them
the bother of thinking . . .
It is clear that no empirical science could advance
on the basis of postulates and definitions alone.
So
long as psychology remained the succubus of theology, as
was the case throughout the seventeenth century and dur
ing the early decades of the eighteenth century, it could
only rest on the accepted authority of the past.^"1
Roback's conception of the history of psychology is a diluted
compromise between Boring's progressionist

approach and

Brett's position that psychology should be defined as a series
of questions
like Brett,

concerning the nature of man.

Roback was willing,

to consider the thought of many individuals out 

side the mainstream which led through

Fechner and Wundt to

twentieth-century experimental psychology.
defining the
human nature,

Yet instead of

history of psychology as past inquiries into
Roback

B oring-like fashion:

tends to evaluate colonial thinkers in a
in terms of the extent to which their

Roback also uses this implicit argument against
contemporary Neo-Scholastic psychology in America (pp. 424446).
It is remarkable that he apparently saw no similarities
between Puritan psychology and Neo-Sch o l a s t i c i s m . Both, of
course, employ a "faculty" psychology that they extract in
almost unadulterated form, from Thomas Aquinas.
31

Roback,

H i s t o r y , pp. 36-37.
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views approximate some trend or other in experimental ps y 
chology.

Thus,

after haranguing

"pastoral psychologist"

Cotton Mather for "taking stock in the absurdities of w i t c h 
craft,"

Roback offers the backhanded compliment that he

"managed to introduce some observation which could be co n 
sidered psychological and which must have particularly
impressed the l i s t e n e r s .1,32

The nature of the psychological

views of Mather remains a mystery,
in Roback's

confused

scheme,

for by definition almost,

neither Mather nor any of his

contemporaries are permitted to have significant psy c h o 
logical views,

Roback wished to elucidate the neglected ps y 

chological thought of the "nebulous colonial days,"
calls the era,

men concerned with,
Roback,

among other things,

on the other hand,

at any rate,

as he

yet the thinkers of the period were religious
the nature of man.

viewed religion,

as a plague on psychology,

or Christianity

which he implicitly

defined in terms of twentieth-century conceptions which pr e 
vented

him from obtaining even a glimmering of Puritan ps y 

chology.

Somewhere between these two,

to Roback,

stands J. W. Fay.

but certainly closer

His monograph demonstrates a

much more careful reading of the sources than is shown by
Roback,

although it is admittedly sketchy when compared to

Miller's exhaustive treat m e n t . 33
from his seventeenth

3 2 I b i d . . pp.
33

Yet if Miller looked

forward

century vantage point in search of

38-39.

American P s y c h o l o g y .
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modern

"Puritans,"

Fay,

like Roback though to a lesser extent,

looked back in American history in search of colonial "psy
chologists."

Fay states:

. . . the science had not yet taken shape, and ideas
which belong properly to that field [psychology] are
disguised and hidden beneath a theological terminology
that is most misleading.
Intermidable discussions of
"predestination," will be found to involve conceptions
of the will, and the momentus question of "original sin"
is weighted with consideration of heredity and the t r ans
mission of original and acquired c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . ^
There is a problem with this statement.

Theological concerns

are misleading only to the historian who ignores the t h e o 
logical context out of which the psychological ideas arose.
Fay,

like Roback,

p rogressionist
purposes,

attempted unsuccessfully to amalgamate the

approach

however,

in effect,

and the human-nature view.

were quite different.

Their

Fay sought to prove,

that the theological psychology of America's first

two and a half centuries made important contributions to
American psychology after William James.
Fay holds,

were

These early thinkers,

"strong in philosophical insight into some

of the most real and important problems of an empirical science,

both introspective and behavioristic

confused assimilation
viewpoints,

of the progressionist

it will be recalled,

religious psychologists,
In Fay's defense,

. . ."

35

Roback's

and human-nature

came not to praise the

but to bury them.
it must be said that, although he

did little to ameliorate Brett's dilemma concerning the

I b i d ., p.
3 5 I b i d . . p.

6.
169.
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dimensions of human nature and although like Boring he looks
backward for antecedents,

his book is far more valuable than

Roback's.

Fay was not a psychologist,

Unlike Roback,

philosopher.

but a

Like many philosophical students of psychology,

he viewed modern psychology as in many respects coterminous
with its philosophical roots.

In this view modern psychology

is just a new method for studying old problems like "will" or
"the mind-body problem," and it is not the new method

but the

old problems that should occupy the focus of a t t e n t i o n . ^
Thus,

when Fay looked backward into colonial Puritanism, he

saw old friends where Roback

saw only new enemies.

The Centrality of Jonathan Edwards
There are a number of fascinating parallels between
the lives and professional careers of Wilhem Wundt and
Jonathan Edwards.

Both were sons of Protestant ministers,

ane each matured into an austere,
thinker.
Oswald

industrious,

combative

Wundt chose to alienate his most brilliant student,

KUlpe,

rather than bend his own system to accommodate

the "imageless thoughts" discovered at KUlpe'slaboratory,

37

Edwards chose virtual banishment to a frontier outpost in
Stockbridge,

Massachusetts rather than "cheapen" the

"^This general orientation toward psychology and its
history is sometimes referred to as the philosophy of mind.
For a recent outline of this interdisciplinary outlook, see
Stuart Hampshire, ed., The Philosophy of Mind (New York, 1966).
^ S e e Boring, H i s t o r y , pp. 396-41 0, for an analysis of
the differences between Wundt and KUlpe.
Wundt's scathing
denunciation of KUlpe's "School of psychology" is discussed by
Robert I. Watson, Great P s y c h o logists.
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requirements

for membership in his Northampton congregation."^

Though neither was British,
cism,

chiefly that of Locke,

the philosophy of British E mpiri
played a decisive role in the

formulation of their mature theories.

Wundt saw his task as

the integration of empiricist philosophy with the expe r i 
mental methods of German physiology,

while

Edwards tried to

unite Lockean empiricism with the Christian theology of
Augustine

and Calvin.

More important than these coincidental similarities
is the manner in which certain intellectual historians
evaluated their importance.
metaphor for historians'
To Boring,

have

The hourglass is the appropriate

judgement of both Wundt and Edwards.

all psychological

roads lead to,

through,

and away from Wundt.
Wundt is the senior psychologist in the history of psy
chology.
He is the first man who without reservation
is properly called a p s y c h o l o g i s t . ^

J. R. Trumbull's History of N o r t h a m p t o n , 2 v o l s . ,
(Northampton, Mass., 1898), provides a detailed account of
this controversy; see also Dla Elizabeth Winslow, Jonathan
Edwards (New York, 1940), pp. 241-267.
Robert Lowell sees the
c ontroversy this way:
Yet people were spiders
in
at
in
to

your moment of glory,
the Great A w a k ening— "Alas, how many
this very meeting house are more than likely
remember my discourse in hell!"

The meeting house remembered!
You stood on stilts in the air,
but you fell from your parish.
"All rising is by a winding stair."
From "Jonathan Edwards in Western Massachusetts."
39

Boring,

H i s t o r y , p. 316.
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"Descartes,

Leibniz,

and Locke on the philosophical side"

are included in Baring's

narrative only because

"the genetic

account requires the explanation of the new movement in terms
of its a n c e s t r y . L i k e w i s e ,

"almost all the new schools of

psychology have been founded as a protest against some one or
another characteristic of Wundt's psychology."

41

Wundt is

thus seen as a kind of narrow neck of the hourglass,
grating material from diverse strains

of thought

inte

into an

intellectual system which became the standard of agreement
and disagreement for generations.
To most historians of American

theology Edwards,

Wundt,

represents a synthetic culmination of the past who

became

a beacon light of the future.

Most would

like

still agree

with George Bancroft's famous remark that "He that would know
the workings of the New England Mind in the middle of the
last century and the throbbings of its heart,
days and nights to the study of Jonathan
been contended,

for instance,

must give his

Edwards."

that Edwards'

42

It has

synthesis of

Lockean empiricism and Calvinist theology contributed to the
development of a tradition of American fundamentalism,
cendentalism,

York,

and even the American revolution.

^Boring,
1929).
41
42

(Boston,

Boring,

43

trans-

In addition,

preface to first edition of the History

H i s t o r y , o p . c i t ., p.

(New

343.

Quoted in Alexander V. G. Allen,
1889), p. vi.

Jonathan Edwards

43
□n Edwards and the fundamentalist tradition, con
sult William Warren Sweet, Revivalism in America (New York,
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the rise of the

"New England Theology,"

Edwards written by his descendants

same function as Wundt's psychology.
complex

an apologia for

(chiefly),

served much the

Its doctrines were so

and its conclusions so objectionable to some that it

gave intellectuals

something to argue over for generations.

44

The centrality of Edwards is no accident or bit of
historical fiction perpetrated by historians of theology.
Like Wundt,

Edwards understood his mission;

was

His self-appointed task was to restore New England

up to.

Puritanism to its former purity.

45

he knew what he

This would require s t ren

uous disputations against deistic and Arminian types who were
clamoring

that man had a "free will."

It would necessitate

cleansing the churches of those who could not demonstrate
publicly that they had been visited by the Holy Spirit.
most importantly,
together,

it would demand a skillful,

in theory and in practice,

And

delicate weaving

of the traditional

Puritan emphases upon heartfelt piety and the rational
1944) and Bernard A. Wisberger, They Gathered at the River
(Boston, 1958).
Perry Miller fills in the gaps between
Edwards and the transcendental movement in "From Edwards to
Emerson" in Errand into the W i l d e r n e s s , pp. 184-203.
The
connection between Edwards "New Light" theology and preaching
and the American Revolution is explored in Heimert, R e l i g i o n .
44
Joseph Haroutunian, Piety Versus Moralism:
ing of the New England Theology (New York, 1932).

The Pass

45
This is the so-called "tragic" aspect of Edwards.
In general, this view of Edwards acknowledges his powerful
intellectual gifts but regrets the alleged time-worn, dead
issues to which he addressed himself.
Edwards, it is held,
yearned to recreate a medieval Bible commonwealth when he
might have used his extraordinary gifts to foster the American
importation of the European Enlightenment.
Expressions of
this view may be found in Peter Bay, A Loss of Mastery:
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intellect.

As the storm of the Great Awakening was raging

around and in Edwards,
mentalists

he recognized that the warring funda

and rationalists represented traditional polari

ties within Puritanism that needed to be united if the faith
was to survive intact.
faith,

In order to show that the act of

and in fact all human perception,

emotional,

is both rational and

he needed to go beyond the traditional disjunctive

faculty psychology he inherited and the Lockean psychology he
adopted.

Paul Conkin has commented

upon "Edwards'

an unending but orderly c r e a t i v i t y .
universe might
Edwards'

also be applied to Edwards himself;

thinking resembles

belief in

This conception of the
all of

an urgent quest for a Bergsonian

creative synthesis.

The Problem of Describing Edwards 1
Psychological Theory
Unfortunately,

Edwards'

commentators have not been as

creatively synthetic as he was.

A careful analysis of secon

dary interpretations

of the psychological views of Edwards

results in a loosely-organized confusion.
effect,

We are asked,

in

to appreciate Edwards for what he tried to say,

rather than for what he said.

Although it must seem odd

indeed considering the volume of attention given Edwards,

it

Puritan Historians in Colonial America (Berkeley, Calif.,
1966) and Vernon L. Parrington, The Colonial Mind (New York,
1927).

19 68),

46
Paul Conkin,
p. 52.

Puritans and Pragmatists

(New York,
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is still unclear just what he said,
are three principal reasons
psychology.

First,

Edwards'

what he meant,

Lockean terminology,

He was groping for a way to

sometimes expressing

guage of Augustinian piety,

There

style of exposition is certainly

no model of grace and clarity.
say

psychologically.

for the shadowy status of Edwards'

himself in the l a n 

sometimes through borrowed

and other times through a confusing
47

combination

of both modes.

He lacked the linguistic tools

which he needed to express his vision of an extraordinarily
complex yet unified human mind,
cannot shoulder all the blame,

and human nature.
however.

Edwards

Intellectual his

torians simply have not been very interested in his psycho
logical system.

In most cases,

brief discussions of Edwards'

psychology are decidedly ancillary to other analyses of his
"theory of beauty,"
Presumably,

"theology," or "p hilosop hical theology.

these historians

have implicitly adopted Brett's

approach to the history of psychology;

Edwards'

"psychology"

is loosely defined as statements about mental constructs which
reflect a view of human

nature.

Unfortunately,

but not

^ S e e Paul Ramsey's "Editor's Introduction" to
Edwards' Freedom of the Will (New Haven, 1957) for a dis
cussion which clarifies, to some extent, Edwards' confusing
interchanges of terminology.
48
Clarence Faust and Thomas Johnson, eds., Jonathan
Edwards:
Representative Selections (New York, 1962), hold
that Edwards' psychology ("Edwards' view of human nature")
provides the base for his system whose apex is his doctrine
of grace.
Nearly all analyses of Edwards' psychology are
undertaken as footnotes to aspects of his system which lay
between the base and the apex, such as the doctrines of
depravity or virtue (p. xvi).
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surprisingly,
Edwards'

the dimensions of human nature addressed by

psychology have never been elaborated.

A final

source of confusion over the description of Edwards'

psy

chology has been caused by an apparent misunderstanding of
the nature of psychological theorizing.
Too often Edwards is treated as if he
disputant who thrived on hair-splitting
half-truth

at best.

Edwards'

combat.

were merely a
This is a

theory of psychology was revo

lutionary and truly revolutionary theories

do not merely

refute old views po i n t - f o r - p o i n t , they completely redefine a
problem or area of interest. 49

Sometimes,

problem from a different level of analysis,

by approaching the
a theorist is

able to accommodate views which formerly seemed irreconcilable.
Instead of trying to make theoretical
apparent

sense out of Edwards'

and remarkable contentions that man is, for instance,

static and dynamic,

free and determined,

have,

contemporaries,

like Edwards'

etc.,

the commentators

th rown up their hands in

49
This is certainly true in th e natural sciences,
The Copernican and Newtonian revolutio ns, for example, can
hardly be construed as arguments over the empirical inadequacies of Ptolemaic astronomy or Aris totelian physics.
They
were, instead, complete reorganization s of the conception of
the universe.
They were, in a word, c reative.
See Thomas S.
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revo________
lutions.. 2nd ed. (Chicago, 1970) for an elaboration of scientific creativity in
this context.
More generally, Brewster Ghiselin speaks of
c reativity of the "higher, primary sort" as that which
alters the universe of meaning itself, by introducing
into it some new element of meaning or some new order
of significance, or more commonly, both . . . Whatever
its relation to the established universe of thought, the
higher sort of creative action invariably brings into the
mind an unfamiliar light.
"Ultimate Criteria for Two Levels of Creativity," in Frank
Barron and Calvin W. Taylor, eds., Scientific Creativity:
Its
Recognition and Development (New Y o r k , 1 963), p p . 42 - 4 3 ’. That
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frustration.

But in this instance also,

should not be unduly blamed for they,

the historians

like Edwards,

lacked a

coherent theoretical structure into which they could appro
priately place Edwards'

psychology.

It is a major contention

of this essay that such an appropriate,

explicit structure

. , 50
now exists.

The Debate Over Edwards 1
Psychological Theory
Most of the confusion surrounding Edwards'
concerns two broad dimensions of human nature:
functional,

fully-integrated

unity,

psychology

(1)

Is man a

or a well-oiled col l e c 

tion of complementary but disjunctive parts?

(2)

Is man p ri

marily p r o active or reactive as he perceives and conceives
aspects of the universe?
tators

upon Edwards'

dispute in this way;
ferences of opinion

It must be pointed out that commen

psychology have not dichotomized their
indeed there is no evidence that dif
have even been clearly perceived.

This

is to be expected since one must have some clear notion of
"psychology"
Edwards,

in mind,

and a particular view toward that of

before he can determine that his definitional c ri

teria have been violated

or his personal position attacked.

Edwards was endowed with extreme creativeness was clearly
recognized by an early biographer, 5. E. Dwight:
These selections L"Notes on "the Mind"] not only evince
uncommon clearness of perception, and strength of d is
crimination, in the mind of Edwards, at that early age;
but also prove that it had begun to be, in no mean degree,
what it was afterwards, in a singular degree, CREATIVE.
(Life of President E d w a r d s . New York, 1830, p. 39).
^See

Chapter 4.
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Those who thus far have presumed to describe and judge the
psychology of Edwards have lacked both.

Man;

An Integrated

Unity or

Collection of Parts?
It is curious that those historians who are least
acquainted with

Edwards have no trouble whatever in describing

his psychology in a couple of brief remarks,

categorizing him,

and dispensing with him.

According to Roback,

it for granted that there

are only two departments of the

mind:

or as we would call it,

(1) understanding,

(2) volition

"Edwards takes

cognition

and a f f e c t i o n , " ^

Fay agrees with Roback;

"Edwards follows the scho

lastic division or mental operations into cognitive and
appetent."
lastic,"

52

In classifying Edwards'

Roback and Fay deny,

psychology as "scho

in effect,

the unity or integrity of the self.

Thomistic psychology had the human mind
into separate,
entities.
will.^

interacting,

that Edwards

upheld

The Puritan version of
(or soul)

divided

but functionally autonomous

This was especially true of the intellect and the
Even today,

51

Roback,

“^ F a y ,

psychologists

H i s t o r y , pp.

speak

of emotional people

46-47.

American Psy c h o l o g y , p. 43.

53
Norman 5. Fearing, "Will and Intellect in the New
England Mind," William and Mary Q u a r t e r l y , 1 972, 24_, 51 5-558.
This is a valuable article.
It contains the only systematic
attempt to point out the many psychological similarities
between Edwards and Augustine.
Yet Fearing, like the other
commentators, draws a too simplistic picture of Edwards (andAugustine's psychological views), claiming that Edwards and
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or rational people,

but few would claim,

as did the Puritans,

that the sources of these human expressions are physiological
globules called

"reason"

and "will."

with many scholastic Puritans,

They would not hold,

that there are acts which are

purely rational or purely emotive.

54

Roback and Fay place

Edwards squarely in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition.
All people,
via classification.

and especially scholars,
Since Adam,

love to "explain"

men have felt vaguely uncom

fortable in the presence of a phenomenon until they have
named it.

Scholastic and Kantian psychological categories

still exert a tremendous

influence on psychological thought,

and ethologists have renewed the old pastime of categorizing
organisms
torians,

according to their instincts.
however,

A number of his

the vast majority of recent Edwards scholars,

believe that Edwards was one of those rare thinkers who chose
to remain uncomfortably ambiguous rather thanapply artificial,
s cholastic-like distinctions to the human m i n d . ^

Yet in his

Augustine merely emphasized will (and emotions) while others,
from Aquinas to Chauncy, emphasized intellect.
See Chapters
3 and 4 for a treatment of these men and their psychological
theories in a very different context.
54
Cf. Albert Ellis, Reason and Emotion in Psycho
therapy (New York, 1962), Peter Lindsay and Donald Norman,
Human Information Processing (New York, 1972), Chapter 17.
^ T h o s e who would agree that Edwards avoided a scho
lastic-like dichotomization of the mind include Perry Miller,
Jonathan Edwards (New York, 1949) and "Jonathan Edwards on a
Sense of the Heart," Harvard Theological R e v i e w , 1 948, 41 ,
123-145; Douglas J. Elwood, The Philosophical Theology of
Jonathan Edwards (New York, 1960); Roland Delattre, Beauty
and Sensibility in the Thought of Jonathan Edwards (New Haven,
1968); Conrad Cherry, The Theology of Jonathan Edwards (New
York, 1966); Faust and Johnson, S e l e c t i o n s : Alan Heimert,
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attempt to preserve the unity of the mind Edwards faced
insurmountable difficulty.

an

The very language he used to

express himself was the disjunctive terminology of faculty
psychology.
sized

Puritan psychological theology had always e m pha

either the reason or the volition in conversion in

spite of the conviction that the whole man must obviously be
involved.
Shepard

Conrad Cherry mentions,

for instance,

Thomas

as a proponent of the reason and William Ames as an

advocate

of the w i l l . ^

Cherry describes

Edwards'

dilemma

this way:
Edwards was thus handed by his theological forbears a
clear effort to account for personal unity in the act
of faith, but he was also handed a way of accounting for
that unity which continually frustrated the effort.
With
man so divided into distinct faculties, the temptation
was to describe the nature of the faith-act in terms of
their distinct operations rather than in terms of the
unity of the human subject.57
The "way"

referred to by Cherry is,

of the separate faculties.

of course,

the doctrine

It is clear that few could resist

the temptation to break down the mind of man into distinct
parts

and to emphasize the importance of one or another of

these

quasi-mythological entities.

readership

agreed with them was,

Whether or not their

in a sense,

unimportant.

At

least writer and reader understood each other.

R e l i g i o n , and introduction to Heimert and Perry Miller, eds.,
The Great Awakening (New York, 1967); Haroutunian, Piety Ver
sus M o r a l i s m ; Conkin, P u r i t a n s ; and John E. Smith, "Editor's
Introduction" to Edwards' Treatise on the Religious Affections
(New H a v e n , 1 959 ) .
"^Cherry,

T h e o l o g y , pp.

12-13.

5 7 I b i d . . p. 14.
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There have been a few thinkers,
resisted the temptation

however,

been clearly understood.

Augustine and Locke are two of these

brave ambiguous who were important influences
The doctrines

special attention

through the writings of a Dutch theologican,
59

upon Edwards.

of Augustine had always been an important part

of Puritan piety and he came to Edwards'

Mastricht.

who have

to partition man and hence have never

Peter van

Augustine held that the rational and emotive

capacities operate in a unified,

inseparable fashion.

For there are some things which we do not believe unless
we understand them, and there are other things which we
do not understand unless we believe them.
. . . Our understanding therefore contributes to the
comprehension of that which it believes, and faith c on
tributes to the belief of that which it c o m p r e h e n d s . ^
Locke,

whose terminology is to be found throughout Edwards'

works,

also registered

his objection to an artifically-

dichotomized human mind.

In a famous

passage he sarcastically

remarked :

The issue concerning the nature of Edwards' p rinci
ple sources is a large and complex one.
Those who view
Edwards' sources as biblical or church oriented generally view
Edwards as a Medieval man.
Others, particularly Perry Miller,
feel that Edwards' greatest debt is to Locke and Newton.
The
"Medievalist" viewpoint is forcefully advanced by Vincent
Tomas in "The Modernity of Jonathan Edwards," New England
Q u a r t e r l y , 1 952, 2_5, 60-84.
The "modernist" interpretation
is in Miller, Jonathan E d w a r d s .
59
Peter von Mastricht, A Treatise on R e g e n e r a t i o n .
Extracted and translated from the Theoloqia Theoretico-Practica
(New Haven, 1770).
^ A u r e l i u s Augustine, Enarrationes in P s a l m o s , CXVIII,
Sermones XVIII, 3, quoted in Elwood, Philosophical Theoloqv.
p. 113.
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Far, if it be reasonable to suppose and talk of faculties
as distinct beings that can act, (as we do, when we say
the will orders, and the will is free,) it is fit that
we should make a speaking faculty, and a walking faculty,
and a dancing faculty . . . And we may as properly say
that it is the singing faculty sings, and the dancing
faculty dances, and that the will chooses or that the
understanding c o n c e i v e s . ^
Locke,

and later Edwards,

faculties to two,

reduced the ponderous list of

understanding and will,

which Locke viewed

The group of scholars who believe that,
the mind is an integrated

to Edwards,

rational-emotive unity generally

portray E d w a r d s ’ attempt to express this unity as a little
more comprehensible than Augustine
hensible than Locke.

and a little less c ompre

One theologian

has stated that:

He [Edwards] agreed with Locke that we should not attempt
to divide the mind into separate compartments, but simply
recognize the several interacting mental processes.
But
Edwards perceived more than this.
He saw an aesthetic
element in every act of understanding as well as a c o gni
tive element in every act of w i l l . 63
That is,

Edwards went beyond Locke to Augustine in asserting

that mental processes do not only interact but they are
rational and emotional components of a superordinate, unified
mental process.
While Augustine's vision is incisive and vast,
explanations are intuitive rather than explicit.

his

Most

61

2 vols,

John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g ,
ed. by A. C. Fraser (New York, 1959), II, xxi, 17.

63_
Elwood,

Philosophical T h e o l o g y , p. 114.
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scholars give Edwards credit for at least trying to explain
what he meant.
fied process

Edwards called the end product of this

uni

"a sense of the heart."

I say, a sense of heart; for it is not speculation
merely that is concerned in this kind of understanding:
nor can there be a clear distinction made between the two
faculties of understanding and will, as acting dis
tinctly and separately, in this matter.
When the mind is
sensible of the sweet beauty and amiableness of a thing,
that implies a sensibileness of sweetness and delight in
the presence of the idea of it.
And yet there is the nature of instruction in it; as
he that hasperceived the sweet taste of honey, knows much
more about it, than he who has only looked upon and felt
of i t . 64
Ultimately,

however,

Edwards'

concept of "a sense of the

heart" is not more useful than Augustine's complete reliance
on the intuitive powers of his reader.
confined to the faculty language.

Edwards is rigidly

All the

imaginable do not obviate the fact that
synonym for will-affections,

a disjunctive

Metaphors are useful only for providing
standing of explicit

explanations.

"taste" metaphors

"heart" is a simple
structural unit.

an intuitive under

Without those explnations,

understanding will never be more than intuitive and conjectural„
Until now,

no scholar has made a serious

rescue Edwards from his quandary.
course,

Edwards is in no dilemma;

traditional faculty mold.
ficial and,

To Roback

attempt to

and Fay,

of

he fits neatly into the

This view,

however,

is very super

as we shall see in chapter 5, wrong.

Historians

Jonathan Edwards, A Treatise Concerning the
Religious A f f e c t i o n s , ed. by J. E. Smith (New Haven, 1959),
p. 272.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

49

who know Edwards have concluded that his vision of a unified
mind does not at all fit the faculty mold.

What mold,

then,

does the unified view of Edwards fit?
Does Edwards represent a Whorfian situation in which
the language of psychology is devoid of concepts which might
be used to explicate Edwards'

ideas?^^

Dr is the present psy

chological system a function of historians'

failure to notice

that Edwards is part of a select but old tradition in psy
chology,

and that a relatively more precise and suitable

language now exists to describe that tradition of p sychologi
cal thought?
luted,

The latter is more l i k e l y . ^

Even the convo

metaphorical brilliance of Perry Miller fails

to shed

any light on the topic:
In Edwards' "sense of the heart" there is nothing tran
scendental; it is rather a sensuous apprehension of the
total situation.
And what makes an idea in the total
situation important for man, as the idea taken alone can
never be, what makes it in that context something more
than an inert impression on passive clay, is man's appre
hension that for him it augurs good or evil.
It is, in
short, something to be saluted by the emotions as well as
by the i ntellect.67
Miller,

and this is true of the other historians,

that Edwards himself does not say.
explanation

says nothing

What is meant to be

is only paraphrase.

^Benjamin
(Cambridge, Mass.,
^See

Lee Whorf,
1956).

Language,

Thought,

and Reality

chapters 3 and 4.

67
Miller,

"Sense of the Heart," p. 127.
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Man:

Proactive,

Reactive,

In 1 949 Perry Miller,
derived an equation which

or Both?

though hardly a mathematician,

cast Edwards'

scholarship into a

state of immediate confusion and controversy.

Among the many

remarkable contentions in his

"intellectual" biography of

Edwards,

psychologically speaking,

Miller claimed that,

Edwards equals Locke.
The mind of Edwards . . . was trained by the doctrine of
New England, in which it had always been held that man
is passive in the reception of grace and that he is bound
to sin if he tries to earn salvation by his own efforts
or on his own terms.
Was it not precisely here that the
new metaphysics and the old theology, the modern psychology
and the ancient regeneration, came together in an e xhila
rating union?
The whole reach of the vision unfolded
before Edwards as he read Locke's innocent observation that
simple ideas, "when offered to the mind, the understanding
can no more refuse to have, nor alter when they are
imprinted, nor blot them out and make new ones itself,
than a mirror can refuse, alter, or obliterate the images
or ideas which the objects set before it do therein p r o 
duce ."
The empirical passivity became for Edwards, in the
context of eighteenth-century New England, not an invita
tion to lethargy, but a program of act i o n . 68
Miller was a historical missionary who spent much of his
career trying to convince his readers that
colonial religious

thinking is

"modern"

New England

rather than "medieval."

Thus Miller holds that much of the thinking of the seventeenth
century New England theologicans can be traced to European
Rennaissance

Neo-Platonism and that Jonathan Edwards,

greatest Puritan,

derived

p sychological views from Locke,

^Miller,

the

his world view from Newton and his
"the father of modern

E d w a r d s . p. 57.
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psychology.

There is a sense in which Miller is justified

in asserting that Locke is
Locke's central doctrine,

"the father of modern psychology."
his picture of man presented

E s s a y , is that of a passive,

responds to impinging stimulation.

The mind,

like a sheet of "white paper" which

is written upon by

"EXPERIENCE.

The

to Locke,

is

"simple ideas" were said to be products

of the reactive association
some respects a strict

of incoming sensations.

"tabula-rasa"

71

In

associational interpre-

tation of Locke is a caricature of his thought.

72

Yet it was

this view of man that passed from Locke to the British
cists

in the

reactive creature who merely

Empiri

(or a s s o c i a t i o n i s t s ) , to Wund and into the early psy

chological laboratories of Germany and America,
even to B.

and perhaps

F. Skinner.

6 9 Ib i d . . p. 72.
^Locke,

E s s a y , II,

^ I b i d ., II,

i, 2.

xxxiii.

72
Locke's chapter on the association of ideas was not
added to the Essay until 170D, in the fourth edition; thus it
may be treated, as Watson puts it, merely "as an appendix to
the rest of his thinking" (The Great P s y c h o l o g i s t s , p. 187).
And, of course, Locke had a great deal to say about the manner
in which the mind actively constructs complex ideas; cf.
E s s a y . II, xxii, 2, and II, xiii.
Edwards, however, seems to
have extracted from Locke only the latter's passive sensa
tionalism.
We shall see in chapter 5 that Edwards' proactive
position goes much further than Locke's admission that the
mind reflects on data derived through the senses.
Edwards
held that the selective capacity of the "active powers" of
the mind actually determines which information is eventually
processed.
It seems much more plausible to attribute this
Edwardsean principle to the Augustinian tradition rather
than Locke.
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In part,

William James dedicated his opus to d e m o n 

strating the superficiality of the "'a s s o c i a t i o n i s t ' schools"
who
seek common elements in the divers mental facts rather
than a common agent behind them [such as a "faculty"],
and to explain them constructively by the various forms
of arrangement of these elements, as one explains houses
by stones and b r i c k s . 73
Clearly,
"house"

James chose not to conceive of man as an inert
composed of substances which were merely applied by

some external force.
Where did Edwards stand on this crucial issue?

On the

one hand is a group of scholars who follow Miller's assertion
that

"he

[Edwards]

adopted the sensational

psychology with a

consistency that outdoes the modern b e h a v i o r i s t ."
and Johnson,
nor the

for example,

"understanding"

intiating

activity.

imposition of the discrete faculty constructs

clear.

(see previous section),

While the

upon E d w a r d s ’

their intent is

They wish to prove that Edwards followed Locke

asserting
that

Faust

described by Edwards is capable of

any sort of physical or mental

system is erroneous

74

maintain that neither the "will"

that man is a passive lump of clay.

Edwards held,

with

Leibniz

and Locke,

in

They maintain

that the mind is

moved by the strongest motive:
Edwards was obviously anxious to exclude any notion
of independent activity an the part of the will.
As he
saw it, the will was purely p a s s i v e . ^
73

James,

"^Miller,

P r i n c i p l e s , I, p.

1.

"Sense of the Heart," p.

"^Faust and Johnson,

124.

S e l e c t i o n s , p. XLVI.
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Moreover,
. . . in E d w a r d s ’ view the understanding, dependent as
it was upon the s enses— natural and supernatural— , was
purely p a s s i v e . 76
Thus a verbal picture is painted of a man whose actions in
the world and his perception of it are totally a function of
external events.
Much of the case for the Edwards-Locke psychological
equation rests upon Edwards'
nology.

Most importantly,

adoption of some Lockean t e rmi

Edwards sometimes referred

to the

presence of the divine and Supernatural light of the Holy
5pirit as a "new simple

idea."^

To Locke,

a "new simple

idea" represented the culmination of a passive process,
it is assumed that

and

Edwards adopted Locke's essential meaning

along with the terminology.

Thus Edwards is said to

have con

ceived of the conversion experience as a completely passive
reception of the Spirit.
of some conjecture,

Although the topic is still a matter

it seems clear that Edwards viewed the

faith-act as the prototype of all human perceptual acts
rather than as an experience which

required a unique

"super-

I b i d .. p. xlvii.
77r-

■
.
For instance:
I say, if God produces something thus new in a mind,
that is perceiving, thinking, conscious thing; then
doubtless something entirely new is felt, or perceived,
or thought; or which is the same thing, there is some new
sensation or perception of the mind which is entirely of
a new sort, and which could be produced by no exalting,
varying or compounding of that kind of perceptions or
sensations which the mind had before; or there is what
some metaphysicians call a new simple i d e a . [italics
mine ]
Edwards, A f f e c t i o n s . p. 205.
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tion may therefore defend the position that Edwards was,
all essential respects,

in

a Lockean who merely happened to focus

his attention on a particular kind of perceptual act,

the

conversion experience.
No one would deny Edwards'
reactive,passive creature.

emphasis on man as a

In the Calvinist scheme of things

nobody has the wherewithal to save himself.

"God

. . . holds

you over the pit of hell," Edwards preached in the bonerattling sermon for which

he is best known,

"and yet it is

nothing but His hand that holds you from falling into the
fire every moment."
doctrine which

79

It is obvious that a psychological

emphasized man's passivity,

such as Locke's,

would hold tremendous appeal to a Calvinist predestinarian
like Edwards.

Yet,

perhaps surprisingly,

a number of scholars

see in Edwards a somewhat muted emphasis on man's active per
ceptual abilities in addition to the obvious Lockean passivity.
Although they have experienced great difficulty in expressing

Some scholars believe that the conversion experience,
in Edwards' view, involved a perceptual process which is
qualitatively different from that used in mundane perception.
Some hold the apposite view; that Edwards' saw no qualitative
differences between the perceptual apparatus' supernatural
and natural perception.
The former viewpoint is expressed in
Paul Helm "John Locke and Jonathan Edwards:
A Reconsideration,"
Journal of the History of Philos o p h y , 1 969, _B, 51-61; the
latter view may be found in Cherry, T h e o l o g y , pp. 27-33.
The
bulk of the evidence supports the latter view (see chapter 5).
79
"Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God"; sermon
preached at Enfield, Conn., July 8, 1741.
In S. E. Dwight,
ed., The Works of President E d w a r d s , 10 vols. (New York,
1 830); v. 7, pp. 1 63-1 77.
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the precise manner in which
active and reactive,

Edwards conceived man as both

each of these commentators rejects the

view that Edwards 1 psychology can be reduced to that of
Locke.
C ommentary on the thought of Edwards has gone through
a number of phases.

During

his own lifetime his c o ntempo

raries seemed most interested
religion.

Later,

in his emphasis on emotional

from 1770-1850,

over haw to counter Edwards'

many theologians argued

formidable defense of determinism.

Around the turn of the twentieth century,
on the origins of Edwards'

whether or not he had read Berkeley.
time,

in 1 889,

A. \l. G.

respects

still the most

Edwards'

psychological

interest centered

early "idealism,"

especially upon

At approximately the same

Allen offered the first,
successful,
views.^

and in many

attempt to describe

According to Allen,

What we call psychology was to him [Edwards] an
unknown science, and yet no modern psychologist could
have laid more stress upon the importance of observing
the different phases of human experience.
In this study,
his conception of inspiration or revelation enabled him
to move with perfect freedom.
The same spirit which
clarified the vision of apostles or prophets was now
illuminating the minds of the common people with a divine
s upernatural light.
This

statement was made the year before the appearance of

James'

watershed

equated,

P r i n c i p l e s , before "psychology" began to be

by most educated persons,

endeavors of the German,
Allen himself,

Wundt,

like Edwards,

with the experimental

and his American disciples.

could "move with perfect freedom"

^Allen,

Jonathan E d w a r d s .

81 I b i d . .

p.

144.
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in conceiving a system of psychology
of human experience")

theological superstructure
revelation").

("the different phases

existing within and augmenting a large
("his conception of inspiration or

This approach is very similar to Brett's,

especially the manner in which Brett extracts psychological
ideas from what he calls the "Christian,

Ethico-Religious

r
i• t •
„82
T r a d i t i o n ."
Allen was,
Edwards,

of course,

aware of Locke's influence

but he minimized its importance.

upon

The commentary of

Allen was written long before Perry Miller had formally
stated the Edwards-Locke psychological equation.
The intellectual impulse came from the philosophy of
Locke, whose Essay on the Human understanding Edwards read
when he was but fourteen years old.
The impression it
left upon his mind was a deep and abiding one.
But even
in his early adherence to the sensational philosophy he
was still himself, independent, accepting or rejecting in
accordance with an inward dictum which sprang from the
depth of his being.
Locke was after all the occasion
rather than the inspiring cause of his intellectual activ
ity.
Had he read Descartes instead, he might have reached
the same c o n c l u s i o n . ^
This is a remarkable

contention when one considers that the

Lockean tabula rasa and Cartesian

innate ideas are usually

placed at opposite poles. ^
Although Allen's

conception of psychology is vague,

it is clear that he saw in Edwards'

^Brett,

History

^^Allen,

E d w a r d s , p. 5.

(Peters,

psychological system a

ed.),

chapter VII.

®^Cf. Watson, Great Psy c h o l o g i s t s , pp. 135-216 and
Richard Lowry, The Evolution of Psychological Theory (Chicago,
1971), pp. 5-23.
Miller also speaks of the "Lockean victory
over innate ideas" ("Sense of the Heart," p. 125).
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view of man which included far more than the Lockean lump of
clay.

In each of its two phases the conversion experience

was said to consist of both reaction to the divine light and
self-initiated

action on the part of the convert.

calls Edwards'

first phase "the tragic element in the p r o 

cess"

Allen

or "the realization of an awful danger and the i mpor

tance of speedy e s c a p e . " ^

Allen contends that Edwards'

view

of this stage of awakened consciousness

"appeared like a

great struggle with some hostile power,

as of a serpent d i s 

turbed or enraged.
of anything;

A struggle is hardly a passive reception

it connotes activity of the most vigorous

Not only must the devil be actively discouraged,
the Spirit must be actively encouraged.
of awakening,

regeneration is,

The struggling

of course,

but

stage

of his Spirit;

convert's eventual

dependent on God's merciful

in that respect,

God treads only where he is made welcome.
Edwards,

In the second

one must perceive his own impotence and a need

for divine mediation.

infusion

sort.

however,

man is passive.

Yet

As Allen reads

"we get a confused picture in which the consciousness

of sin in the sight of God leads the s u fferer in various ways
to seek

relief. "87
The "confused picture"

demonstrates remarkable

8 8 Allen,

derived from Edwards by Allen

honesty as well as insight.

Allen,

E d w a r d s , pp. 1 44-1 45.

8 6 Ib i d . . p. 145.
B 7 Ibid. . p. 146.
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and many others,

have been bewildered by Edwards'

apparent

attempt to show that man is both proactive and reactive in
the act of faith;
own conversion.

that he is and is not instrumental in his
Edwards did not state his case clearly and

neither have his commentators.
Allen wrote in 1889 and,
relatively easy.

in a sense,

his task was

He did not have to contend with Perry

Miller and the Edwards-Locke equation.

Arguing with Perry

Miller can be very difficult and frustrating indeed.
is an argumentative

There

edge combined with a Madison Avenue

erudition in much of Miller's work that can produce a streak
of caution in even the boldest s c h o l a r . ^
Miller's Edwards-Locke psychological
qualified,

Recently,

however,

equation has begun to be

most importantly by Claude A. S m i t h . I t

is

Smith's stated purpose to "advance the discussion of Edwards'
relation to the thought of Locke a step beyond the treatment
accorded it by Perry Miller" by showing that "Edwards was

In what may be the most balanced evaluation of
Miller yet published, Peter Gay (A Loss of M a s t e r y ) openly
concedes Miller's greatness as a historian while lamenting his
tendency to over-write, and his "overly" fertile mind.
Yet
Miller's brashness, his bullish approach to writing and his
often indiscriminate ejaculation of ideas onto the printed
page, were born of necessity.
He almost singlehandedly
revived Puritan scholarship and, in the process, gave it a
thousand new directions.
®^Claude A. Smith, "Jonathan Edwards and 'the Way of
Harvard Theological R e v i e w , 1 966, 5_9, 1 53-1 73.
See also the following for a reassessment of the rela
tionship between Edwards and Locke in other contexts:
Leon
Howard, e d . f "The Mind" of Jonathan Edwards":
A Reconstructed
Text (Berkeley, Calif., 1 963); Edward H. Davidson, "From Locke
to Edwards," Journal of the History of I d e a s , 1 963, 2A_, 355372; and Jonathan Edwards:
The Narrative of a Puritan Mind
Ideas,'"
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farced to go beyond Locke's analysis,

in order to do full

justice to the richness of his experience.
view,

90

In Smith's

Edwards saw man as considerably more than tabula r a s a ;

the mind had active as well as passive powers.
obvious to Edwards,

according to Smith,

It was

that neither our p e r 

ception of the natural nor the supernatural is a function of
random glances.

There are,

as Edwards put it,

"rules of

harmony and regularity" that may be observed in all perceptual actso

91

Conrad Cherry,

In other words,

perception is selective.

who finds the sources of Edwards'

psychology

in Solomon Stoddard and Augustine as well as Locke,
Edwards'

describes

concept of perception rather cryptically as "active

• n g ."
„ 92
r e c e i•v i
Did Edwards follow Locke all the way or didn't he?
Those who agree with Miller say that
thus conceived of man as a simple,

he did and that Edwards

passive creature,

waiting

patiently to be written upon by the pen of God directly,
indirectly by the constituents of God's universe.

or

For those

who have sought to qualify the Edwards-Locke psychological
equation,

either before or after it was formally written,

task of characterizing

Edwards'

the

psychology is not so easy.

(Boston, 1966); Paul Helm, "Locke and Edwards," in Helm, ed.,
Treatise on Grace and Other Writings (Cambridge, England,
1971 ).
gn

Smith,

"Way of Ideas," p.

154.

91

Jonathan Edwards, "Notes on the Mind" (No. 1), in
Harvey G. Townsend, ed., The Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards
from His Private Notebooks (Eugene, Ore., 1955), p. 26.
^ 2Cherry,

T h e o l o g y , p. 19.
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It is one thing to say that Edwards went beyond Locke,
quite another to explain where,

exactly,

he went.

but •

The problem

is very similar to that faced by those who characterize
Edwards'
case,

view of man as a rational-emotive unity.

attempts to explain Edwards'

In each

view of man have resulted

in redundant paraphrase.

Allen maintains

related to the perceptual

"struggle," Smith talks of "rules"

that govern the process,
"active receiving."

that "needs" are

and Cherry speaks paradoxically of

The complexity of E d w a r d s 1 thought

requires that his view of man be characterized
emotive

as a rational-

unity and as both proactive and reactive.

is speaking in riddles.

But this

What is needed is a believable p s y 

c hological model that will incorporate each pair of seeming
polar opposites into a

coherent

scheme.

one and neither have his commentators,
unravel Edwards,

Edwards didn't have

but one is needed to

the psychological paradox.

The Problem of Interpreting
Edwards'

Psychology

The problem of describing Edwards'
views is indeed

psychological

a difficult one for those commentators who

have failed to carefully construct an appropriate historical
scheme of psychology into which Edwards can be inserted.

The

consensus is that Edwards was not a faculty psychologist who
postulated mythical constructs in an effort to explain human
behavior.

Likewise,

there is a rising tide of scholarly

opinion which holds that Edwards somehow transcended the
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t raditional proactive-reactive dichotomy and viewed human
perception as some sort of active-receiving.
Edwards'

psychology has,

therefore,

admiration of his uniqueness.

Much comment on

resulted in a sterile

We know that he disagreed

with the psychological views of his contemporaries to such
an extent that he experienced great difficulty in expressing
himself intelligibly.
and most

The essence of Edwards'

psychology,

have agreed intuitively that the essence is very

profound,

must remain

a mystery until an implicit adoption of

Brett's human nature approach to the history of psychology is
transformed

into explicit principles,

and until a model of

human behavior is provided which can incorporate the p a r a 
doxical Edwardsean concepts into a coherent unity.
□ne may wonder,

in light of all the confusion

ignorance concerning Edwards'

psychological system,

one would try to interpret his psychology.
words,

would

Why,

and

why a n y 

in other

a scholar be inclined to try to place Edwards in

the overall perspective of the history of psychology and to
compare his views with modern,

non-theological psychologists.

The answer lay somewhere in the confidence,

or foolhardiness,

of otherwise competent scholars who are blissfully ignorant
of the precise nature of Edwards'
century psychology.

views and of twentieth-

They have been free to rely upon their

creative imagination to produce farfetched analogies with
little fear of criticism from their colleagues who,
selves,

like th e m 

know little of the ground from which the analogies

have been fetched.
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Consider Perry Miller.

His position as the pr e 

eminent Puritan scholar is universally acknowledged
although
sided,

his writing was often brash,

and,

argumentative,

and one

he usually based his arguments on extensive data.

his interpretation of Edwards'
extends
reader's

psychology,

his claims far beyond what the data,
imagination,

will allow.

"intellectual" biography of Edwards,

ness is everywhere;

In

Miller

or even the

In his controversial
Miller's affection for

mysteries takes on an almost pathological

meant.

however,

intensity.

Strange

Edwards never meant what it seems he

Hidden meanings abound.

So his second publication ["A Divine and Super
natural Light . . ."] like his first-and his last-contains
an exasperating intimation of something hidden.
There is
a gift held back, some esoteric divination that the
listener must make for himself.
Edwards' writing is an
immense cryptogram, the passionate oratory of the revival
no less than the hard reasoninq of the treatise on the
w i l l . 93
Although
sound.

the language is excessively dramatic,

the message is

This essay represents an attempt to translate the

psychological aspects of the Edwardsean
this confession of ignorance,

however,

"cryptogram."

Despite

Miller later can claim

. . . though he defeated himself by employing the very
term ["faculty"] he repudiated, his thought was tending,
as fast as any in the eighteenth century could, toward
conceiving reason itself, or even logic, as an image of
temperament; it would have taken him about an hour's
reading in William James, and two hours in Freud, to
catch up c o m p l e t e l y .94
93

Cherry,

T h e o l o g y , p. 19.

9 4 Ibi d . . p.

183.
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Miller was fond of comparing Edwards with Kierkegaard,
and it appears that,

following the dictum of the Dane,

himself has taken a "leap of faith."
claim depends on Miller's

(and the reader's)

for the nature of psychology and its history,
chological views,
chology?

Miller

The evaluation of this
intuitive feel
Edwards'

and those of James and Freud.

What

ps y 
is psy

What did James or Freud say that can be directly

compared

and contrasted with Edwards'

(admittedly crypto-

grammatic and therefore not fully comprehensible)

ps y c h o 

logical theory?

of course,

These

questions have no answers,

until the views of each theorist are translated into a common
language of the relevant dimensions

of human

until the understanding of Edwards'

views comes to depend less

nature,

and

on faith than on an explicit model.
Miller would have Edwards become a precursor of
Jamesian or Freudian psychology but,

characteristically,

he

left the detailed investigation of the truth of this assertion
to "future research."

It is almost certain that some budding

scholar will in the future,

or perhaps

study the Jamesian or Freudian aspects
Miller's esoteric vices are often,

has already begun,
of Edwards'

to

thought.

at the same time,

heuristic

virtues.
The other significant

attempt to interpret Edwards'

psychological theory within the context of the history of
psychology lies poles apart from Miller's ambiguity.
Joseph

Haroutunian,

a behaviorist,

To

Edwards was no Jamesian or Freudian,

and unlike Miller,

but

Haroutunian offers a
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detailed

explanation of his interpretation.

A modern rendition of this analysis of Edwards is the
study of human behavior in terms of "stimulus" and
"response."
A stimulus is Edwards' "motive," and response
is volitional behavior.
Such a study is based upon the
principle that where there is no stimulus, there is no
response; where there is no action, there is no reac
tion; where there is no cause, there is no effect.
The
nature of a given stimulus is irrelevant to the fact that
it acts as a stimulus.
An "5-R bond" may be physical or
it may be moral, and in both cases it is a "certain c o n 
nection" between a "motive" and an act of volition.
Edwards' metaphysical principle of necessity is the
modern methodological principle that all action is r eac
tion.
The excellence of Edwards' thought consists in
that he withstood a careless attribution of mental f unc
tions to underlying quasi-physical structures or entities
(which is also the virtue in behaviorism), and did not
commit the fallacy of reducing one function into another,
the mental and moral into the physical (which is the vice
of modern behaviorism as understood by the "vulgar").
The will is neither a "faculty," nor an uproar in the
cells of a muscle or a gland.
Volition is not caused hy^^
the will, because there is no will to cause such an act.
This is an extremely complex statement and it requires
careful examination.
behaviorist.

Why?

First it is asserted that Edwards is a
Because of his ruthless hard determinism:

"where there is no cause,

there is no effect."

Haroutunian equates behaviorism and determinism.
1932 when Haroutunian wrote,

causes.

Perhaps,

in

behaviorism was so dominant in

America that he could not see,
surely no behaviorist,

Clearly,

for instance,

was also holding

that Freud,

that all effects

have

The chief difference between behaviorists and most

other more cognitively-oriented psychologists is not relative
adherence to hard determinism.

The widest

gulf separating

behaviorists and other scientific psychologists concerns

^ Piety Versus M o r a l i s m , pp.

225-226.
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reductionism.

Behaviorists

have always been hesitant to

speculate upon or postulate the existence of definable mental
Qg
operations.
Observable behavior, they claim, is the object
of their analysis.
functionalists,

Many psychologists,

and Gestaltists,

response psychology;

i.e.,

including Freudians,

have objected to this stimulus-

that the mind is not a fit topic

for respectable scientific research.

E. C. Tolman expressed

the principle objection to 5-R behaviorism very cogently back
in the thirties.
caused,

97

Of course,

he readily admitted;

all behavioral events are

every response has a stimulus.

But this simple 5-R level of analysis,
too simple.
stimulus

and response.

standing for "organism."

Tolman,

is a function not only of some

tions,

is

The behavioral sequence is thus S-O-R,

the "0"

complex,

though convenient,

The organism effectively intervenes between

The observable response,

to

specifiable stimulus

but also of an i n d i v i d u a l ’s assumptions,

e xpecta

and purposes concerning the s t i m u l i . T o l m a n ,

and

^ A t least since John B. Watson's behaviorist m a n i 
festo, "Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It," Psyc h o 
logical R e v i e w , 1 91 3, 20, 1 58-1 77.
97
(New York,

E. C. Tolman,
1 932) .

Purposive Behavior in Animals and Men

98

A typical demonstration used by cognitive p s ycholo
gists to refute the behaviorist "theory" of mind is as
follows:
1.
12
13
14
15
2.
A
13
C
L
Normally, item No. 2 in line 1 is perceived as a
"thirteen," while item No. 2 in line 2 is perceived as the
letter "B."
Why are identical stimuli perceived differently?
Because, it is argued, a person reading line 1 does not have
the same expectations and assumptions as the person reading
line 2.
Behaviorists do not usually speak of expectations
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other cognitive

psychologists,

believe that responses are

constructed within the organism based

upon the information

present in the stimuli and upon what the organism is looking
fo r .
Cognitive psychologists,

then,

may be characterized

by their willingness to speculate about mental functioning
while behaviorists tend to view the organism as empty-headed.
Certainly,

in this context,

Edwards is no behaviorist,

spite of his uncompromising determinism.

Indeed,

in

much of

the secondary commentary on Edwards consists in trying to
restate his voluminous,

yet vague

and unsuccessful,

attempts

to explicate the mental functioning which occurs during the
conversion experience.
for Edwards'
wrong one.

In groping for a contemporary label

psychological views,

that would permit classifying
behaviorist.
endeavor,

Haroutunian picked the

Edwards simply lacked the reductionistic mentality

After all,

him as an eighteenth-century

Edwards'

first serious philosophical

undertaken while a young teenager,

Notes on the M i n d . ^

was entitled

The idealistic metaphysics

contained in

this early work would provide nothing but profound emba r r a s s 
ment to an aspiring behaviorist.
H a r o u t u n i a n 's naive conception of modern behaviorism
leads him directly to contradict himself in a curious manner.
Edwards,

he states,

"did not commit the fallacy of reducing

and assumptions because, of course,
and cannot be observed directly.
99

In Townsend,

they are not "behaviors"

P h i l o s o p h y . pp.

21-73.
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. . . the mental and moral into the physical."
Edwards is not a reductionist.
an excellent church historian,

Therefore,

It is obvious to Haroutunian,
that Edwards'

tracts and

pamphlets are packed with discussions of mental and moral
"faculties,"
term.

regardless of what he might have meant by the

Edwards,

iorist at all.
primarily,

the S-R behaviorist,
He does

therefore,

not concentrate

is no behav

strictly,

or even

upon "the physical," or what modern behaviorists

call "observables."

Haroutunian,

in effect,

offers a sound

interpretation of Edwards as a cognitive psychologist,
maintaining

while

all along that he is a behaviorist.

*
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CHAPTER

ON SCIENTIFIC

III

HISTORY AND EDWARDS*

PLACE

IN THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY

Imagine the following

situation

galleon in the sixteenth century:
is to search

aboard a Spanish

The purpose of the voyage

for villages along the Central American coast

which might have gold in their possession.
sighted,
mates,

and the captain,

along with

Land has been

his first and second

begins to investigate the land through

scope .

his

tele

This is the first mission for the second mate,

he has inadvert ntly inverted his spyglass.

and

He reports that

he sees what appears to be a city made up of a few buildings
--he cannot determine how many.
"city," if it is a city,
where

he comes from.

He can only guess that the

does not look much like Barcelona,

The captain,

meanwhile,

ing the land through his own telescope,
c orrectly in aristocratic fashion.
reports

is also

ships.

obse r v 

he is holding

He is overwhelmed.

seeing a massive civilization,

of many races and great sailing

which

huge buildings,
The captain

He
people

goes to

his cabin where he lies down and listens to the palpitations
of his racing heart.

The first mate realizes that his captain

is in a state of shock.

He thus races to the bridge with

telescope held correctly but nervously in hand.
find words to describe what he sees,

He cannot

but he notices

another,
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less impressive city beyond the one that forced his captain
to retire.

Although he is incapable of describing either

settlement,

he does record a few comparisons between them:

□ne is taller,

the other brighter,

etc.

Each of the three

observers returns home to Spain confident that his p seudo
description of the unexplored territory is the correct one.
After listening to the three views of the city, the confused
king decides to make the next voyage himself.
Like the mythical city,

Edwards'

psychological theory

has been the object of three types of fallacious

inquiry.

Roback and Fay have inverted their historical telescope.
They assume,

a p r i o r i , that the dimensions

and concerns of

twentieth-century psychology are ultimate criteria for the
description and evaluation of psychological views.
only skim the surface of Edwards,

making

Thus they

a few evaluative

statements based on how closely he seems to approximate a
poorly-defined concept of modern psychology.
to Edwards'
narrow,

This approach

psychology has resulted in an analysis which is

shallow,

and totally unacceptable.

It is an example

of the presentist

fallacy in which the past is studied for the
■j
sake of the present.
Edwards is not a twentieth-century psy
chologist.

That,

in essence,

is the message of Fay and Roback.

^The connotations given to "presentism" [and "historicism"] are derived from George W. 5tocking, who attached
these labels to two broad historiographic positions outlined
by Herbert Butterfield in his Whig Interpretation of History
(London, 1931); See Stocking, "On the Limits of 'Presentism'
and 'H i s t o r i c i s m ' in the Historiography of the Behavioral
Sciences," Journal of the History of the Behavioral S c i e n c e s .
1 965, 1_, 211-217.
Many different labels have been attached
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A very different
cialists,

approach is taken by Edwards spe

especially Perry Miller.

They assume that everyone

knows intuitively what psychology is and thus it is perfectly
all right to overwhelm the reader with claims about Edwards'
"psychology."

Their historical telescope works too well.

The result is voluminous
chology,

speculation about Edwards'

psy

and a deluge of detail offered in support of those

speculations,

neither of which can be evaluated in the absence

of an explicit psychological criterion.
torians assume,

albeit implicitly,

Although these his

for the most part,

a s ensi

ble Brett-Human-Nature approach to the history of psychology,
no attempt is made to point out Edwards'

view concerning

relevant dimensions of man's complex nature.
is thought to be adequate.

Textual exegesis

This is an unfortunate attitude,

and it is an example of the historicist fallacy,
the past for the sake of the past.
instance,

that

2

or studying

Alan Heimert claims,

for

"The central conflict of the Great Awakening

was thus not theological but one of opposing theories of the
human psychology."

3

Yet until the nature of psychology,

thus of a psychological
century readers,

controversy,

and

is clarified for twentieth

such statements are meaningless.

The commission of the presentist and historicist
fallacies implies that the historian's telescope into the past
to these two modes of historical inquiry, but
Stocking's terminology throughout.
^Stocking,

"'presentism'

I will use

and 'Historicism.'"

^Alan Heimert and Perry Miller,
Awakening (New York, 1967), p. xxxix.

eds.,

The Great
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is out of focus.

The presentists are nearsighted;

their

narrow attempts to assimilate the past to some amorphous con
temporary rubrics effectively blinds them to much of what the
past has to offer.

The historicists

are farsighted;

they are deeply immersed in many aspects of the past,

although
they

lack the ability to interpret their findings to a contemporary
audience.

In general,

presentists'

comments upon the psy

chology of Edwards demonstrate a substantial,
awareness of psychology,
Edwards.

Historicists'

on the other hand,

though implicit,

but an inadequate knowledge of
evaluations of Edwards'

show familiarity with

psychology,

Edwards and ignorance

of psychology.
The historicists face yet another difficulty which is
not a problem for the presentists.

Edwards was content to

formulate his psychological theory in the language of Calvinism
and scholastic faculty psychology.^

Presentists tend to per

ceive only the formal linguistic aspects of Edwards,
his discussion of "faculties,"

such as

and thus they see few essential

differences between the psychological views of Edwards and
those of his contemporaries.

Historicists,

however,

deny

that Edwards was a faculty psychologist and they have noted
what appear to be two extraordinary complications
theory:

in his

Man is always and at once a rational-emotional unity,

^Perry Miller has remarked that Edwards "was entirely
satisfied to express himself, so far as content goes, in the
received tenets of Calvinism"
"He was an artist working in
a tradition, and for him the tradition was sufficient,"
Miller, Jonathan E d w a r d s , pp. 47-48.
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and he is both proactive and reactive.
problem is this:

thing other than contradictions
that makes sense.

The h i s t o r i c i s t 's

how to present these complications as some
in a comprehensive

mountable because the historicists lack

a psychological

which can accomodate the Edwardsean polarities.
attacking the problem,

They assume,

model

Instead of

the historicists have merely c i r c u m 

scribed it by committing what
fallacy.

scheme

This difficulty has proven to be in s u r 

I shall call the neqativist

in effect,

that because we know what

Edwards did not say— that his psychology was not that of his
c o n t e m poraries— we therefore

know and understand what he

actually said and what the implications of those statements
are.^

Edwards himself,

working within the self-imposed

restrictions presented by the faculty-psychology terminology,
could often do no better than explain what he did not m e a n /
The negativist fallacy,
of paraphrasing Edwards'
respect,

therefore,

has usually taken the form

original negativisms."^

In this

the plight of the historicists is similar to that of

the first mate in the fable who,

recognizing that he is capa-

5 Cf. Miller, Jonathan E d w a r d s , pp. 165-195; Edwin
5cott Gaustad, The Great Awakening in New England (New York,
1957), pp. 80-101; Heimer and Miller, Great A w a k e n i n g , pp.
xxxv-xliii.
^Cf. Edwards, A f f e c t i o n s , p. 272, in which Edwards
attempts to explain that his notion of a "faculty" is not the
usual disjunctive one.
Locke also found himself repeatedly
defending and qualifying his use of the term faculty; see
E s s a y . II, XXI, 6.
^See Chapter 2, PP«

25-27.
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ble of describing what he sees,

proceeds to record a small

sample of the infinite number of differences between the
object of his attention and a neighboring edifice.
historicists are to be believed,

Edwards'

tem was in many respects startingly unique,
fore a great psychological
ever,

thinker.^

negative,

but hardly great.

aspects of Edwards'

sys 

and he is t h ere

It is a mistake,

to equate uniqueness with greatness.

are unique,

If the

psychological

how

Two-headed

The positive,

sheep

as well as the

psychology must be clearly

understood before a legitimate assessment can be made.

A Revised Concept of Scientific

History

Each of the three fallacies which have been committed
while trying to describe and analyze Edwards'

psychological

views have in common an over-reliance upon the intuitive
powers of the reader.

Presentists,

like Roback and Fay,

unfairly request that the reader somehow

decipher their notion

of contemporary psychology and assume that their sweeping
often unsupported genralizations
assume,

implicitly,

that psychology is

a universal discipline,
Finally,

are correct.

and

Historicists

(and always was)

such

that it needs no definition whatsoever.

the historicist-negativists assume that the reader

is capable of arranging their numerous Edwardsean negativisms
such that a coherent positive statement will emerge.
case ignorance,

lack of interest,

or both,

In each

have led historians

to demand that the intuitive skills of their audience compen-

^Cf.

Miller,

Jonathan Edwards and "Sense of the

H e a r t ."
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sate for their own inability to be explicit.
the introduction of a somewhat arbitrary,

At this point,

but explicit

comprehensive definition of psychology is needed.
can only be lamented;
rejected,

and amended.

countered with
presentist

and

Vagaries

definitions and models can be accepted,
The negativist fallacy will be

a concrete model in chapter 4.

The intuitive

and historicist fallacies will be answered with

Prescriptive Theory which may be interpreted in part as an
attempt to isolate the dimensions of Brett's

"Human Nature"

which have relevance throughout the history of psychology.
The prescriptive definition of the history of psychology,

and

the model presented in chapter 3, provide the two concrete
aspects of a modified concept of scientific history which will
be used as an antidote to the intuitive and often confused
investigations

into the psychology of Edwards.

To issue an endorsement of scientific history,
in modified form,

even

is to dive headlong into an intensely

argued controversy that has raged more or less continuously
for the past century.

The central question of the debate con

cerns whether or not history is,
entific."
teenth

should be, or can be "sci

The issue was first vigorously debated in the nine

century when enthusiasm for science and its methodology

reached an almost millennial intensity.

Buckle,

for instance,

claimed that history should be the search for universal laws,
while Bury requested that historians maintain a detached,
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"objective" posture toward their subject matter.

9

The

positivist faith in the benevolent omnipotence of scientific
goals and methodology appeared to be conquering even history.
Although the positivist conception of science has
proven to be largely a golden calf,

loud entreaties to make

history a science may still be heard.
nineteenth

1□

and early twentieth centuries,

carrying the day,
history could,

Yet even in the
when science was

numerous historians rejected the view that

or even should be,

that historical knowledge,

a science.

Dilthey argued

or "understanding," is f unda

mentally different from scientific laws.
So the process of understanding, as here set out, is to
be understood as a kind of induction.
And this induction
belongs not to the class in which a general law is
extracted from an incomplete series of cases, but rather

9

Henry T. Buckle, History of Civilization in England
3 vols. (London, 1899).
A short excerpt from Buckle's History
appears in Patrick Gardiner, ed., Theories of History (Glencoe,
111., 1959), pp. 105-124; J. B. Bury, "The Science of History."
In Selected Essays (Cambridge, Eng., 1930), pp. 3-22.
10

The contemporary thrust toward making history "sci
entific" has taken two principal directions.
First there are
those who urge that historians adopt the assumptions and goals
of a "scientific" psychological theory, psychoanalysis.
This
endeavor is now called psychohistory, and among its leading
practioners are Erik Erikson and Robert J. Lifton; See Erikson, Young Flan Luther (New York, 1 958), G h a n d i 1s Truth (New
York, 1969), and Lifton's Home from the War (New York, 1973)
and Death in Life (New York, 1967).
The other side of the
scientific history front is manned by those who would have
historians imitate the quantitative aspect of science; see
Lee Benson, The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy:
New York
as a. Test Case (Princeton. N.J., 1961) and Charles Tilly,
The Vendee (Cambridge, Mass., 1964).
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in which a structure, an ordered system, is built,
gathers the separate instances into a unity.11
Likewise,

Trevelyan,

which

countering Bury's pleas for objectivity,

maintained that historians must always subjectively interpret
their data.

The simple process of accumulating dusty bits of

data will never,

claimed Trevelyan,

comprehensible history.
the synthesis.

synthesize itself into

The individual historian must supply

12

The focal point
science itself.

of the scientific history issue is

Debaters

on all sides of the controversy

have held a view of science which may be summarized as follows:
(1)

The scientific method

is objective;

and

(2) the goal of

science is the discovery of laws which yield predictable
behavior.

Recently,

for instance,

history to second-class
explanations
the deductive
hand,

Hempel and Popper relegated

scientific status because historical

do not satisfy the predictive
"covering law" model.

admits history's scientific

13

requirements of

Berlin,

"inadequacy,"

on the other
but views it

1 1

Wilhelm Dilthey, "The Understanding of Other Persons
and Their Life— Expressions," in Gardiner, Theories of His
t o r y . p. 224.
^ G . M. Trevelyan, "Clio, a Muse" in Clio, a Muse and
Other Essays, Literary and Pedestrian (London, 1913).
For an
excellent review of the Bury-Trevelyan debate consult W. H.
Walsh, "The Limits of Scientific History," in James Hogan, ed.,
Historical Studies III (London, 1961), pp. 45-57.
13
See C. G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, "The Logic of
Explanation," in Feigl and Brodbeck eds., Philosophy of S ci
ence (New York, 1953), pp. 319-352 , and Karl R. Popper, The
Logic of Scientific Discovery (London, 1959).
A good summary
of the objectivist, deductive model of scientific inquiry may
be found in Alan Donagan, "Historical Explanation:
The PopperHempel Theory Reconsidered," History and T h e o r y , 1964, A, 3-26.
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as a declaration of independence rather than as cause for
lamentations over second class intellectual citizenship.
Paraphrasing Dilthey,
[history]

he holds that "the objective of all this

is to understand the relation of parts to w h o l e s . " ^

History is humanistic,

an impressionistic weaving together

rather than a search for laws.
process is highly subjective,

And,

of course,

the weaving

a selection of materials and

interpretations based upon who knows how many personal and
cultural factors.
Almost no one claims that history is scientific,
either in its method or its goals.

15

It is significant,

how

ever that those historians and philosophers who hold widely
differing views concerning whether or not history can or
should

be scientific have not disagreed

science.
tivists,

Still,

about the nature of

under the gloomy spell of the logical p osi

they see in science no more

objective search for laws.

(and no less)

This represents,

than the

at best,

extremely limited view of the practice of science,

an

a view

which has recently begun to be amended by a number of i nflu
ential p h i l o s o p h e r-scientists.

Concerning

scientific

"objectivity," Bronowski has written:
14
Isaiah Berlin, "History and Theory:
Scientific History," History and T h e o r y , 1961,

The Concept of
1_, 1-31,

15.
Windelband was a notable exception.
Writing in
the late nineteenth century, he believed that history had
already become a natural science, and he advocated the "reces
sion" of history from the sciences; see W. Windelband,
Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft (Strassburg, 1894).
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What a scientist does is compounded of two interests:
the interest of his time and his own interest.
In this
his behavior is no different from any other man's.
The
need of the age gives its shape to scientific progress
as a whole.
But it is not the need of the age which
gives the individual scientist his sense of pleasure and
of adventure, and that excitement which keeps him working
late into the night when all the useful typists have gone
home at five o'clock.
He is personally involved in his
work, as the poet is in his, and as the artist is in the
p a i n t i n g .1 6
Likewise,

the discovery of scientific laws may not be much

different from the historical tapestry woven by the historian.
The order found in nature and displayed through laws
. . . does not display itself of itself; if it can
be said to be there at all, it is not there for the mere
looking.
There is no way of pointing a finger or a
camera at it; order must be discovered, and, in a deep
sense, it must be created.17
Even the classical physicists and astronomers,

whose models

and laws were long thought to represent the essence of sci
entific objectivity and predictability,
in the usual sense of the term.
Copernicus,

Kepler,

were hardly objective

As Kuhn has demonstrated,

and Galileo all had a pronounced mystical

side which led them to formulate theories which were more
symmetrical or beautiful than the accepted ones.18
heliocentric universe of Copernicus,
dict the movements
geocentric system.

(New York,

for example,

The
did not pre

of heavenly bodies any better than Ptolemy's
It did,

Jacob Bronowski,
1965), p. 8.

however,

satisfy the mathematician's

Science and Human V a l u e s , rev.

ed.

1 7 I b i d . . p . 14.
Thomas S. Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution:
Plane
tary Astronomy in the Development of Western Thought (Cam
bridge, Mass., 1957); see also Kuhn's Scientific Revolutions.
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need for neatness,

simplicity,

Copernicus endorsed it.

19

and "beauty";

If history's

had to take the positivists'

and that is why

greatest scientists

test of detachad objectivity and

evaluation by predictability,

it is clear that most would

fail.

Polanyi has given specificity

More than anyone else,

and legitimacy to the revised,
science.

He has formulated

personalist,

conception of

a general system of e p i s t e m o l o g y ,

Personal Know l e d g e , which subsumes scientific and historical
knowledge,

and which is consistent with what is now known

about the history of science and scientific discovery.

20

Polanyi's greatest debt is to Dilthey and the later Gestalt
psychologists

although his theory of Personal Knowledge cannot

be reduced to theirs.

Polanyi holds that man's chief di s 

tinction is his yearning to und e r s t a n d . which is the process
by which man merges a set of particulars into an awareness of
their joint significance.

We seek clarity,

altogether satisfying solution.
is always the most satisfying.
trol over what satisfies
animal,

and it is this

us,

precision,

and an

That which is held to be true
Yet we have little or no con

any more than does the lowest

"tacit dimension" of knowledge which

we humans share with t h e m . ^
19

Kuhn,

Copernican R e v o l u t i o n , pp.

171-180.

2 D Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge;
Toward a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago, 1958).
This is surely one of
the most remarkable books written in the twentieth century.
For a psychologist's reaction to it, see Abraham H. Maslow,
The Psychology of Science;
A Reconnaissance (New York, 1966).
Personal K n o w l e d g e , pp. 132-195;
The Tacit Dimension (New York, 1966).

see also Polanyi's

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

80

This view entails a decisive change in our ideal of
knowledge.
The participation of the knower in shaping
his knowledge, which had hitherto been tolerated only as
a flaw— a shortcoming to be eliminated from perfect
knowledge--is now recognized as the true guide and master
of our cognitive powers.
We acknowledge now that our
powers of knowing operate widely without causing us to
utter any explicit statements . . . The ideal of a knowl
edge embodied in strictly impersonal statements now
appears self-contradictory, meaningless, a fit subject
for ridicule.
We must learn to accept as our ideal a
knowledge that is manifestly p e r s o n a l . ^ 2
Scientific

knowing,

like all other forms of knowing,

detached or uninvolved.

is not

It is indeed objective in the sense

of establishing contact with a hidden reality," but it represents a "fusion of the personal and the objective."
personal,

tacit

23

(one is tempted to say unconscious)

is present in every act of scientific

The

dimension

understanding,

including

the discovery of laws.
In an essay entitled "Understanding

History,"

Polanyi

has extended his theory of Personal Knowledge from science to
history.Polanyi

holds,

in opposition to debaters on the

topic from Buckle to Berlin,
of historiography

that "the characteristic

features

. . . emerge by the continuation of a

development broadly prefigured already within the natural
sciences."^

There exists an essential unity of scientific

and historical knowledge.

Scientists may study the structure

^Michael
pp. 26-27.

The Study of Man

23

Polanyi,

(Chicago,

1 959 ),

Personal K n o w l e d g e , pp. vii-viii.

2<^In The Study of M a n . pp.
2 5 Ibid..

p.

71-99.

73.
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of nature,

machines,

animals,

or men,

while

men and their ideas in complex situations.
sents

a search

historians

study

Yet each re p r e 

for an integrated understanding of the meaning

of a set of particulars and each is personal.
lar levels of physics and chemistry,
as Yeats called it,

On the m o l e c u 

the "passionate intensity,"

is a function of the beauty of the formu

lae and the pleasure derived from predicting correctly.
history,

With

the personal involvement lay in our encounter with

complex,

interesting

individuals

If all science
enterprise,
history."

what,

then,

26

is meant by the term "scientific

Simply this:

make explicit

and their ideas.

and history is an intensely personal

that the historian

the tacit dimension,

should attempt to

as much as possible;

he

should lay bare his assumptions and pre-conceived points of
view as far as they are known.
Popper has written,

it actually happened.'"
much

"History has no m e a n i n g ,"

"there can be no history of

27

'the past as

The historian must give it meaning

as a scientist gives meaning to data with a theory.

Without personal selection history,
strangled by superfluous

like science,

would be

information.

The only way out of this difficulty is . . . c o n 
sciously to introduce a preconceived selective point of
view into one's history; that is, to write that history
which interests u s . This does not mean that we may twist
the facts until they fit into a framework of preconceived
ideas, or that we may neglect the facts that do not fit.

2 6 I b i d . . pp.

2 vols.

73-85.

2 ^Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its E n e m i e s ,
(London, 1945), II, pp. 254-256.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

82

□n the contrary, all available evidence which has a
bearing on our point of view should be considered carefully and objectively . . . ,2B
By

"objectively" is meant with an awareness of one's personal

viewpoint,

not under the naive assumption that one has no

biases or principles of selection.
History,
idea,

then,

is unavoidably presentist.

A man,

an

or an event is what it is only as seen through a pri s 

matic point of view.

Paradoxically,

history becomes more

scientific when it acknowledges the personal and selective
nature of its theorizing and data collecting.
and conclusions of this kind of scientific

The assertions

history can be

evaluated in relation to the viewpoint of the historian.
This is certainly the case in psychology,

for example,

where

the evaluation of a piece of research is almost always
accompanied by a determination of the writer's status as
behaviorist,

psychoanalyst,

existentialist,

etc.

29

The

Karl R. Popper, The Poverty of Hi s t o r i c i s m . 2nd ed.
(London, 1960), p. 150; Popper uses the term "historicism"
very differently from that employed by Stocking and followed
here.
See also Robert F. Berkhofer's A Behavioral Approach
to Historical Analysis (New York, 1969) for a plea that h is
torians make clear their biases and assumptions.
To Popper,
"historicism" is "an approach to the social sciences which
assumes that this aim is attainable by discovering the
'rhythms' or the 'patterns,' the 'law' or the 'trends' that
underlie the evolution of history" (Poverty of H i s t o r i c i s m .
p. 3).
The Marxists, according to Popper, represent the
epitome of this "poverty-stricken" position.
29
One need only survey a personality theory text such
as Salvatore R. Maddi, Personality Theories;
A Comparative
A n a l y s i s , 2nd ed. (Homewood, 111., 1972) for convincing evi
dence that the same ps ychological data can be interpreted in
widely different but theoretically consistent ways.
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psychologist is aware,

or should be,

that data collection and

interpretation is greatly influenced by the assumptions and
II
•
.• .
purposes ofr* the
scientist.

30

In studying the psychological thought of Edwards
there is a special urgency to "make our ideas cl e a r , " as
Peirce once put it.

Unavoidable presentism needs to be trans

formed into conscious presentism.

The inappropriate and

ambiguous presentist approach of Roback and Fay clearly twists
and neglects pertinent

aspects of Edwards'

ideas in an attempt

to make him comprehens ible to twentieth-century psychologists
and historians of psychology.
hand,

are too naive.

The h i s t o r i c i s t s , on the other

"The nature of man" which they use

implicitly is much too broad a concept to carry any meaning.
What is needed in the study of Edwards is a point of view,
telescopic view into the history of psychology,

a

which neither

focuses too broadly on Edwards nor emerges too narrowly from
the present:

a psychology for all seasons,

and understandable to the living.

true to the dead

The point of view known as

Prescriptive Theory will serve this function.

The Mysterious

Zeitgeist of Edwin G. Boring

Just as any student of American
with

Perry Miller,

Puritanism must begin

a historian of psychology must first deal

with Edwin G. Boring.

Since Prescriptive Theory is in part a

^ T h e classic demonstration of the importance of
"demand characteristics" or "experimenter bias" in psychologi
cal research is by Robert Rosenthal, Experimenter Effects in
B ehavioral Research (New York, 1966).
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reaction,

or at least an amendment,

point of view,
ography.

to Boring's historical

something needs to be said about his h i s tori

In chapter one,

Boring was characterized as a p ro

gressionist historian who viewed the history of psychology as
a series of events which led toward,
Wundt.

31

More specifically,

through,

and beyond

Boring held what might aptly be

called an experimental view of history.

Trained in e xperi

mental psychology under the rigorous Titchener,
carried the experimentalist's

tionships over into his historical studies.
Great Experiment,

Boring

quest for cause and effect rela32

History is the

a scientific enterprise in the best p o s i 

tivist tradition.
To think of the man whose brilliant novel thought
heads an important development as the originator is to
abandon scientific psychology and suppose that among all
orderly lawful phenomena the insights of genius cons t i 
tute an exception in that they occur without c a u s e s . 33

32
It is significant that Boring's great History is
dedicated to Titchener, and an engraving of Wundt adorns the
frontispiece of that volume.
33
H i s t o r y , p. 745.
A typical Boring causal chain is
his "Nerve Physiology as a Paradigm of Scientific Progress."
He states
(1 ) Progress is continuous when viewed in large p e r s p e c 
tive, but intermittent and irregular when examined for
small intervals of time.
There were decades when nothing
of great importance happened, yet a steady development
from 1790 to 197G nonetheless.
(2) Discovery depends upon previous discovery.
The series,
Galvani-Volta-du Bois-Reymond-Helmholtz-Berstein-LucasAdria n - L i l l i e , labels a continuous development by noting
eight successful prominent features of it.
(History,
p. 43)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

85

To Boring,

the purpose of the history of psychology,

the history of any science,
tionships.

By his own admission,

is the rule in history,

as with

is to isolate cause-effect r e l a 
however,

multiple causation

hence on numerous occasions Boring

invoked the term Zeitgeist to "explain"

scientific dis

coveries

definition of the

and events.

Zeitgeist was

Boring's "mature"

"the total body of knowledge and opinion

avail

able at any time to a person living within a given c u l t u r e . " ^
History is a most imperfect laboratory and the invocation of
the Zeitgeist concept is really an admission that the c a usa
tive variables are u n k n o w n . ^
way of admitting defeat;
has remarked,

It was a hard determinists 1

for "the Z e i t g e i s t ," as Dorothy Ross

is a "truism of historical explanation" which

"offers only the most elementary kind of causal insight.
Philosophers do not make discoveries

in the sense that

Boring believed scientists discover hidden reality.

They do

"Dual Role of the Zeitgeist in Scientific Creativity,"
Scientific M o n t h l y , 1 955, 8_0, 101-106.
Quote from p. 106.
Boring appeared to change his definition of the Zeitgeist
more than once.
Robert A. Friedman, however, has shown c o n 
vincingly that Boring's view of the Zeitgeist remained rel a 
tively constant throughout his long career; see "Edwin G.
Boring's 'mature' view of the Science of Science in Relation
to a Deterministic Personal and Intellectual Motif," Journal
of the History of the Behavioral S c i e n c e s , 1 967, 3_, 17-26.
35Boring seemed to realize this.
He remarked, "His
tory is a part of nature where multiple causation rules and
where single effective causes are the over-simplifications,
devised to bring the incomprehensible complexity of reality
within the narrow compass of man's understanding" (History,
p. 744).
^ " T h e 'Zeitgeist' and American Psychology," Journal
of the History of the Behavioral S c i e n c e s , 1 969, .5, 256-262;
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not fit neatly into a causal chain because they tend to argue
over relatively timeless issues across the centuries.
are not associated with events.

Boring was not what fundamental questions
asked about man,

They

The principle concern for
a psychologist

but rather his scientific status and his

role in a causal chain of historical events.

An excellent

example of Boring's de facto avoidance of the fundamental
philosophical issues in psychology may be found in one of his
earliest historical p a p e r s . ^

In 1 927 Boring had not yet

adopted the Zeitgeist as an explanatory term.

Instead,

he

settled for a historical application of James:
The stream of consciousness is sensibly continuous
in the history of thought as well as in the thinking of
and individual.
Certainly the historian is impressed by
the fact that almost never does an idea seem entirely
n e w .3 8
Boring undertook to prove this "by a few psychologists'
instances."

39

His discussion

tant discoveries of Bell,
contributors to Wundt's
He proves,

'founders'

Broca,

and other

founding of experimental psychology.

(as he would

"'fathers'

analyses of the imp o r 

Helmholtz,

to his own satisfaction,

ous Zeitgeist
that

included

MUller,

that indeed the m y s t e r i 

refer to it by 1929)

are necessarily also

are very apt to be

'sons'

was at work;

and that the

'promoters.'

^^"The Problem of Originality in Science," American
Journal of Ps y c h o l o g y . 1 927, 39_, 70-90.
This paper deals
with the science of psychology.
Oddly, many of Boring's
statements concerning the Zeitgeist occur in a very general
scientific context, with little mention of psychology.
3 B Ibi d . . p. 71.

4 D I bid.. p. 71.

3 9 Ibi d . . p. 71.
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The

"psychological"

nature of these discoveries rests

on Boring's belief that they led directly to Wundt's l a b o r a 
tory and hence to twentieth-century psychology.
non-experimentalists
Locke,
Greeks.

Berkeley,

Hartley,

Descartes,

According to Boring,

interested
century

are also mentioned,

A number of

however,

including

and a few ancient

these philosophers seemed to be

in matters which also interested the nineteenth-

"father-sons"

to trace decisively.
from an exasperating
are seen as barren,

but their influence is too amorphous

41

While scientist-psychologists

fertility,
or orphans,

for the lineal metaphor.

emerge

their philosophical forbears
depending

on one's preference

"Philosophy," Boring remarked,

"becomes common sense slowly,

but

. . . inevitably."

42

Thus,

one of Kant's chief functions in the history of psychology is
to provide Johannes MUller with the

"common sense"

foundation

for his scientific discovery of a "physiological counterpart
of a Kantian category."

43

Yet what,

psychologically,

Kant and MUller as the unexorable Boringian
on?

What fundamental

unites

Zeitgeist moves

principles are involved?

Boring's

experimental view of history prevented him from even asking
the question,

much less answering it.

On the contrary,

he saw

41
Vague relationships did not interest Boring; an indi
vidual either did or did not "influence" someone else.
Boring's
intense need for closure, historical and otherwise, is di s 
cussed by Julian Jaynes, "Edwin Garrigues Boring 1886-1968,"
Journal of the History of the Behavioral S c i e n c e s , 1969, 5,
99-112.
42

"Problem of Originality," p.

^ I b i d .,

p.

74.

73.
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p hilosophy and theory as potential enemies which sometimes
prevented experimental psychologists from going about their
experimental b u s i n e s s . ^
accompanying lame-duck
the contributors

Boring's determinism and the

Zeitgeist concept obscures not only

to the Z e i t g e i s t , but also the fundamental

p sychological principles which men argue
a radical change in methodology.

historian in the old positivist sense,
cated by Polanyi and Popper.
effects,
clear.

if not laws,

about,

even through

Boring was a scientific
and in the manner indi

He searched for causes and

and he made his assumptions perfectly

Within the area circumscribed by those biases,

his

histories will probably never be s u r p a s s e d . ^
If his approach

has been rewarding to some,

it has

been somewhat stultifying to others who do not share his
experimental view of history.
of psychology who hold

Unfortunately,

few historians

to some variant of Brett's Human Nature

approach to the history of psychology have been as scientific

44
According to Boring,
Psychology has never succeeded in taking philosophy to
itself or in leaving it alone . . . A division of the
mind within psychology is not healthy . . . Psychology
ought to . . . proceed, unimpeded by a divided soul, about
its business (H i s t o r y , p. 742).
Boring's experimental view of history, and its concommitant
disdain for philosophy, has been very influential.
Fred
Keller, for instance, holds that
Descartes and the "mental philosophers" played an
early part in launching the young science with which we
are here concerned.
But much more had to be done before
our modern discipline emerged.
Sooner or later, these
armchair ideas, no matter how insightful, had to leave the
speculative realm for the world of observation and experi
ment (The Definition of P s y chology, 2nd ed., New York, 1 973).
^In

addition to his H i s tory, Boring's other classic
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as Boring;

that is, they have failed to present their point

of view explicitly in the form of a usable definition of psy
chology.

The confusing situation among these professional

historians of psychology is very similar to that which

exists

among serious students of Edwards who have necessarily
adopted Brett's general viewpoint.

By dropping a compre

hensive definition of psychology into the intuitive lap of
the reader,

they render many of their assertions empty and

meaningless.

Some of Gardner Murphy's historical work exempli

fies the confusion that may result when a historian discusses
the

"psychology" of men and eras far beyond Boring's expe r i 

mental mainstream,
neat,

without offering

a replacement for his

narrow definition of psychology.

instance,

psychology.
chologist,
as Freud,

At one point,

for

he argues for and purports to describe Pythagorean
Yet it is quite unclear why Pythagorus is a psy
or how

he can be included

under the same rubric

who is also discussed at length

another book,

in the b o o k . ^

In

Asian P s y c h o l o g y , Murphy moves the farthest

imaginable distance,

both historically and geographically,

from Boring's definitional t e r r i t o r y . ^

Initially,

he must

is Sensation and Perception in the History of Experimental
Psychology (New York, 1942), a volume so thorough and e xhaus
tive that, as Jaynes has pointed out, there was virtually no
one capable of adequately reviewing it when it appeared; see
Jaynes, "Edwin Garrigues Boring."
46
Psychological Thought from Pythagorus to Freud
(New Y o r k , 1968).
47
c hology

Gardner Murphy &. Lois B. Murphy,
(New York, 1968).

eds.,

Asian Psy
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fortify his position;

like those who purport to discuss

seriously the psychology of Edwards,

he must demonstrate the

possibility of the existence of Asian psychology to an audi
ence of skeptical Boringians.
restating
editor,

He accomplishes this task by

and elaborating an important point made by Brett's

R. 5. P e t e r s . ^

reasons why,

He points out that there are two

until very recently,

Western universities have

included philosophy and psychology in the same department.
First,

"psychology was a part of philosophy because it was

immature."

49

It had not yet asserted the scientific inde

pendence whose progress Boring was to describe so eloquently.
Yet there is another important reason for the close relation
ship between philosophy and psychology,

"Namely that the phi

losopher took universal knowledge and wisdom as his goal and
he certainly had to include wisdom about the m i n d . " ^
quest for wisdom about the mind,
object of knowledge,"

51

Murphy believes

literate cultures and times.

holds true for all

These countless,

inquiries into the nature of the human mind,
nature,

constitute what he calls the

48
49

"Theory,

Policy,

timeless

that is human

"universal p sychology—

a psychology that applies wherever mind,
intuitively accepted terms,

This

the "especially precious

or let us say,

wherever mind,

heart,

in

and will

and Technology."

Asian P s y c h o l o g y , p. viii.

5 0 t u ..
I b i d ., p. ix.
I b i d ., p. ix.
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exist."

52

Thus Murphy justifies his volume of Asian p s y 

chology and,

it might be added,

The result,

however,

he refuses to go beyond
Miller,

Cherry,

Elwood

this volume

as well.

is far from satsifactory because

"intuitively accepted terms."
and other Edwards scholars,

Like

Murphy

does not elaborate his conception of the dimensions of human
nature.

For better or worse,

ment which

the Western mind is an inst r u 

understands only when it classifies and thereby

views things in some relation to each other.
point of view,

order can be extracted from chaos.
words,
about

Without some

some superordinate classification scheme,
We need to know,

no

in other

specifically what kinds of questions have been asked
human nature,

and what answers have been given.

With

out this scientific addition to a history of psychology,
which lay outside Boring's Wundtian hourglass,

"psychology"

remains only a convenient elastic label which may be applied
in a haphazard manner.

Calling an idea

"psychology" does

not

promote the understanding of Confucius any more than it does
when it is applied to Edwards.

53

The Thematic Approach to the History of Psychology:
"Prescriptions"

and "Fundamental

Issues"

Neither Brett nor his lineal descendents in the
h istory of psychology should be evaluated too critically for
5 2-Irb
uiud ..

p. vi.

53

That is, "understanding" in the sense meant by
Dilthey and Polanyi:
a perception of the joint significance
of a set of particulars.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

92

failing to specify their notion of human nature.

The under

taking of scientific history is much more difficult for them
thr n it was for Boring;

they must,

in effect,

attempt to

reduce much of the most complex and profound Western thought
of the past 2,500 years to a few categories.

To attempt

such an intellectual feat requires great courage,
another point of view,

great foolishness.

must be relatively few in number,
exclusive as possible,

timeless,

and exhaustive.

or from

The categories
as mutually

The accomplishment

of this monument of schematization requires both erudition
and arbitrary decisiveness,
It is little wonder,
efforts,

by Robert

arrogance and humility.
then,

that only two serious

I. Watson and Michael Wertheimer,

have

been made to bring schematic order to the approach of Brett.

54

Although there are numerous differences between W a t s o n ’s
Prescriptive Theory and the Fundamental

Issues of Wertheimer,

they have in common the desire to delineate the basic p rinci
ples which unify pre-experimental psychology with postWundtian psychology,
Boring's
Watson

to bridge the gap created in part by

deterministic

and amorphous Z e i t g e i s t .

Yet both

and Wertheimer are also indebted to Boring.

includes

not only his components of human nature

Each

(contentual

^ W a t s o n , "Prescriptive Science:
A Prescriptive
Analysis of Descartes' Psychological Views," Journal of the
History of the Behavioral S c i e n c e s , 1971, 7, 223-248; "Pre
scriptions as Operative in the History of Psychology," Journal
of the History of the Behavioral S c i e n c e s , 1 971, 7,, 31 1 -322;
"Prescriptive Theory and the Social Sciences."
Invited
address delivered at the annual convention of the American Psy
chological Association, August, 1974; and Michael Wertheimer,
F undamental Issues in Psychology (New York, 1 972).
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or substantive issues),
principles.

but also certain methodological

There are not only various assumptions about

human nature,

there have also been differing opinions regard

ing the manner in which those assumptions should be inve s t i 
gated.

There are,

in other words,

methodological

issues

as

well as substantive ones.
It is Watson's position that psychology currently
lacks,

and always has lacked a unifying

paradigm such as

exists in sciences like physics or chemistry.
fore argued that the history of psychology,
the present,

He has there

from Descartes to

is viewed most profitably in terms of a number

of themes called

"prescriptions."

The overall function of these themes is orientative or
attitudinal; they tell us how the psychologist-scientist
should behave.
In short, they have a directive function.
They help to direct the psychologist-scientist in the way
he selects a problem, formulates it, and the way in which
he carries it out.^5
Those prescriptions which Watson has isolated are arranged in
contrasting

pairs

(see Table 1 ) .^

of the history of psychology,
contentual

(e.g.,

methodological

Note that in this stage

some prescriptions

are clearly

Determinism- I n d e t e r m i n i s m ) , others clearly

(e.g.,

Q u a n t i t a t ivism-Qualitativism), while

there is still another group that may fall in either category
(e.g. , Functionalis m - S t r u c t u r a l i s m ) .
In contrast to Watson,

Wertheimer has no firm t heo

retical base from which to launch his historical scheme.

“^ W a t s o n ,
5 6 I b id.,

"Prescriptive Science,"
pp.

p.

He

437.

436-437.
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TABLE 1

PRESCRIPTIVE TERMS ARRANGED

IN CONTRASTING PAIRS

Conscious mentalism-Unconscious mentalism

(emphasis on aware

ness of mental structure or a c t ivity— unawareness).
Contentual ob.jectivism-Contentual subjectivism

(psychological

data viewed as behavior of i ndividual— as mental structure
or activity of individual).
Determinism-Indeterminism

(human events completely explicable

in terms of a ntecedents— not completely so explicable) .
Quantitativism-Qualitativism

(stress upon knowledge which is

countable or measur a b l e — upon that which

is different in

kind or essence).
Rationalism-Irrationalism

(emphasis upon data supposed to

follow dictates of good sense and i n t e llect— intrusion or
domination of emotive and conative factors upon intellec
tual p r o c e s s e s ).
S taticism-Developmentalism

(emphasis upon cross-sectional

v i e w — upon changes with time).
Staticism-Dynamicism
change

(emphasis upon enduring aspects— upon

and factors making for change).

Empiricism-Rationalism

(major,

if not exclusive source of

knowledge is experience— is reason).
Functionalism-Structuralism

(psychological categories are

a c t ivities— are contents).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

95

Inductivism-Deductivism

(investigations begun with facts or

o b servations— with assumed established truths).
Mechanism-Vitalism

(activities of living beings completely

explicable by physio-chemical constituents— not so
e x p l i c a b l e ).
Methodological objectivism-Methodological subjectivism

(use

of methods open to verification by another competent
obse r v e r — not so open).
Molecularism-Molarism

(psychological data most aptly described

in terms of relatively small units— relatively large
u n i t s ).
M onism-Dualism

(fundamental principle or entity in universe is

of one kind— is of two kinds, mind and matter).
Naturalism-Supernatural ism

(nature requires for its operation

and explanation only principles

found within it— requires

transcendent guidance as well).
IMomotheticism-Idiographicism

(emphasis upon discovering

gen

eral laws— upon explaining particular events or ind i 
viduals ) .
P eripheralism-Centralism

(stress upon psychological events

taking place at periphery of bod y — within body).
Purism-Utilitarianism

(seeking of knowledge for its own sake

— for its usefulness

in other activities).
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is simply a man with a problem;
out of psychology,
plex past.

he seeks a way to make sense

a complex science with an even more c o m 

Over a period of ten years,

he says,

he played

a kind of intellectual game, to see if I could find some
questions that are broad and that are central to p sy
chology and to which no clear-cut answers could be given
[because then they would stop being recurrent issues]
. . . that anybody else would come up with the same set
of questions is highly unlikely; further, given the set,
it is improbable that anyone else would group them in the
same way or present them in the same o r d e r . 57
Wertheimer is too modest,

for he is very knowledgeable

about

results of his informal approach show a number of important
similarities with Watson's more circumscribed,
approach.

Wertheimer's

Fundamental

systematic

Issues are presented in

Table 2.
Both Prescriptions and Fundamental
sented as pairs of polar opposites.

Issues are p r e 

Each theorist emphasizes

that this mode of presentation is mostly a mnemonic c o n 
venience,

although most thinkers have aligned themselves

closer to one pole than to another.
contentual and methodological

Both approaches include

dimensions,

and each has dis-

books dealing with contemporary psychology and the excellent
A Brief History of Psychology (New York, 1970).
59
Wertheimer, however, complicates his presentation
with many sub, and sub-sub issues, while Watson's p r escrip
tions are relatively discrete and (it is claimed) exhaustive.
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TABLE 2

THE FUNDAMENTAL

ISSUES

The Substantive

Issues

(1) Man as Master versus Man as Victim cf his Fate
(2) Man as Good versus Man as Evil
(3) Andsum versus Transsum
more than,

(the whole of man is merely,

or

the sum of his component parts)

(4) Mind versus Body
(5) Subjectivity versus Objectivity
(6) Past versus Present
(7)

Nature versus

Nurture

(8) Simplicity versus

Complexity

The Methodological

Issues

(9) Richness versus Precision
(10) Theory versus Data

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

98

There are,

however,

several differences between

Prescriptive Theory and the Fundamental

Issues approach

which suggest the greater systematic usefulness of p r e scrip
tions.

The Fundamental

idiosyncratic;

Issues are admittedly haphazard and

a potpourri whose pre-twentieth-century m a t e 

rial is derived largely from secondary sources.

It has a

practical underpinning rather than a theoretical one;
written

it was

as an organizational text for students and that is

why much of the terminology is catchy but rather imprecise
(e.g.,

M a s t e r - V i c t i m ; Good-Evil).

other hand,
represent

Prescriptions,

though unavoidably idiosyncratic,

the condensation of a long and continuing

the history of Western psychological thought.
Watson's

on the

to some extent,

own work,

study of

In addition to

a number of dissertations have recently

applied content analysis to various aspects of Western
thought in an attempt to work toward
of p s y c h o l o g y .^

Importantly,

a prescriptive history

the prescriptive framework

seeks to describe someone's psychological thought specifically
so that prescriptive
Fundamental

comparisons can then be made.

Issues approach,

however,

In the

no attempt is made to

Watson, "View of Descartes."
For other practical
applications of prescriptive theory to the history of psy
chology, consult the following dissertations done at the
University of New Hampshire:
Barbara C. Ross, "Psychological
Thought within the Context of the Scientific Revolution,
1 665-1 700,"' (1 970); Kenneth R. Gibson, "The Conceptual Bases
of American Psychology:
A Content Analysis of the Presi
dential Addresses of the American Psychological Association,
1892-1970" (1970); and Ronald H. Mueller, "The American Era
of James Mark Baldwin (1893-1903)" (1974).
See also the
recent study by G. Kawash &. A. H. Fuchs, "Prescriptive D imen
sions for Five Schools of Psychology," Journal of the History
of the Behavioral S c i e n c e s . 1 974, 1_0, in press.
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describe a thinker in terms of Issues.

Rather,

each indi

vidual is simply used as an example of this or that issue.
The Prescriptive framework requires that one specify which
prescriptions are salient,

dominant,

for a given thinker or period.

61

and counter-dominant

Obviously,

the concerns of

one age are not necessarily those of another.

Finally,

Prescriptive terminology is relatively precise,
compared to the somewhat esoteric Fundamental

if jargonesque,

Issues.

None of this should be construed as a condemnation of
Wertheimer or his Fundamental
issues,

Issues.

In fact,

two of his

Master-Victim and Andsum- T r a n s s u m , are used exten

sively in the analysis of Edwards.

The discussion simply

serves to demonstrate that the present purpose,

a clear syste

matic description of the heretofore inscrutable psychology of
Edwards,

is more consistent with the prescriptive approach

than with the more informal and somewhat less historically
oriented

Fundamental

Issues.

62

Both represent laudable,

ful attempts to provide a schematic framework

use

for writing a

scientific history of psychology which lie inside and outside
Boring's experimental territory.

^See

Watson,

"Prescriptive Science."

^ A l t h o u g h Wertheimer spans much of Western history in
search of examples for his various issues, most come from the
twentieth century.
This is consistent with his purpose:
to
integrate the field of psychology historically for contempo
rary students; see also W. D. Hitt, "Two Models of Man,"
American Psyc h o l o g i s t . 1 969, 24_, 651 -659 , for an attempt to
specify the dimensions of human nature implicit in two impor
tant contemporary positions, behaviorism and phenomenology.
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A Prescriptive Description of Previous
Research on the Psychology of Edwards
It was noted in chapter one that Edwards'
nearly always tends toward synthesis and unity.

thought
He was

e xtraordinarily adept at extracting ideas from such diverse
thinkers

as Augustine,

Calvin,

Locke,

and Hutcheson,

fying them in a way that suited his purposes.

and uni

His urgent

need to discover unity in man's magnificent diversity is per
haps the principal contributor to Edwards'
The language of his expositions
simple,

while the underlying implications of those statements

are incredibly paradoxical.
standing of Edwards'
level,

In order to raise the under

psychological theory above the intuitive

his theory must be integrated into a coherent model

which depolarizes the paradoxes.
earlier,
stood.

inscrutability.

is very logical and apparently

Yet,

as was pointed out

the immense complexity itself is not clearly under
It is easy to say that Edwards believed that man was

a rational-emotive unity or that man is both proactive
reactive,

when one is ignorant of what he is saying.

and
The

chief function of Prescriptive Theory and the Fundamental
Issues is to make explicit the rather astounding implications
of Edwards'

paradoxical theory.

Nearly every commentator on Edwards'
ing the past forty years believes that though
disjunctive faculty terminology,
a rational-emotive unity.^

psychology dur
Edwards

used

he meant to describe man as

This unified view of the mind was

^ E x c e p t , of course, for Roback and Fay.
Roback's
treatment is too superficial to be taken seriously while, as
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usually,

though not always,

expressed in Edwards'

analyses of the conversion experience.

Edwards most often used to express the unity was
the heart,"

and a host of supportive

numerous

The phrase which
"a sense of

"taste" metaphors.

64

A "sense of the heart" is certainly composed of a rational
and an emotional component

(what Edwards misleadingly

referred to as "faculties"),

but it cannot be reduced to the

simple additive sum of reason plus emotion.
other words,

The whole,

is far more than the sum of its parts;

what Max Wertheimer called a gestalten,

in

it is

or a Transsumative

W h o l e .^
In a gestalt, the parts are not indifferent to each
other, but are mutually related; they interact and influ
ence one another.
In an andsum, one part may be changed
without other parts of the whole being affected in any
m ajor way, but in a gestalt or transsum, change of one
part,may produce a radical change in other parts or in
the entire whole — as in a soap b u b b l e . 66
Edwards'

"sense of the heart" is thus a particular expression

of a unified psychological view which

shall be referred to as

transsummative m a n , an integrated coordination of apparently
diverse components.

Fearing has pointed out, Fay "misinterprets Edwards' p s y 
chology, which he thinks is Aristotelian and scholastic
because Edwards speaks of only two rational faculties, under
standing and will ("Will and Intellect," p. 553).
^45ee Chapter 2, pp. 43-59.
^ A clear expression of Gestalt may be found in Max
Wertheimer, Productive T h i n k i n g . Michael Wertheimer, ed. (New
York, 1959).
Although he did not invent the term gestalt,
Wertheimer is generally credited with founding the formal
school of gestalt psychology.
^ M i c h a e l Wertheimer,

Fundamental I s s u e s , p. 69.
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The important
Edwards'

prescriptive implications are that

transummative view of man,

described it is
m o l a r , and

as his commentators

(4) d y n a m i c .

Clearly for Edwards the explanation

of the activities of living beings requires
emergent

have

(1) v i t a l i s t i c , (2) s u p e r n a t u r a l i s t i c , (3)

phenomenon,

a vitalistic,

"a sense of the heart."

vitalistic in a special sense.

Edwards'

Yet it is

psychological

laboratory was his parish and his subject matter was religious
conversion.

Thus the

"sense of the heart" did not simply

emerge from man's inherent rational and emotive capacities,
it required transcendent

guidance.

ple was,

supernaturalistic

in other words,

Edwards'

emergent pri n c i 

as well as vi t a l 

istic .
Wertheimer points out that transsummative e x p lana
tions are usually relatively molar rather than m o l e c u l a r . ^
This is certainly the case with Edwards.

Puritan psychology

before and after Edwards often found itself

embroiled in sch o 

lastic debates concerning the sovereignty of this or that
hypothetical faculty.

Minute analyses were

undertaken to

demonstrate that the reason or the will is the
faculty.^

"dominant"

Edwards never involved himself in molecular

debates of this sort.

His transsummative view of the f a c u l 

ties as integrated aspects of a superordinate whole led him
to an entirely different,

67

I b id..

pp.

relatively molar level of analysis.

78-79.

^ A n a l y s e s of the "faculty" debates
Seventeenth C e n t u r y . Fulcher, "Puritans and
e specially Fiering, "Will and Intellect."

are in Miller,
Passions," and
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It is almost a truism to state that
heart" is a dynamic concept,
tionship

should not be allowed to obscure it.

of man's transsummative whole,
said to represent the

The emergence

"a sense of the heart," was

culmination of the most significant

change ever undergone by man,
saint.

"a sense of the

yet the obviousness of the r e l a 

his conversion from sinner to

Edwards often used his theory

to defend his i n v olve

ment with emotional revivalism in the Great Awakening.
opponents in the controversy,
light,"

objected to both the emotionality of revivals and to

the soliciting of converts.

Their psychological view,

reason-oriented scholastic approach,

,

than change.

and stability rather

69

Edwards'
molar,

a

emphasized the "reason"

rather than rational-emotive involvement,
■i

His

Charles Chauncy and the "old

view of transsummative man as a vitalistic,

dynamic whole is represented in Figure 1.

God is

responsible for the "indwelling principle," within Trans,•
summative
man. 70

Characteristically,
describe,

as best he could,

Edwards was not content merely to
a paradoxical view of man.

Instead he went much further to describe how the t r a nssum
mative man he sketched might behave in his relationship with

6

9
This debate had important political and social co n 
sequences; see Joseph Tracy,
The Great Awakening;
A History
of the Revival of Religion (Boston, 1842); Heimert, R e l i g i o n ,
and Gaustad, Great Awakening in New E n g l a n d .

Dwight,
p. 174.

^"A
ed.,

Divine and Supernatural Light . . ." in 5. E.
The Works of President E d w a r d s . 10 v o l s ., VI,
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Figure 1.
view of man.

Edwards'

transsumative
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God.

One might object to including this issue in a c o n s idera

tion of a system of psychology;
man-God relationships.

theology

God relationship in psychological terms,
and at other times,

usually subsumes

Yet Edwards clearly viewed the man-

Augustinian.

tinction is false to Edwards'

sometimes Lockean

A theology-psychology dis

view of the

universe,

which

he

saw as operating in a moment-to-moment dependence upon God.
Thus man's relationship to God can be viewed as a type of
p erceptual psychology in which man is seen in relation to the
Holy Spirit or a social psychology in which he is seen in
relation to the Holy Spirit or a social psychology in which
he is seen in relation to God's universe.
represent
chology"

This does not

an inappropriate stretching of the term "psy
as used by Brett and followed here.

recently,

Until very

psychological thought has always been embedded in

other contexts.

For Edwards,

the context was God,

always and

everywhere.
Investigations into Edwards'
God relationship has led,

as we have

conception of the manseen,

to a debate

between those who endorse an "Edwards-Locke psychological
equation"

and those who do not.

The former group believes

that Edwards followed Locke in asserting
or merely reactive.

that man is passive

The latter holds that Edwards fashioned

a view of man who is both proactive and reactive.
has aptly labeled this fundamental
Man as Victim of His Fate.""^
71

Wertheimer,

issue

Wertheimer

"Man as Master versus

A prescriptive summary of the

Fundamental

I s s u e s , pp.

27-53.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1 06

Edwards-equals-Locke view of a totally-reactive Man
tim")

emphasizes

(1)

("Vic

Unconscious M e n t a l i s m , (2) Contentual

Sub.j e c t i v i s m , (3) D e t e r m i n i s m , (4) E m p i r i c i s m , and

(5)

Structuralism.
(1)

Unconscious M e n t a l i s m .

The British empiricist

tradition emphasizes the combination or association of mental
elements in a manner that is neither controlled nor observed
by the individual.

Simple ideas,

sis upon passivity,

became associated with each other accord-

ing to various "laws"

the heart of Locke's empha

such as contiguity or continuity.

72

Edwards sometimes referred to the "indwelling principle"
resulting from a conversion

experience as a "new simple

i d e a ."..73
Contentual Subject i v i s m - S t r u c t u r a l i s m .
hence to Edwards,

To Locke,

and

psychological data is viewed as the mental

structure or activity of the individual.

Both Locke and

Edwards derived much of their evidence from personal i n t r o 
spection.

In fact,

Locke is often seen as one of the fountain-

heads of the introspectionist school of psychology known as
"structuralism," though the structuralists owe more to James
Mill's mental-chemistry notions than to Locke.

A p s ycho

logical view which emphasizes contentual subjectivism-

7^This is a cornerstone of the school of philosophical
psychology known as "associa t i o n i s m ," from Hobbes to Bain; see
Howard C. Warren, A History of the Association Psychology (New

73Cf.

A f f e c t i o n s , p. 205.

7<^The classic statement of the "structuralist" posi
tion is Edward Bradford Titchener, "The Postulates of a
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structuralism is also consistent with the earlier Puritan
"structuralism" whose advocates delighted in airy spec u l a 
tion about "faculties" which they regarded as physiological
structures located somewhere in the mind."^
over the mental morphology

Edwards'

concern

of conversion is said to place him

s quarely in both structural traditions.
Determinism.

Psychological

theorists from Locke to

Skinner who have viewed man as a passive,
have had little patience with the
According to Locke,
motive,"

reactive organism,

nation of free will.

human action is determined by "the great

or "some uneasiness" which renders man "ultimately

the passive
'uneasiness.

subject of a natural necessity consequent

upon

It is also very easy to show that Edwards'

diatribe against the Arminians is chiefly directed toward
d emonstrating that there are no acts which are devoid of

Structural Psychology," Philosophical R e v i e w , 1 898, _7» 449465; see also Edna Heidbreder, Seven Psychologies (New York,
1 933), pp. 11 3-1 51 .
^ T h e r e is a sense in which the "faculty" concept is
functional:
a "reason" or a "will" implies the execution of
some sort of activity.
Normally, however, "faculties" were
thought of as semi-independent entities or elemental str u c 
tures of the mind rather than as complementary functions of
a total act, as the American school of functional psychology
would have it.
The term functional is confusing, as was
demonstrated long ago by C. A. Ruckmick, "The Use of the Term
Function in English Textbooks of Psychology," Arnerican
Journal of Psy c h o l o g y . 1913, 2_4, 99-1 23.
On the school of
American functionalism, consult James R. Angell, "The Prov
ince of Functional Psychology," Psychological R e v i e w , 1907,
1 4 , 61-91, and Heidbreder, Seven Psyc h o l o g i e s , pp. 201-233.
^ E s s a y , II, xxi, 29.
A. C. Fraser, the editor,
points out that this was not Locke's original view but that,
in any event, he viewed the will as fully determined, whether
by the "greater good," or "some uneasiness," see E s s a y , I,
p. 330.
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motivation,

that is of antecedent c a u s e s . ^

Although

a

reactive view of man need not be mentalistic like Locke's
(or Edwards'

by virtue of the Locke-Edwards

equation),

it is

necessarily deterministic.
Empiricism.

Locke is synonymous with empiricism:

all of man's materials
simply,

for reason and knowledge,

come "from E X P E R I E N C E ."7^

he stated

In this view,

man is held

to be more complex but not fundamentally different from a
popcorn kernel.

Only when heat

(sensational experience)

applied does it behave the way popcorn
to behave.

Without

"experience," it is inert;

imposition of foreign
reactively.

is

kernels are supposed
after the

stimulation it functions,

but only

It has been claimed that Edwards joined with

Locke in the latter's

"victory over innatism."

scriptively summarized Lockean,

79

The pre-

reactive view of man is repre

sented in Figure 2.
The popcorn-kernel man,
heat of God's universe,

would

buffeted by the stimulating

certainly appear to be con

genial to a Calvinist predestinarian
interest in psychology.

like Edwards who had an

It provides the psychological foun da

tion for belief in a God who is omniscient and omnipresent.
A growing number of Edwards'

modern commentators,

however,

have expressed the view that the Edwards-Locke psychological
77See W i l l .

7BE s s a v . II, i, 2.
7^Miller, "Sense of

the Heart," p. 125; see also
Jonathan E d w a r d s , pp. 43-68.
Locke's view, of course, is far
more complex than a mere "sensationalism," but it is this
passive aspect of his thought that Edwards borrowed from him;
see Chapter 2, footnote 72.
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o

2

Figure
. The Edwardsean reactive man.
Prescriptions and
accompanying arrows indicate that transsummative man is inert
until impinged upon by outside stimulation which, in Edwards'
view, always originated with God himself.
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equation does not tell the whole s t o r y . ^
this view holds,

Edwards'

theory,

claims that man in his relationship with

God is proactive as well as reactive;

he can initiate activity

as well as respond to impinging stimulation.

Cherry refers

to this paradoxical Edwardsean view as "active-receiving,"
and the evidence is overwhelming that Edwards did not respond
to Locke with Lockean passivity.*^

Edwards appears not to

have been a sheet of white paper in his encounter with the
E s s a y ; he brought with him an interest in man's

"active

powers" which he may have gotten from Hutcheson and from the
Cambridge

P l a t o n i s t s .^

"Active-receiving"
A prescriptive
tion,

is a deceptively-simple phrase.

summary demonstrates the extent of the decep

for instead of one paradox there are many;

man" represents

"proactive

a prescriptive inversion of 'teactive m a n . " ^

^5ee

Chapter 2, pp.

^See

Cherry,

T h e o l o g y , pp.

12-24.

^ T h o m a s Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of
Pur Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (London, 1625); John Smith,
Select Discourses (London, 1673).
The oddity of a genius
like Edwards inhabiting the cultural backwater of mideighteenth-century western Massachusetts has aroused a flurry
of activity among those who wonder where he got his ideas.
Nearly as much as been written on Edwards' "influences" as on
Edwards himself.
Recent efforts to trace Edwards to his roots
may be found in John E. Smith's introduction to the Affections
(Thomas Shepard and Solomon Stoddard, chiefly) and Paul Ram
sey's introduction to The Will (Locke).
Elwood has provided
a needed antidote to all this lineal speculation by pointing
out that, no matter where Edwards first encountered some of
his ideas, he always made creative use of them, thus more
attention should be given to explicating what Edwards said;
see Elwood, Philosophical T h e o l o g y , p. 122.
®^The presentation of this prescriptive summary is
necessarily shorter and more informal than that for "reactive

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

A view of man as proactive is characterized by (1) Conscious
M e n t a l i s m , (2) Contentual Obj e c t i v i s m , (3)
(4) R a t i o n a l i s m , and

(5)

An organism which
most importantly,

is, therefore,

initiates activity proactively is,

decision maker.

with questions like when,

why,

approach

The proactive view

consciously m e n t a l i s t i c ; man must be aware of

the

God,

Man must deal effectively

and how.

his mental activity in order to
For Edwards,

I n d e t erminism,

Func t i o n a l i s m .

to

The decision and

make appropriate

decisions.

decision to be made was whether or not to
prepare oneself for possible conversion.
conversion are

both acts,

which

indicates

that the proactive view is further characterized by c o n t e n 
tual objectivism and f u n c t i o n a l i s m .
therefore,

Psychological data,

is behavior which is composed of activities that

are to some extent a function of the purposes and dete r m i n a 
tion of the individual.
Since,

from the proactive point of view,

conversion

is in part the result of conscious striving and decision
making,

an individual may decide,

on a conscious level,

to

change the direction in which he is apparently being led by
antecedent events.

Individuals do make choices and on a

man," since it represents what heretofore has been a vaguelystated point of view, in contrast to the elaborate position
outlined in the Edwards-Locke equation.
^ E d w a r d s , however, claimed that the choices t h e m 
selves are determined by inexorable motives (liking and di s 
liking, pleasure and pain) built into man, who is thus under
a condition of "moral necessity" to be inclined toward that
which he likes and away from that which he dislikes; The Will,
p . 217.
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Figure 3.
A prescriptive representation of the Edwardsean
t r a n s s u m m a t i v e , proactive-reactive man.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

112

Finally,

man,

Edwards'

potential convert,

analogous to a popcorn kernel.

is entirely not

Man's decisions concerning

what to do must necessarily be based upon decisions
which

regarding

aspects of the stimulation he should attend to.

cannot respond to all of God's unfathomable heat;
choosy.

This suggests that man has built-in

He

he must be

"rules of

harmony and regularity" with which he orders his e x p e r i e n c e . ^
Recall that virtually no one denies Locke's cons i d 
erable influence upon Edwards.

The

"proactive" hypothesis is

presented only as a qualification to the Edwards-Locke eq u a 
tion.

Edwards viewed man not only as reactive,

holds,

but also as proactive.

this view

The extraordinary complexities

introduced by this humble amendment are illustrated

in Figure

3.
While Perry Miller may have overstated his case when
he formulated the Edwards-Locke equation,
an obvious
neat,

comprehensible,

transformed
section.

the proposal has

consistency that the amended version lacks.

The

Lockean one-way perceptual street is

into a confusing,

multifaceted

conceptual in t e r 

The usually disjunctive prescriptive polarities

transformed

into conjunctions,

are

man is and is not a number of

86

,, .
things.

^Jonathan

Edwards,

The M i n d , p. 26.

^ W a t s o n also speaks of dominant and counter-dominant
prescriptions and this terminology is sometimes used to
describe the psychological tendencies of an era.
Sometimes a
position transcends the prescriptive polarities.
Logical
Empiricism, for instance, may be viewed as an attempt to find
a satisfactory middle ground between Rationalism and E mpiri
cism.
See Watson, "Prescriptive 5cience."
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Edwards and the Synthetic Tradition in
the History of Psychology
If it is true that Edwards'

view of man was Trans-

s u m m a t i v e - p r o active-reactive, and it appears certain that it
was,

it is apparent that his integration lacks unifying

principles.

To paraphrase Robert Browning,

Edwards'

reach

for a unified view of human psychology clearly exceeded his
own profound grasp of the psychological concepts available to
him.

The use of the Fundamental

analysis

Issues— Prescriptive Theory

opens a Pandora's box of theoretical inconsistencies

and c o m p l i c a t i o n s .
Is Edwards'

view of psychology unique?

torical perspective,

terizes man as a rational-emotive unity?
alone,

From a his

does he alone defend a view which char a c 
If he truly stood

his psychology would probably never be understood

except in an artifical sense within the context of an ad hoc
model out of thin air and a historian's imagination.
Fortunately,
Edwards'

rather than being a historical oddity,

psychological theory is part of a long tradition,

synthetic t r a d i t i o n , in the history of psychology.
of other thinkers,

it turns out,

have attempted the same sort

of prescriptive syntheses sought by Edwards:
who is transsummative,

proactive,

a view of man

and r e a c t i v e . ^

Two of the

synthetic positions which will be discussed briefly,
Augustine and John Dewey,

a

A number

that of

contain a "bohemian" component

' B7This is not a Boringian causative tradition, but a
Brettian affinitive tradition.
"Influence" is not an issue.
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similar to that in Edwards:
finality what,
Like Edwards,
cal grasp.

exactly,

no one has ever determined with

these theorists were trying to say.

their visionary reach exceeded their theoreti

A third and contemporary view,

information pro

cessing , reaches as far as the others but with a much-surer
grasp.

While Augustine,

Edwards,

t r a n s s u m m a t i v e , proactive,

and Dewey held that man is_

and reactive,

information-pro

cessing theorists have constructed concrete models which
demonstrate
or models,

how such a complex man might function.

The model,

will be presented in detail in Chapter 3.

The dis

cussion which fallows in this chapter is designed to provide
a common context for Edwards and information processing as a
j ustification for the presentistic application of the pres criptively similar but more explicit
rary view to Edwards.
words,

and coherent contempo

Information-processing theory,

in other

will provide the integrative whole into which pre

scriptive particulars may be placed as a vehicle to promote
understanding of Edwards'

complex psychological theory.

The reader is now asked to endure a rather lengthy
and redundant

series of quotes in which Augustine,

contemporary information-processing

views which are nearly identical to Edwards:
summative and as proactive-reactive.
influence Edwards,

and

man as trans-

Although Augustine did

and Dewey has had considerable impact upon

information-processing theory,
influence is not at issue here.
sixteen

Dewey,

theory are seen to express

the elucidation of historical
The point is that for almost

hundred years certain visionary individuals,

including

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

115

Edwards,

have held a unified,

prescriptively-paradoxical view

of man which defied concrete description.

Information-pro

cessing theory differs from the other unified views only in
its conscious attempt to construct models which are capable
of explaining how a t r a n s s u m m a t i v e , proactive-reactive man
might function.
Augustine,

like Edwards,

expressed his psychological

views almost entirely within the framework of Christian t h e 
ology and the conversion experience.

It is God's universe

that must be actively received:
'Seek ye God, and your soul shall live" (Ps.. lxviii, 33).
It is because He is hidden that he must be sought in
order to be found; and being found He must still be
sought because of His immensity . . . For He satisfies
the seeker in the measure of his capacity and He makes
the finder to have greater capacity so that he may againgg
seek to be filled when his ability to receive has grown.
"Faith seeks," said Augustine,
i s,

"understanding

finds.

nitive faculty which receives,

and faith,

affections which actively seeks God.
supplemented by the emotions,
is cognition full or complete.
90
re-cognition.

or the Will-

Only if cognition is

or what Augustine called
Full cognition,

Knowledge can never be

6

89

De Trinetate libri quindecim,

XV,

"love,"

therefore,

disassociated

^ In Joanis Evanqelium t r a c t a t u s , LXIII,
Przywara, ed., An Augustine Synthesis (New York,
7 .

p.

That

there is a reciprocal relationship between a passive cog

is

from

i; in Erich
1958
pp. 75-

ii, 2;

Ibid.,

77.
90

The use gf the term re-cognition to describe
A ugustine's proactive-reactive position derives from Robert
E. Cushman, "Faith and Reason," in Roy W. B a t t e n n o u s e , ed.,
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love,

or will,

which transforms vague awareness into sharp,

full cognition.
Augustine's
The proactive

use of faculty terminology is misleading.

(faith)

and reactive

(understanding)

aspects of

man appear,

in certain passages to correspond to Aristotelian

"faculties"

of the soul.

used in a conjunctive

Yet,

as with

Edwards,

the terms are

rather than a disjunctive sense.

Since, therefore, memory, understanding, will, are not
three lives, but one life; not three minds but one mind;
it follows as a certainty that they are also not three
substances, but one substance . . . And hence these three
are one, in that they are one life, one mind, one essence,
and whatever else they are severally called in respect to
themselves, they are called also together, not plurally,
but in the singular number.91
In short,

man is t r a n s s u m m a t i v e , possessed of different,

but

i nseparably-related capacities.
It is difficult to say whether
fifteen

hundred years

years after Edwards,

after Augustine

John Dewey,

writing

and one-hundred-fifty

had significantly clarified the s y n 

thetic view of man beyond the clumsy attempts of Augustine
□
and Edwards.

2

It is even hard to determine whether Dewey

had successfully removed the issue from its original theo
logical

context,

for Dewey's early expressions

of the syn

thetic viewpoint were strongly influencedby Leibniz and

A Companion to the Study of St.
pp. 287-314.

Augustine

(New York,

91
De Trinitate libri q u i n d e c i m , in Przywara,
A u g u s t i n e . p. 148.

1955),

ed.,

2

■^See Chapter
, pp. 42-49 for representative
expressions of Edwards' transsummative ("sense of the heart")
and proactive-reactive views.
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carried noticeable traces of the Hegelian world spirit.
Dewey's

93

admiration for Leibniz was in large measure

due to their common attempt to portray man and the universe
as an "organic unity."
The difficulty of Locke is the difficulty of every theory
of knowledge that does not admit an organic unity of the
knowing mind and the known u n i v e r s e . 94
Strictly speaking, sensation is an activity of the mind.
There are no windows through which the soul receives
impressions.
Pure passivity of any kind is a myth, as
scholastic fiction.z5
"Organic unity" implies

a reciprocal relationship between

man and the environmental sources of his stimulation.

Dewey

thus sought to alter the level of analysis from the stimulusresponse concept of the reflex arc,
stimulus and response
which

to one which viewed

as part of an entire purposive act

necessarily contains proactive and reactive components.^
In any functional act,

emotions are involved,

both the intellect and the

and they function as a unity.

For

93
In his review of Dewey's P s y c h o l o g y , E. Stanley
Hall severely criticized Dewey for twisting psychological
facts until they fit "the [Hegelian] system which is far more
important than they"; American Journal of Psychology, 1BB7,
1, p. 157.
94

Leibniz'sNew Essays Concerning the Human Under
standing in Jo Ann Boydston, ed., The Early Works of John
D e w e y , I. (Carbondale, 111., 1969), pp. 253-435.
(1888)
Dewey later enlarged on this them in John Dewey and
Arthur F. Bentley, Knowing and the Known (Boston, 1949).
95

Leibniz's New E s s a y s , p. 319.

^ " T h e Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology" in Boydston,
ed., Early Works, V, pp. 96-109.
Dewey also makes this point
in How We T h i n k , rev. ed. (Boston, 1933).
He states, "The
nature of the problem fixes the end of thought and the end
controls the process of t h i n k i n g ." (p. 15).
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instance,

if a man encounters a bear

. . . we have but the one organic pulse, the frightful
bear, the frightened man, whose reality is the whole con
crete coordination of eye - l e g - h e a r t , etc., activity, and
that the distinction of cold intellectuality and warm
emotionality is simply a functional distinction within
this whole one of a c t i o n . 97
Thus,

not only is man's relationship to the universe a pro

active-reactive organic unity,

but the various functional

components within man also operate as an organic unity.
Feeling, knowledge, and will are not to be regarded as
three kinds of consciousness, nor are they three
separate parts of the same consciousness.
They are three
aspects which every consciousness presents, according to
the light in which it is considered; whether as giving
information, as affecting the self in a painful or plea
surable way, or as manifesting an activity of self.
But
there is still another connection.
Just as in the
organic body the process of digestion cannot go on w i t h 
out that of circulation, and both require respiration and
nerve action, which in turn are dependent upon other proces ses, so in the or gan ic mind knowledge is not possible
without fe eling and will; and neither of the:se without
the other t wo.98
As an expression of t:ranss ummative man,

thi s state-

ment is neithe r more nor less clea r than either Aug u s t i n e 's
or Edwa rds '.

While Augu stine and Edwards

essence , " and "a sense o f the heart,"

spoke of "one

respective iy, D e w e y 's

"organic mind" offers little in addition except physio
logical metaphors.
arc,

however,

can describe

Dewey's revised concept of the reflex

is clearly an attempt to provide a model which
the precise manner in which man functions

proactive-reactive unity.

as a

It was his goal to transform the

97
"The Significance of Emotions,"
Early W o r k s . IV, pp. 169-188.
(1895)

in Boydston,

ed.,
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notion of the reflex arc from the age-old conception of "a
mechanical conjunction of unallied processes" to one in which
sensory stimulus, central connections, and motor responses
shall be viewed, not as separate and complete entities in
themselves, but as divisions of labor, functioning fac
tors, within the single concrete whole, now designated
the reflex a r c . 99
Dewey's

"reflex arc" paper was an inspiration for the dev e l 

oping school of American psychology known as functionalism.
The "Organic Mind"
form or another,
Dewey,

James,

and "the reflex arc" were adopted,

by the leading functionalists,

Angell,

and C a r r T h e y

in one

including

carried these syn

thetic principles with them in their battle with behaviorism.
American behaviorism has always represented the
quintesscence of parsimony;
the old adage

an experimental application of

"believe nothing of what you hear and only

half of what you see."

Since neither minds nor introspective

reports concerning minds can be seen
observed),

(that is directly

transsummative man became a dead issue.

mind is unknowable;

he simply behaves,

Man's

and this behavior is

reactive— an organism responds to a stimulus.”' ^

The

"^"Reflex Arc," p. 97.
^ ^ J a m e s was not, strictly speaking, a member of any
school of psychology but he was in substantial agreement
with Dewey's transssummative and proactive-reactive princi
ples; see James, Principles I, pp. 221-223 for James's dis
cussion of "knowledge of acquaintance," a concept very sim
ilar to "sense of the heart" and "organic mind."
See also I,
pp. 7-11 for James's position on the proactive-reactive princi
ple, especially his "Romeo and Juliet" illustration.
1 01

The combination of reactive man and anti-mentalism
reached a kind of model-building zenith in Clark L. Hull's
drive-reduction theorv.
See Principles of Behavior (New
York, 1943).
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simplicity of the stimulus-response model,
experimental

successes,

together with

soon assured behaviorism the dominant

position in academic psychology.

It appeared,

for a while,

as if the synthetic tradition within academic psychology
would never progress beyond the still-mostly intuitive
ganic mind"

and the slightly-more explicit

"or

"reflex arc" of

the functionalist school.
The synthetic theorists,
were too timid.

always tentative and conjectural.
legitimate-,

from Augustine to Dewey,

Their excursions into model building were
Yet their timidity was

unlike the behavior is ts they could not see what

they were talking about,

they could only guess,

were two guesses in complete agreement.

and seldom

When psychological

model building reached an unprecedented peak in the first
half of the twentieth century the synthetic tradition,
in need of an explanatory model,

was ignored,

badly

although the

Europeans Bartlett and Piaget continued to postulate mental
constructs called
Recently,
breathed

"schemata .
however,

a remarkable series of events

new life into the synthetic tradition.

theorists

has

Synthetic

now have the confidence to build comprehensive,

working models of proactive-reactive
because of the invention
puting machines,

and transsummative man

and development of electronic c o m 

and especially the area known as "simulation."

1 02

1932);
trans.

Frederick C. Bartlett, Remembering (Cambridge, Eng.,
Jean Piaget, Judgement and Reasoning in the C h i l d ,
by M. Warden (New York, 1926).
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In fact,

computers can do far more than add numbers;

can recognize complex patterns,
problems,

and even imitate many of the idiosyncracies

human p e r s o n a l i t y . ^ ^

accomplish these feats,

thetic theorist
Augustine,

man-like.

but h o w .

and,
Thus,

it

by implication,
while the s y n 

cannot see into man any more clearly than

Edwards,

and functioning

of

Importantly for the psychologist,

cannot only be observed that computers,
men,

they

solve difficult logical

or Dewey,

he can observe the machinery

of devices which

are in many respects,

He can build models which,

very

like those of the

b e h a v i o r i s t s , have observable referents.
. . . the "program analogy" (which may be a better term
than "computer analogy") has several advantages over
earlier conceptions.
Most important is the philosophical
reassurance which it provides.
Although a program is
nothing but a flow of symbols, it has reality enough to
control the operation of very tangible machinery that
executes very physical operation.
. . . what kind of a thing is a schema?
If memory con
sists of transformations, what is transformed?
So long
as cognitive psychology literally did not know what it
was talking about, there was always a danger that it
was talking about nothing at all.
This is not longer a
serious risk.
Information is what is transformed, and
the structured pattern of its transformation is what we
want to u n d e r s t a n d .^
This is hardly a timid or speculative statement,
festo.

it is a m a n i 

Cognitive psychology is a model building,

shall see,

a synthetic exercise with

and as we

an observable base.

I n f o r m a t i o n , that which facilitates choice by narrowing

alter-

See W. Sluckin, Minds and Men (London, 1959) for a
review of the early work in simulation and Michael J. Apter,
The Computer Simulation of Behavior (New York, 1970) for a care
ful yet very readable review of recent work in the field.
1 04uiric Neisser,

Cognitive Psychology

(New York,

194B).
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natives,
as heard.

is processed by equipment which can be seen as well
The information

processing

point of view,

as the

computer program analogue to human cognition is generally
known,

is the first

synthetic psychology to provide explicit

models of transsummative and proactive-reactive man.

A

detailed presentation of the models is given in chapter four
and applied to Edwards'

synthetic but vague psychological

theory in chapter five.

It is enough here simply to indicate

the manner in which synthetic principles are expressed in the
language of information processing.
Man's relationship to the universe is included
"cybernetic hypothesis,"

in the

his encounter with the world is best

described as a proactive-reactive
said to Test-Operate-Test-Exit

"feedback loop."

(TOTE).

1 05

Man is

This fundamental unit

of analysis is actually a more confident,

explicit,

computer-

based model of Dewey's revised conception of the reflex arc
(Figure 4 ) .^ ^
Incoming information is received
or incongurity
is perceived,

control is exerted in the form of an operation

to correct the imbalance.
the operation,

Information is then fed back from

if the incongruity has been erased,

vidual exits from the loop.

"'^Norbert Wiener,

Pribram,
1960).

and if some inbalance

(similar to Locke's principle of "uneasiness")

the indi

Proactive control alternates with

Cybernetics

(New York,

1 948).

^ ^ G e o r g e A. Miller, Eugene Ealanter, and Karl H.
Plans and the Structure of Behavior (New York,
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Figure 4.

A simple feedback loop,

or TOTE unit.
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reactive reception

of information until harmony is achieved.

Transsummative man,

a rational-emotive unity,

is conIt is

held that there are two

kinds of mental organization,

rational and one emotional.

one

Rational functioning is held to

be analogous to the operation of a sequential computer pro
gram which

"makes only those tests which are appropriate in

the light of previous test outcomes."''^
irrational activity,

on the other hand,

Emotional

operation of a parallel computer program which
many activities simultaneously,

or

is comparable to the
"carries out

or at least independently."

109

The sequential program has many of the attributes of the
human

"stream" of consciousness,

while the parallel program

resembles what is known of the chaotic unconscious.
tantly,

Impor

in man these sequential and parallel programs are said

to function as a complex,

integrated,

unpredictable unit.

. . . human thinking is a multiple activity.
Awake or
asleep, a number of more or less independent trains of
thought usually coexist.
Ordinarily, there is a "main
sequence" in progress, dealing with some particular
material in step-by-step fashion.
The main sequence
corresponds to the ordinary course of consciousness.
It
may or may not be influenced by the other processes going
on simultaneously.
The concurrent operations are not
conscious, because consciousness is intrinsically s in
gle. n o

^ ^ 5 e e IMeisser, Cognitive Psy c h o l o g y , Chapt. 11, and
"The Multiplicity of Thouqht," British Journal of Psychology.
1 963, 54, 1 -1 4.
^^ N e i s s e r ,

110

Neisser,

Cognitive P s y chology, p. 297.

"Multiplicity," p. B.
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The principal function of this unconscious activity is,
according to Freud,

to find discharge for emotions which

striving for expression in our minds.

11 1

are

Thus all conscious

’’rational" mental activity is influenced by unconscious emo
tional activity.
The Synthetic psychological viewpoints which have
been discussed,

and their respective

expressions of the syn

thetic principles are summarized in Table 3.
In contrast to what many of his commentators believe,
Edwards'

psychological views have some historical company.

From at least the time of Augustine,

a select group of

thinkers have tried to describe their vision of a man at one
with himself and with the universe.
c hological descriptions
ful,

and historians'

Unfortunately,

these psy

have been only indifferently s u ccess

efforts to interpret synthetic p sy

chology have resulted in failure.

The thinkers themselves

can hardly be blamed for the confusion because they lacked
adequate raw intellectual materials.

Augustine,

Dewey were forced to use the faculty language,
ideal vehicle for expressing
Historians of Edwards'

Edwards,

and

hardly the

unified conceptions of anything.

psychological theory,

however,

have

111

Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams (New
York, 1923).
Neisser seeks to transform the Freudian concepts,
primary and secondary process thinking, into information p r o 
cessing concepts (parallel and sequential, respectively) which
are derived from observations of computer hardware.
It also
represents an attempt to discuss Freud in a cognitive rather
than a strictly motivational context; see Neisser, Cognitive
P s y c h o l o g y , pp. 3-11, for a clarification of "the cognitive
a p p r o a c h ."
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TABLE 3

SOME EXAMPLES OF THE SYNTHETIC

Transsummative
Theorist

Augustine

P r o a c tive-Reactive
Man

Man

"one life,

PRINCIPLES

one mind,

"re-cognition"

one essence"

"a sense
Edwards

Dewey

"Organic

Information

"Multiple

Processing

of the

"Active Powers"-Lockean Passivity

heart"

Mind"

"Reflex Arc"

"Feedback Loop"

Processing"
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been sloppy;

they have not bothered to define the history of

psychology in a way that places him in a context.

They have

been content merely to praise his uniqueness and lament his
fate.

Edwards has now been placed in a psychological co n 

text;

a prescriptive analysis of his views demonstrated the

immensity of his dilemma and the need for a model to explain
how man can be so utterly diverse as the

synthetic theorists

claim.
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CHAPTER

IV

AN INFORMATION-PROCESSING MODEL OF
HUMAN THINKING AND BEHAVIOR

In spite of proactive-reactive and transsummative
similarities which place them in a common

synthetic tradition,

Edwards and contemporary information-processing theorists
seem,

on the surface,

to be worlds apart.

a bstract in the extreme,
saints,

and sinners.

Edwards'

populated by deities,

He yearned

world was

devils,

for the day when

angels,

he would

join his colleagues in supernatural communion

in the next

world.

on the other

hand,

The information-processing theorists,

hold a view which is throughly mechanistic.

world is chiefly one of the concrete

gadgets,

Their

programs,

and

printouts that characterize their computers whose yearnings,
if computers can be said to yearn,

would certainly not be

directed toward the Calvinist God but rather toward an oil
can which never runs dry or perhaps an infinitely long piece
of magnetic tape.

The aspirations and fate of the theorists

t hemselves remains,
many would

of course,

an open question,

although

undoubtedly feel more comfortable alongside their

machines than in the presence of Edwards'
The mechanistic

proactive-reactive and transsummative
mation-processing

God.

attitude is displayed in both the

approach.

aspects of the i n for

Most information-processing
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theorists believe,

following

Norbert Wiener,

cybernetic systems need not even be alive.^
turies past)
up systems,

or nobody in particular
ranging

that functioning
God

(for c e n 

(after Darwin)

has set

from the molar universe down to molecular

biology and atomic physics,

which run on a homeostatic p r i n 

ciple.^

seeks to satisfy a need and when

An organism always

equilibrium is achieved,
manifest.

it will rest until a need is again

The thesis of much contemporary and motivational

psychology is that one of man's basic needs is to organize,
3

manipulate,
must plan,

understand,

and control his

environment.

Man

seek and receive information relevant to his plan,

execute the plan,

and evaluate the extent to which the plan

has been successfully executed.
inescapable as death;

Lifelong planning is as

it is an incontrovertible fact of human

nature.
The human race at times
lot.

appears to be such a rational

We TOTE our plans here and there,

testing,

testing,

operating,

and eventually exiting from our various loops.

man were only a TOTE-er,
dictable as the computers

however,

If

he would be as dull and pre

he is alleged to resemble

"'wiener, Cybernetics .
^Loren Eiseley has described in a lucid and com
pelling fashion the manner in which multifaceted nature
became detached from the God hypothesis; see Darwin's Century
(New York, 1958).
It might almost be contended that the time
is ripe for the re-invocation of a modified God Hypothesis,
now that man has created cybernetic "thinking" machines.
^The classic statement of this position is Robert W.
White, "Motivation Reconsidered:
The Concept of Competence."
Psychological R e v i e w . 1 959 , _ , 297-333.
Early research on

66
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intellectually.
stances,

Yet except under extreme or trivial c ircum 

human thinking

unpredictable.
theorists,

Why?

and activity is characteristically

Chiefly,

say the information-processing

because of the exasperating human propensity to

choose what we like from among alternatives without actually
knowing what we like.

The choices may be considered

or fickle but in either case they involve discarding or not
attending to what is perceived as irrelevant or unpleasurable
stimulation.^

The conscious and/or unconscious selection

of

alternatives is said to be based on emotional considerations.
The choices are a function of the total conscious and uncon
scious history of the organism which,
it can never be),

if known(as,

of course,

might permit exact prediction of a person's

next plan and mode of executing it.

Jonathan Edwards;

A Computerized Theologian?

How can such utter mechanism be reconciled with
Edwards'

insistence that man operates within a moment-to-

"competence" motivation came from the primate laboratory of
Harry F. Harlow; see Harlow's "Mice, Monkeys, Men, and
Motives,"
Psychological R e v i e w . 1 953 , 6J3, 23-32, and R. A.
Butler, "Discrimination Learning by Rhesus Monkeys to Visual
Exploration Motivation,"
Journal of Comparative and Physio
logical P s y c h o l o g y . 1 953, 4_6, 95-98.
4
Few computer simulators have taken Meisser's cogent
seriously.
He has maintained that all human th i n k 
ing is motivated, often by emotionally-laden desires that are
unconscious, i.e., outside the focus of attention.
See his
"The Imitation of Man by Machine," S c i e n c e . 1 963,
39 , 1 93 —
197, and Cognitive P s y c h o l o g y , Chapter 11.
Those informationprocessing -theorists who have attempted to incorporate emotion
into their programs have generally treated it as an "inter
rupting mechanism," rather than as an aspect of cognition
which is thoroughly integrated with all intellectual

1
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moment dependence upon God?"*
two views are very similar.

In fact,

in many respects,

the

Neither scheme can account for

or predict much of the immense variability in human thinking
and acting.

Edwards

and the information-processing theorists

generally present the motivational determinants of cognition
and behavior in the form of excuses for their ignorance of
those determinants.
hend

Who,

asks Edwards,

can pretend to a p pre

God's will in its totality?
In these [spiritual] things, men that are prudent for
their temporal interest, act as though they were bereft
of reason:
"They have eyes and see not; ears and hear
not; neither do they understand:
They are like the horse
and Mule, that have no understanding" (Mark 8 : 1 B, Ps. 32:
9).
(Jer. 8:7), "The stork in the heaven knoweth her
appointed times; and the turtle, and the crane, and the
swallow, observe the time of their coming:
But my people
know not the judgement of the Lord."
. . . And how can these things be accounted for,
by supposing a most wretched depravity of n a t u r e ? ^

but

It is man's condition of original sin which prevents him from

activity.
See especially Herbert 5imon, "Motivational and
Emotional Controls of Cognition," Psychological R e v i e w , 1967,
74, 29-39.
Programs which have this sort of "emotional" fac
tor built into them include Walter Reitman's "Argus" (C o g 
nition and Thought:
An Information Processing A p p r o a c h , New
York, 1965) and J. C. Loehlin's "Aldous" (Computer Models of
P e r s o n a l i t y , New York, 1968).
Although computerized "emotion"
of this sort does interrupt and select, it does not, a ccord
ing to Neisser, do even remote justice to the complex, mostly
unconscious nature of most emotional attraction and replusion.
"'This aspect of Edwards' thought has been elaborated
by Paul Conkin, Puritans and Pragmatists (New York, 1968),
Chapter 2, and David Lyttle, "Jonathan Edwards on Personal
Identity," Early American L i t e r a t u r e , 1 972, . ( ), 1 63-1 71 .
The clearest demonstration of Edwards' belief in utter and
complete dependence upon God is contained in his History of
the Work of R e d e m p t i o n , in 5. E. Dwight, ed., W o r k s , III, pp.
165-436.
In this unfinished opus Edwards attempted to explain
the entire history of the world, in Toynbee-like fashion, as
the expression of God's personal handiwork.

82

1 970),

^Original S i n , ed. by Clyde A. Holbrook
pp. 1 55-1 56.
(1 758)

(New Haven,
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complete understanding of God's will,
No one,

claims

theorist,

Ulric Neisser,

and hence,

of himself.^

a leading information-processing

can hope to understand completely the remarkably

complex intermingling

of conscious

and unconscious processes

which together form the "main sequence" of consciousness.
The existence of more than one process implies that
the main sequence may be altered in "unpredictable" ways
at almost any moment.
The change will usually be away
from immediate adaptation to the external world and
toward an emphasis on inner needs.^
At this moment

I do not know,

on this fDage will be beca use
strength

exactly,
I am not

what the next sentence
ah(are of the nature and

of many personal inner needs.

Like th e will of

E d w a r d s ' God , the human m ind is far too complex and man's
discernir ig p ower m uch too inadequate to permit a p e r s o n 's
thoughts

and actio ns to b e described ahe:ad of t ime in a per-

sonalized,

ideo-motor itinerary.

Edwards and the information-processing point of view
not only hold proactive-reactive
ples in common,

and transsummative p rinci

each also acknowledges

the essential unpre

dictability of human thinking and action.
somewhct arrogantly perhaps,

Edwards sought,

to use his knowledge of the

At one point Edwards hinted that the mechanism of
depravity is a sort of cognitive laziness combined with the
extraordinary complexity of the divine stimulation.
Those ideas which do not pertain to the prime essence of
th i n g s — such as all colors that are everywhere objected
to our eyes; and sounds that are continually in our ears;
those that affect the touch as cold and heat; and all our
sen s a t i o n s — exceedingly clog the mind in searching into
the innermost nature of things.
(The M i n d , p. 35).
^"Multiplicity of Thought,"

pp.

9-1□.
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psychology of mortals as a stepping stone to insight into
G o d ’s will.

Modern cognitive psychologists,

supernaturalist

distrusting

"explanations," concern themselves with man's

mind as an end in itself.

Each view,

however,

an attempt to unravel the old dilemma of St.

is offered as

Paul who,

like

most of us, often had difficulty understanding his thoughts,
his plans,

his behavior and the relationship between each of

them.
For that which
I do I allow not:
for what I would
that I do not; but
what I hate, that do I.
If then I do
that which I would
not, I consent unto the law that it is
good.
Now then it is no more I that do it, but sin that
dwelleth in me. . . .
I find then a law, that, when I
would do good, evil is present with m e . 9
Here in a theological nutshell lay a central problem in the
history of psychology:

the relationship between motivation,

cognition,

"How," ask Miller,

and action.

et a l . pointedly

"in the name of all that is psychological should we put the
mind,

the heart,

and the body t ogether?"”'^

Edwards had the remarkable insight that such a syn
thetic enterprise was actually necessary.
not know how this might be accomplished.

But

Edwards did

He only knew that

human functions which were alleged to be separate and inde
pendent were really not that way at all.

Contemporary info r

mation-processing theory has taken up the synthetic principles
where Edwards left them.

They have constructed some fas

cinating models which demonstrate how a proactive-reactive,
g
Romans 7:15-17;

21

(King James Version).

^^ P l a n s , p . 71.
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t r anssummative rational-emotive man might
principal difference,
information

processing

of course,

function.

between Edwards'

The

theory and

is that Edwards looked through man in

search of the first cause while the information-processing
point of view attributes human thinking and behavior to the
more mundane,

but hardly less mysterious

human mind."^

For a long while after the b e h avioristic revolution
in American scientific psychology,
complex,
trickle.

interesting,
12

For a variety of reasons,

among the i n t r o s p e c t i o n i s t s , the
i oristic
Watson,

speculation concerning

"inner mental processes"

"theory,"

including

slowed to a
squabbling

utter simplicity of b ehav

and the flamboyant

leadership of John B.

behaviorism quickly became the dominant school of

American psychology.

13

During this era,

from approximately

^ T h e o r e t i c a l l y , Edwards stands on firmer ground than
information - p r o c e s s i n g theorists in the area of motivation.
For Edwards., God was at the root of it all.
Contemporary
cognitive theorists, on the o ther hand, have simply thrown up
their hands; motivation is simply treated as an "independent
variable" in cognition research.
"Thus," Neisser points out,
it is no accident that the cognitive approach gives us
no way to know what the subject wil l think of next.
We
cannot possibly know this; unless we have a detailed
understanding of what he is trying to do and why.
(C ognitive P s y c h o l o g y , p. 305).
1 2 In 1913, John B. Watson first drew the battle lines
between his cause, behavior, and the "introspectionists," or
those who purported to be seeking the elements of the human
mind; see "Psychology as the B e h a v iorist View it."
^ 5 e e Boring, History, pp. 620-663, and R. I. Watson,
Great P s y c h o l o g i s t s , pp. 406-435, for surveys of the rise of
behaviorism.
For an interesting "inside" view of the early
days of behaviorism consult J. B. W a t son's short autobiography
in Carl Murchison, ed., A History of Psychology in A u t o 
biography , III, (Worcester, M a s s ., 1 9 3 6 ) , p p . 2 7 1 - 2 8 1 .
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1 920 to 1 950,
lation

American psychology truly lost its mind;

specu

about mental processes was almost non-existent."^

Late in this period Donald □. Hebb made a valiant attempt to
prod his colleagues into a reconsideration of central p r o 
cesses

and the nature of thought."^

theory of neural-phase

Although Hebb's complex

sequences and cell assemblies

has

stimulated the research of an entire generation of p h y s i o 
logical psychologists,
inconclusive."^

much of this research has remained

Walter R. Reitman has outlined the d i ffi

culties encountered by those whose research is based on Hebb's
model of central processes,

and the manner in which an i n for

mation-processing approach can solve a number of these prob
lems .
It should be clear that the use of information processing
programs . . . enables us to state and explore systems of
psychological constructs in a manner not possible either
with theories framed in words or with direct e x p erimenta
tion.
With verbal models, it is practically impossible
to be sure that conclusions follow only from explicit
assumptions and that they in no way depend upon "unpro
grammed" elements entering formally into the argument.

Of course, Gestalt psychology and Psychoanalysis
acknowledged the importance of the mind but they were European
imports which were regarded with suspicion.
Edward C. Tolman
was a notable exception among American behaviorists in that
he emphasized the importance of mental constructs which he
called "cognitive maps;" see "Cognitive Maps in Rats and Men."
Psychological R e v i e w . 1 948, 55., 1 89-208.
A short historical
review of the death and rebirth of interest in the mind among
American psychologists may be found in Robert R. Holt,
"Imagery:
The Return of the Ostracized," American Psvcholoq i s t , 1 964, J_9, 254-264.
1 5The Organization of Behavior

(New York,

1949).

^Hebb has discussed and reviewed research on his
model in "The American Revolution," American P s y c h o l o g i s t .
1 960, 1_5, 735-745 and in his Textbook of P s y c h o l o g y . 3rd
edition (Philadelphia, 1972), pp. 56-94.
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With laboratory experiments, we cannot get a test of the
theory in and of itself.
We must settle for a test of
the theory taken together with all the assumptions about
manipulations, measures, and conditions that couple the
theory by means of operational definitions to the real
world.
If unexpected results occur, we are unable to say
w hether the difficulty is in the theory, the ancillary
assumptions, or both.
In an information-processing model,
we can state, manipulate, and deduce implications from
our theories in a way that is at once sure, unambiguous,
and yet independent of operations relating the theory to
data on human b e h a v i o r . 17
One might objectto Reitman's enthusiastic,

blanket

endorsement of the information-processing approach on the
grounds that virtually nothing ties the analogue
to the phenomenon that

is to be explained

From a skeptic's point of view,

information-processing

chology might resemble a metaphorical

machine

analogy,

Let

point out,

the computer analogies,

is composed of hard,

information-processing

The mind-

is just an analogy.

virtually all information-processing

models,

"How might the mind

us count the ways!"

in other words,

psy

game played by f r u s 

trated poets that goes something like:
be like a computer?

(the machine)

(the human mind).

Yet,

as

theorists are eager to

unlike all previous mind

functioning,

psychologist can

real stuff.

not only avoid

The
getting

bogged down in the interminable warfare over proper e xperi
mental

designs,

demand

characteristics,

can be observed to do many things which

etc.,

his machines

humans can also do.

Computers can be programmed to solve problems in symbolic
17
Cognition and T h o u g h t , p. 14.
It might be said that
Hebb's theory has been "framed in experiments," while E d w a r d s ’
theory is "framed in words."
Each type, according to the
i nformation-processing point of view, can benefit from a c on
crete computer analogue.
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logic,

play chess,

is interesting,
machines
ties,

and recognize perceptual patterns."'^

therefore,

to determine

can most efficiently accomplish

and to speculate that,

just maybe,

It

by what mechanisms
human-like act i v i 
humans

also process

information in a similar fashion.
In order to transform computer technology into p s y 
chology some attempt must be made to investigate human c o g 
nition,

characterize it,

processing models.

and compare it to information-

Do the available data on human cognition

and behavior indicate that the basic mind-machine
r easonably appropriate?

analogy is

In order to answer this question,

the information-processing theorists must combine enthusiasm
for experimentation on human subjects with extensive k n owl
edge of computer programming.

They must bring themselves to

apply the principles derived from their clean machines to the
messy arena of human thinking and behavior.
George A. Miller,

Pribram,

have demonstrated that the computer analogue is a

very heuristic

Eugene Galanter,

Three such indi

viduals,

and Karl H.

device which provides a coherent model for

^^Allen Newall, J. C. Shaw, and Herbert 5imon p r o 
grammed their "Logical Problem Solver" to solve the symbolic
logic problems in Russell and Whitehead's Principia M a t h e 
matics . See "Elements of a Theory of Human Problem Solving,"
Psychological R e v i e w , 1 958, 65., 151-166.
A. D. DeGroot's
analysis of Chess is compatible with information-processing
theory; see Thought and Choice in Chess (The Hague, 1965).
Oliver Selfirdge and Ulric IMeisser have programmed a computer
to recognize a wide variety of shapes such as the letter
"A"; see "Pattern Recognition by Machine," Scientific American,
1960, 203, 60-68.
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much of what

humans think and do.

the TOTE unit,
is derived,

is compelling,

19

Their unit of analysis,

and the analogue from which it

the cybernetic information-processing machine,

really is and does something.
As they have attempted to establish the legitimacy
and develop the potential of the mind-machine analogy,
expositions

of many information-processing

the

psychologists

have become increasingly esoteric.

To the uninitiated,

semi-official organ of publication,

Cognitive Psy c h o l o g y ,

their

probably bears a closer resemblance to an astrological
epheiwermus than to recognizable
mind.^

discussions of the human

While the details of computer programming

lation of human processes may be obscure,
ciples are not.

and simu

their general prin

The proactive-reactive principles of the

information-processing

approach have never been elaborated

more clearly than they were by Miller et al.1s elaboration of
the TOTE unit.

This clarity is one reaon why their dis

cussion provides much of the substance of the summary
which follows below of the proactive-reactive
mation-processing

account

aspect of infor

psychology.

19
P l a n s ; see below, section 2.
Since 1960, there has
not been a book written on cognitive psychology which does
not derive, in part, from this extremely seminal work.

20

C f . the monograph by Terry Winograd, "Understanding
Natural Language, . . ." Cognitive Psy c h o l o g y , 1 972, _3, 1191.
Like the whereabouts of the mythical Captain Zero, the
contents of this study must be truly "known only to a few in
the outside world."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The other,

more obvious,

reason for focusing on the

basic proactive-reactive TOTE unit,
transsummative model,

along with IMeisser's

is that this essay is conceived as an

exercise in historical interpretation.
concerned with

Jonathan

Edwards'

expressed in his congitive theory.
fore,

It is essentially

view of man as it was
What is needed,

there

is an approach to information processing which empha

sizes the model of man implied in it:

in essence a philo

sophical approach to information processing.

The thesis is

that since

Jonathan Edwards and contemporary information-

processing

psychologists each holds that man is a proactive-

reactive and rational-emotive unity,

it is appropriate to

apply the clearer and more explicit modern terminology to
Edwards ' v i e w s .
The attempt made here to map a contemporary p sycho
logical scheme onto a historical theory might be considered
an intellectual historian's counterpart to psychohistory.
It is the psychohistorian's task,

usually,

to interpret the

behavior of some famous and enigmatic historical figure within
the framework

of revised,

Eriksonian psychoanalytic

theory.

21

21

Although Freud did write history from a p sycho
analytic point of view, the term "psychohistory" is closely
associated with Erik H. Erikson.
See especially Young Man
Luther and Ghandi's T r u t h . The life of Jonathan Edwards has
been psychoanalyzed in two related fascinating studies by
Richard Bushman.
In "Jonathan Edwards and Puritan Conscious
ness," Journal for the Scientific Study of R e l i g i o n , 1 966, _5,
383-396, Bushman's use of psychoanalytic theory is very
vague and the notion of a Puritan Consciousness must remain a
mystery because of the author's failure to discuss the meaning
of some general "consciousness."
See also Bushman's "Jonathan
Edwards as Great Man:
Identity, Conversion, and Leadership
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It is contended by psychohistorians that certain p s y c h o 
analytic insights,

especially

"identity crisis,"

help to

explain the behavior of these interesting individuals.
this

essay,

In

a significant contemporary psychological theory,

information processing,

is used to explain

behavior but the intellectual formulations
figure.

22

not the personal
of a historical

The whole exercise is conceived as an attempt to

place a set of seemingly rather odd and quaint ideas into a
context which permits their psychological

significance to

become comprehensible to contemporary readers.
Two standard criticisms of psychohistory are also
pertinent to the current
sidered.

First,

endeavor and these need to be c o n 

it has been pointed out that the perceived

c redibility of psychohistorical research is largely a function
of one's devotion to revised psychoanalytic theory.
does

23

not believe in the existence of identity crises,

If one
for

in the Great Awakening," Soundings;
An Interdisciplinary
J o u r n a l , 1 969, 52_, 15-46.
This article represents an attempt
to transpose the Eriksonian model onto Edwards' early life
and later writing.
^ T h e classic statement of "identity crisis" is in
Erikson's Identity, Youth, and Crisis (New York, 1968).
23
A sarcastic, even bitter, but very literate attack
on the concept of psychohistory is that of Jacques Barzun,
"History;
The Muse and Her Doctors," American Historical
R e v i e w , 1 972, _77, 36-64.
Barzun asks a very pertinent
question:
Why is psychoanalysis in its broadest sense the only psy
chology favored by the psycho-historian? . . . Certainly
there is no warrant for believing that only psychoanalysis
can show results in the study of personality (p. 50).
The point of view of the psychohistorians is specifically
defended by Robert Jay Lifton, "On P s y c h o h i s t o r y , in Herbert
Bass, ed., The State of American History (New York, 1970),
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instance,

it is unlikely he can be convinced that

he has a

deeper understanding of Luther because he is informed that
Luther had an identity crisis.
and unfair.

This

It is fair because,

criticism is both fair

of course,

there are v ir

tually an infinite number of ways to interpret theoretically
a piece
Jungian,

of behavior.
or Adlerian,

pretation?

After all,

Why not,

it might be asked,

or Sullivanian,

employ a

or existential in t e r 

psychoanalytic theory has fallen upon

hard times within clinical psychology and personality theory,
so why should historians adopt it u n q u e s t i o n i n g l y ? ^
criticism is also unfair.
operated

Traditionally,

Yet the

historians have

as though they inhabited a methodological vacuum

when in fact they have not.

They

have simply chosen to

remain blissfully ignorant of their biases.

25

An important

and by the contributors to Bruce Mazlish, e d . , Psychoanalysis
and H i s t o r y , 2nd edition (New York, 1971).
^^Psychotherapy no longer requires the famous couch
or references to mysterious, unconscious drives.
Many c o n 
t emporary theorists and therapists focus on the conscious
goals and purposes of a patient rather than aboriginal id
forces; cf. Carl Rogers, On Becoming a Person (Boston, 1961),
George A. Kelly, The Psychology of Personal C o n s t r u c t s , 2
Vols. (New York, 1955), and Albert Ellis, Reason and Emotion
in Psychotherapy (New York, 1962).
Behavioristic clinicians,
on the other hand, see no need to ask a patient about either
his conscious or his unconscious processes; cf. Joseph Wolpe,
The Practice of Behavior Therapy (New York, 1969).
For a
good survey of contemporary clinical theory and practice, con
sult Lawrence A. Pervin, Personality:
Theory Assessment and
Research (New York, 1970).
25
David Hackett Fisher calls this the Baconian Fal
l a c y , whose classic examples derive from the nineteenth
century.
Yet it is Fischer's contention that most conte m p o 
rary historians still implicitly accept the inverted Kiplingism,
"Them that asks no questions isn't told a truth."
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virtue of good psychohistory is that the historian's assump
tions are relatively clear,
up on a table.

like a deck of cards laying face

There is no pretense at "bare description";

the psychohistorian seeks to interpret,

and if the reader

believes that his understanding of a historical figure or
event has been enhanced,

then the enterprise has been suc

cessful.
Psychohistory is, therefore,

a form of presentism,

the study of the past for the sake of the present.
application

of information-processing

or

The

concepts and terminology

to the psychological theory of Edwards,
be sure,

26

while presentistic to

is presentistic in part for historicist reasons.

In contemporary historiography, there is a tendency not
to reject this statement in an abstract way but rather to
accept it in principle and to forget it in practice.
There is an inherited antipathy to questions and hyptheses
and models which is apt to run below the surface of a
historian's thought.
The results are readily apparent in
the conceptual poverty of many historical m onographs—
a poverty to be explained not by the stupidity of the
authors, but rather by their habitual reluctance to give
sufficient attention to the organization of their inquiry,
to the specification of their assumptions, and to the
explication of their intentions.
Historian's Fallacies;
Toward a Logic of Historical Inquiry
(New York, 1970), p. 7.
“^ A c t u a l l y Stocking's use of "presentism" referred to
a progressionist interpretation of historical events.
Yet
another form of "the study of the past for the sake of the
present" is the imposition of contemporary models and cate
gories on history; see Stocking, "Historicism and Presentism,"
and pp. 6 9 - 7 3
above.
Polanyi refers to the misuse of the
presentistic application of models to history as "the ratio
nalist fallacy" in which "history may be written by applying
our own standards, without allowing for the difference in
the historical setting . . . ," Study of M a n , p. 87.
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While it might be argued that Luther or Ghandi did what they
wanted to cfo, there is clear evidence that Edwards could not
say what he wanted to say because he lacked a suitable
vocabulary.^
described

Edwards'

psychological thought cannot even be

adequately without the imposition of some add i 

tional concepts that he did not u s e . ^
Theorists may be divided into neologizers and nonneologizers,
vision

into those who invent new words to fit their

and those who try to stretch or alter the meaning of

current
gory.

usage.

Edwards clearly falls into the latter ca t e 

He stretched the meanings of key psychological terms

like "faculty," heart,"
creates

and "will"

studies Edwards.

inexpressible in the psychological
The information-processing

serves a dual purpose:

in fact,

they also were mostly
jargon of Edwards'

analogue is,

and presentistic explanation.
must,

This

Not only are many Edwardsean concepts

foreign to contemporary psychology,

which

until they broke.

an odd situation for the historian of psychology who

therefore,

era.

a tool

it aids historicist description
To some extent,

the reader

"buy" the information-processing approach to

^ P e r r y Miller makes this point often; cf. Jonathan
E d w a r d s , pp. 187-188, and "5ense of the Heart."
This s itua
tion represents an interesting inversion of the so-called
"Whorfian Hypothesis"— that linguistic structure places
severe limitations upon human understanding.
Edwards appar
ently saw the world differently but could not adequately
describe it.
Very creative individuals must face this problem
frequently.
^ S e e Chapter 2, pp. 60 - 6 7, for a discussion of the
scholarly confusion which has resulted from trying to under
stand the psychology of Edwards solely on his own terms.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1 44

human cognition in order to react favorably to the interpre
tation of Edwards'
keep in mind,

thought in chapter five.

however,

Skeptics should

that analogies are all that have ever

existed for the explication of mental processes.
mation-processing analogue is,
heuristic,

and

yet devised.

29

by all estimates,

(with certain limitations)

The infor
the most

believable analogy

It is certainly an improvement on an analogy

popular in Edwards'

era,

the "mind of God."

Asa Burton,

an

Edwardsean of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth cen
turies,

for instance,

claimed that

the attributes of God are all comprised in three; b enevo
lence, knowledge, and power, answering to the faculties
in men called the heart, the understanding, and will

. .

.30

It must have been reassuring to know that one's mind is a bit
like God's.

The analogy is somewhat deficient,

however,

since

in order to evaluate the adequacy of the analogy one must
first die.

This would

appear to place severe limitations on

the capacity of the psychologist to convey the results of his
evaluation to his colleagues.

inability of computers to be sufficiently emotional and
irrational (Cognitive P s y c h o l o g y , Chapter 11).
A recent
development in the application of information-processing theory
and technology to irrational processes is the work of Christo
pher Evans, who holds that dreaming is analagous to taking a
computer "off-line"; see the interview with Evans in Intellec
tual D i g e s t , October, 1973, pp. 6-10.
30
Essays on Some of the First Principles of Met a physicks, Ethicks. and T h e o l o g y , ed. by James G. Blight
(Albany, New York), 1973.
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The second criticism of psychohistory
cation,

(and by im p l i 

the application of information-processing theory to

Edwards)

is in some respects more serious than the first.

is claimed that psychohistorians

It

often substitute empty jar-

gon and far-fetched analogies for good historical knowledge.
There is no pat response to this
historian,
exhaust

allegation.

Like any other

the presentist must do his homework;

he must

all primary and secondary information pertinent to

his topic.

He must be acutely aware of the complexity of

historical information and not leap
plistic,
model,

31

blockbuster flourishes.

32

into unwarranted,

sim-

The use of an explicit

like revised psychoanalysis or information-processing

theory,

unfortunately provides the temptation to try to map

the model onto history in a perfectly-congruent fashion.
presentist

fits and where it does not.
computer programmer.

Jonathan Edwards was hardly a

He had never even heard of anybody

called a "psychologist."

There are,

therefore,

between the contemporary model and the
inquiry.

33

The

historian must carefully delineate where the model

It has been pointed out that,

^Cf.

Barzun,

differences

object of historical
for Edwards,

"History."

"^Probably the classic piece of sophomoric, s e c o n d 
hand psychoanalysis is the study of Woodrow Wilson by William
C. Bullitt and Sigmund Freud, Thomas Woodrow Wilson, TwentyEighth President of the United States:
A Psychological 5tudy
(B o s t o n , 1967).
33
There is never perfect congruence between models
and whatever it is that is being modeled.
As Michael J. Apter
points out,
If models are essentially explanatory in function . . .
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i nformation

if of supernatural rather than natural origin,

and that the operational phase of the TOTE

unit consists

not

in active manipulation of the environment but in passive
reception of the Holy Spirit.

34

In chapter four these d i f 

ferences between the theological psychology of Edwards and
contemporary information-processing theory are not explained
away or glossed over but,

instead,

are incorporated into a

revised model that is appropriate for Edwards.
c hological viewpoint,
when

however,

compared to the remarkable continuities.

proactive-reactive,

rational-emotive

Flan, that

unity that Edwards

observed

floundering

long

is the same unified being that

ago,

From a psy

these differences are minimal

after God in his Northampton parish so
information-process

ing theorists envision when they reflect on the human implica
tions of the structure and function of their computing machines.

The Cybernetic

Hypothesis:

A Modern

Conception

of Man as Proactive and Reactive
According to Miller,
p sychological optimists

Galanter,

and Pribram,

and psychological

there are

pessimists.

35

The

then the criteria used to judge them must be those used
to judge theories in general.
One will never be able to
prove that a model is "true," just as one can never
finally prove that a theory is true.
The most that one
can say of both a theory and a model is that it is con
sistent with the known facts, not that it is true.
Computer S i m u l a t i o n , p. 25.
34

See Chapter 3, pp.

^ P l a n s , pp.

108-112.

6-8
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optimists are the behaviorists,
who,

following

Pavlov,

the stimulus-response men,

seek to discover sets of environmental

events which will consistently elicit given sets of overt
behavior.

In the twentieth century,

these theorists have

expressed great confidence that they can,
least,

theoretically at

predict and control all human b e h a v i o r . T h e i r

con

fidence is based on the remarkable belief that the hyphen
(the human m i n d ) between stimulus and response is a passive
sieve through which an environment and an organism interact
with each other.
tain that

although

The pessimists,

on the other hand,

main

environmental events do affect behavior,

the effect is mediated by an organism's i m a g e , or "picture of
itself and its universe,"

that is, by the manner in which the

person construes objects and e v e n t s . ^
cognitive psychologists,

The pessimists, or

believe that the conscious and uncon

scious hyphen of the behaviorists is actually the most i m por
tant determinant of human behavior.

In a science which is

dedicated to parsimony and prediction of behavior,
mists clearly violate the rules.

They

the p essi

hold that man's nature

The most famous statement of the Behaviorist utopian
b raggadoccio is John B. Watson's:
Give me a dozen healthy infants, well formed and my own
specified world to bring them up in and I'll guarantee to
take any one at random and train him to become any type
of specialist I might select— doctor, lawyer, artist,
merchant-chief, and yes, even beggar-man and thief,
regardless of his talents, penchants, tendencies, abili
ties, vocations; and race of his ancestors.
B ehaviorism (New York, 1925), p. 82.
More subtle and slightly
qualified, but similar expressions may be found in B. F.
5kinner's works, expecially Walden II (New York, 1948) and
Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York, 1971).
■^Miller,

et a l .. Plans,

pp.

1-2.

The concept of
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is not contained in a simple S-R equation but rather he is
incredibly complex,

and therefore that prediction of human

activity will never be more than potential.
If it is granted that minds make a difference,
must inquire into how,

exactly,

trolled by his "image'.1.

This,

ancient mind-body dilemma,
of the will.

one

a person's behavior is con
of course,

is an aspect of the

and more specifically,

the problem

The most famous and influential modern tr e a t 

ment of "the psychology of volition"
ideo-motor action.

Actually,

is James's theory of

the ideo-motor concept is a

theory of mental life:

each defaults by postulating a void.

"M o v e m e n t ," said James,

"is the natural,

feeling

. . .

expression,
James,

It is so in reflex action,

immediate effect of
it is so in emotional

it is so in the voluntary l i f e . 38

then,

son's internal representation of his universe,
that.

According to

behavior is automatically controlled by a p er
and that is

To support this rather abrupt contention he offers a

persuasive

and picturesque example which,

he claims,

"seems

. . . to contain in miniature form the data for an entire
psychology of volition."

39

We know what it is to get out of bed on a freezing
morning in a room without a fire, and how the very vital
principle within us protests against the ordeal.
Prob
ably most persons have lain on certain mornings for an

33William James,
(Mew York, 1890), V. II,

Principles of Psy c h o l o g y , 2 Vols.,
p. 527.

3 9 I b i d ., p. 525.
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hour at a time unable to brace themselves to the resolve.
We think how late we shall be, how the duties of the day
will suffer; we say, "I must get up, this is ignominious
etc., but still the warm couch feels too delicious, the
cold outside too cruel, and resolution faints away and
postpones itself again and again just as it seemed on the
verge of bursting the resistance and passing over into
the decisive act.
Now how do we ever get up under such
circumstances?
If I may generalize from my own experi
ence, we more often than not get up without any struggle
at all.
We suddenly find that we have got up.
A fortu
nate lapse of consciousness occurs; we forget both the
warmth and the cold; we fall into some reverie connected
with the day's life, in the course of which the idea
flashed across us, "Hollo! I must lie here no l o n ger"—
an idea which at that lucky instant awakens no c ontra
dictory or paralyzing suggestions, and consequently pro
duces immediately its appropriate motor effects.40
Despite the charm and apparent common sense contained in
James's notion of willing,

his explanation strikes many con-

temporary psychologists as inadequate.
of the relationship between mental

41

Dur understanding

activity and behavior is

hardly enhanced because we are told that volition becomes
activity at "lucky instants."
"The bridge

As Miller,

et a l . , put it,

James gives us between the idea and the motor is

nothing but a h y p h e n . W h y

^ I b i d ., p.

did James,

lying in bed,

not

524.

41

Cf. Gregory A. Kimble and Lawrence C. Perlmuter,
"The Problem of Volition," Psychological R e v i e w , 1970, 7 7 ,
361-384, and Rollo May, "William James' Humanism and the
Problem of Will," in Robert B. MacLeod, e d ., William James:
Unfinished Business (Washington, D.C., 1969), pp. 73-91.
These recent articles examine James' theory of volition from
very different p e r s pectives— Kimble and Perlmuter are experi
mental psychologists while May is an existential psycho
therapist.
In each case, however, James' theory of volition,
of will, is held to be basically sound but in need of elabora
tion.
42
P l a n s . p. 12.
James' ambiguity was not unique in
the nineteenth century; nearly all theorists of volition pro
vided a hyphen "explanation."
Cf. William B. Carpenter,
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get up?

Why did he eventually arise?

Why,

after arising,

did he stay up and proceed with his daily activities?

A

model is needed which can transform the series of "lucky
instants"

into events which appear to occur in some logical

sequence.
The cybernetic hypothesis,
theory of Miller,

and in particular the TOTE

et a l . . provides a coherent,

computer-

based model which attempts to characterize the relationship
between the inner man and the outer world.

It can help to

explain how man is both proactive and reactive:
could

lie in bed,

how James

passively receiving information from inner

and outer sources and then suddenly get up and stay up;
how a backsliding
could

or

Northampton parishioner of Jonathan Edwards

sit in a pew,

earnestly seeking his salvation in yet

another hellfire sermon,

and suddenly become completely ove r 

whelmed by a spiritual experience which later investigation
would

"prove" to be genuine.
The TOTE unit,

number of key concepts,

Test-O p e r a t e - T e s t - E x i t , is based on a
most of which are derived from c o m 

puter technology.
Plan —
A plan is any hierarchical process in the organism that
can control the order in which a sequence of operations
is to be performed.
A plan is, for an organism, essentially the same as a
program for a computer, especially if the program has the
sort of hierarchical character described a b o v e . 43
Principles of Mental Physiology (London, 1874) and Alexander
Bain, The 5enses and the Intellect (London, 1855).
43|V|iiier>

et a l . , P l a n s . p.

16.
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Strategy and T a c tics—
The molar units in the organization of behavior will be
said to comprise the behavioral s t r a t e g y , and the
molecular units, the t a c t i c s .^4
Exec u t i o n -We shall say that a creature is executing a particular
plan when in fact that plan is controlling the sequence
of operations he is carrying out. . . . The execution of
a Plan need not result in overt action--especially in man,
it seems to be true that there are Plans for collecting
or transforming information, as well as Plans for guiding
a c t i o n s . 45
Image—
The image is all the accumulated, organized knowledge
that the organism has about itself and its world. . . .
It includes everything the organism has l e a rned— his
values as well as his fact— organized by whatever con
cepts, images, or relations he has been able to m a s t e r . ^
These concepts are all airy attributes of the human
mind.

No one has ever seen a Plan,

Executive,

or an Image,

ulty" or an electron.
"law" of parsimony,

Each notion is invoked,

explain some observed behavior.

p.

an

following the

only when it is deemed necessary to help
It is apparent that until

very recently few twentieth-century

4 4 Ibid..

a strategem or tactic,

just as no one has ever seen a "fac

psychologists

believed

17.

45 I b i d .. p. 1 7 .
Informational Plans constitute
Edwards' domain when he attempts to explain the interaction
between the divine and supernatural light and the psy c h o 
logical mechanisms in man.
We shall see that he proposes a
plan for collecting (that is, for absorbing or receiving)
the Spirit and a Plan for transforming the Spiritual light
into an entirely new image.
46

Ib i d ..

p.

17-18.
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that the explanatory value

of mental constructs was worth

the speculative confusion they seemed to produce.
Miller et a l . lament,

experimental psychologists

as

generally select for their analy

sis of behavior is the r e f l e x .
responds;

Thus,

"the elementary unit that modern,

Man is stimulated and he

no analysis of the mind is necessary to account for

behavior.
The S-R reflex

unit would be ideal if men restricted

their behavior to running
they are starved.

through mazes and eating food when

Most important human activities,

however,

are far more complex activities which require reasoning,
evaluation

of alternatives,

decision-making,

the processing of a lot of information.
lation,

all right,

manipulated

and in general,

Man reacts to stimu

but his reaction occurs only after he has

and transformed the relevant information contained

in that stimulation into a response that is appropriate to the
achievement of a goal.

stimulus-response theory.
Miller et a l . needn't have been so
historically provincial; Perry Miller has pointed out that
Elizabethan (and seventeenth-century American Puritan) p sy
chology was also based upon "the reflex"; see Seventeenth
C e n t u r y , Chapter 9.
Although America's first intellectuals
were more than willing to speculate about the structure and
function of mental "faculties," they believed that mental
activity occurred responsively and inevitably to stimulation.
Decisions were not made, they just happened.
In a sense,
then, Locke wasn't saying anything new to a Puritan theol o g i 
cal psychologist like Edwards.
The passive, tabula rasa
notion was implicit in Puritan theory.
Remarkably, Edwards
went beyond Locke, beyond his Puritan forbears, in formulating
hiw own version of a synthetic psychology that included a
crude version of what is now called the cybernetic hypothesis.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1 53

The general pattern of reflex action, therefore, is to
test the input energies against some criteria e stab
lished in the organism, to respond if the result of the
test is to show an incongruity, and to continue to
respond until the incongruity vanishes, at which time the
reflex is terminated.
Thus there is "feedback" from the
result of the action to the testing phase, and we are
confronted by a recursive l o o p . 48
The feedback loop,

"the fundamental building block of the

nervous system," was presented in Figure 4.

49

It is pre

sented in a slightly different form in Figure 5.

The TOTE

loop is certainly less parsimonious than the simple 5-R unit;
Occam's razor has been put aside.

That is as it should be

for this most useful of all scientific dictums has been trans
formed by some behaviorists into a psychological guillotine
Psychologists can thank

their computers for reminding them

that men still have minds.
What flows
in Figure 5?

(a) information
the TOTE loop.

"over the arrows" from one box to another

Most cognitive psychologists would agree that
and

51

(b) control link the various

phases of

An individual receives information from

many sources which he organizes into a Plan.

He will then

48
Miller,
49

I b i d .,

et a l ., P l a n s , p.
pp .

26.

26-27.

^^Behaviorists have vied with one another for the
figurative title of most behavioristic.
When E. C. Tolman
suggested that his rats constructed hypotheses, Edwin R.
Guthrie, like Tolman a " b e h aviorist," derided Tolman for
leaving his rats lost in thought; see E. R. Guthrie, The Psy
chology of L e a r n i n g , rev. ed. (New York, 1 9 5 2 ) .
51 See P l a n s , pp. 2 6 - 2 7 .
An important publication outlet
for cognitive psychologists is called simply Information and
Control.
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TEST

EXIT

TEST

OPERATE

Figure 5.

The TOTE unit.
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exert control in whatever direction seems most appropriate
for achieving the goal outlined in his Plan.
information,
operations
ated,

or feedback,

Additional

is received after those initial

are completed.

After the feedback

has been evalu

a decision is then made to either re-execute or t e rmi

nate.

It is important to note that,

decision making
choices

although

is crucial in this model,

conscious

the decisions or

are themselves determined by a fundamental principle

which might be called

"cognitive hedonism."

must choose that response which

An individual

seems most likely to help him

execute his plan successfully.
The TOTE unit is an attempt to represent the r e l a t i o n 
ship between the Image and action, mind and body.

Miller,

et a l . have thereby elaborated the hyphenated will bequeathed
to twentieth-century psychology by James.
may be said to represent the relationship
and his environment.

The TOTE unit also
between a person

Information received from the e n v iron

ment is actively processed,

stored,

and generally manipulated.

Perception is not a strictly passive process,
ally occurs in the service of some purposeful,
Plan.

In fact,

rather it usu
goal-oriented

the TOTE unit permits no rigid distinction

between perception and action.

We are asked,

in effect,

to

consider a stimulus and response not in narrow isolation,
broadly,

but

as aspects of a feedback loop.
The simplest TOTE unit may be illustrated by the

example of hammering
feels

a nail.

Let us assume than an individual

a compelling need to hammer a nail
52See P l a n s , pp.

(see Figure 6) . 5^

33-39.
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Head

Head

Sticks

Flush

Examine
Nail

Hammer

Figure 6.
Hammering as a TOTE unit
Miller, et a l ., P l a n s ), p. 34.

(Adapted from
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First he would test the nail and note that the head sticks
up.

Next he would operate on the nail,

hammering it down.

He would then examine the visual feedback and,
that the head still stuck up a bit,
loop

if he noted

he would re-enter the

and stay there until his task was completed.

head of the nail is flush with the board,
Many human activities,

however,

are neither as

mechanical nor as simple as hammering a nail.
William

James,

for instance,

involve a complex inner struggle,
James'

morning

In the case of

lying in bed on a cold morning,

the process of creating a sufficient

tion,

After the

he would exit.

need to arise seems to

illustrated in Figure 7.

Image is a function of two sorts of inf o r m a 

comfort and guilt.

When he first awakens,

is in a state of quilibrium,

he feels

not even a little bit guilty.

It is,

his

Image

quite comfortable and
after all,

very cold in

the world outside his quilts and surely no one can fault
for not working while he is sleeping.
rates,

however,

he feels less comfortable and more guilty.

It is getting colder and colder in the room,

his back is

aching slightly from sleeping on a soft mattress,

and even

philosophers need to use the bathroom in the morning.
addition,
with

him

As the morning ev a p o 

In

he visualizes with increasing vividness faces red

anger over unkept

appointments.

(represented in subroutines
7) and probably many others,

For all these reasons

"comfort"
James'

and "guilt" in Figure

picture of himself within

his morning universe becomes decidedly unsatisfactory;
needs to get up.

Time not only heals all wounds,

he

it creates
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THE MORNING

IMAGE OF

WILLIAM JAMES

T est

■

Test

Operate

Operate

COMFORT
LOOP

GUILT
LOOP

Figure 7.
A TOTE representation of the mental operations
required to create the need for William James to arise in the
morning.
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Need to get up
In Bed

□ ut of

5tretch
Perceive
Uprightness

Floor
5tand Up

Figure 8.
A TDTE representation of the physical operation
of getting out of bed.
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a few,

and when James'

the passage of time,
ure 8).

Image is sufficiently punctured by

he will organize a Plan to get up

(Fig

Since he is very experienced at getting up, one

jaunt through the loop will probably be sufficient.
All this talk about loops,

TOTE units,

routines,

and

information processing might lead one to ask what,

precisely,

is

James the

proved by characterizing a carpenter or William

lie-a-bed

as computer-like devices.

Aren't we,

in effect,

stripping them of their humanity by describing their behavior
in terms of the computer analog?

Miller et a l . believe that

just the opposite is true:
It is so obvious that knowing is for the sake of doing
and that doing is rooted in v a l u i n g — but how?
How in the
name of all that is psychological should we put the mind,
the heart, and the body together?
Does a Plan supply
the pattern for that essential connection of knowledge,
evaluation, and action?
Certainly any psychology that
provides less— that allows a reflex to behave at random,
or leaves it lost in thought or overwhelmed by blind
p a s sion— can never be completely s a t i s f a c t o r y .^3
They are convinced that man has a mind,
He is a wonderfully complex,

a heart,

paradoxical machine.

and a body.
His "know

ing" is initially reactive,

he receives information from an

infinite number of sources.

This information is then pro

cessed,
action.

evaluated,

and organized into a proactive plan of

From one point of view,

demeaning device at all.

then,

the TOTE unit is not a

Rather it represents a flatfooted

acceptance of the complex nature of man's reaction to and
53
I b i d ., p. 71.
Miller et a l . seem to havederived
their immediate inspiration for this notion from Clarence
Irving Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (La
Salle, 111., 1946).
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impress upon his environment.

Moreover,

far beyond other synthetic concepts,
Augustine to Dewey,

the TOTE unit

goes

offered by thinkers from

in providing an empirically-based,

coherent model which

suggests how such a complex man might

fu n c t i o n .

Multiple Processing:

Transsummative Man

in Computer Dress
The TOTE unite provides a model of the relationship
between man's thinking

and his actions.

tant proactive-reactive device,

A complex and impor

the mind,

is seen to inhabit

the b e h a v i o r i s t s ' void between stimulus and response.
TOTE unit does not,

however,

thinking processes which
human behavior.

cybernetic loop.

thinking and acting

Yet thinking

et a l . call the "mind"

ment.

and,

in the gap of the

progress along a

includes aspects of what Miller

and the "heart";

values,

are inextricably intertwined with

Man is,

emotive unity.
in fact,

in other words,
Edwards,

The

about the

seem to organize and direct much of

Miller et a l . have filled

will rather nicely;

motivation

tell us very much

emotion,

reason

and

and j u dge

a t r a n s s u m m a t i v e , rational-

of course,

made a similar assertion

Miller et a l . 1_ discussion of mind and heart

hardly clarifies matters any more efficiently than Edwards'
"sense of the heart."

In short,

a model of transsummative

thinking is needed to supplement the TOTE conception of proactive-reactive man.
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The multiple-processing model which will be employed
is,

like the TOTE unit,

tion technology.

derived chiefly from computer-simula-

Its real origins,

however,

lay not in cold

steel and magnetic tape but on the warm leather couch of Sig
mund

Freud.

As just about everyone

of his neurotic,

Victorian,

knows,

Freud's analysis

Viennese patients led him to

postulate the existence of sexual and aggressively-oriented
unconscious processes,
thought.

in addition to the conscious

The psychoanalytic tradition which

has since maintained that mental functioning
mized into two modes,

stream of

Freud founded
can be dichoto

primary-process thinking and secondary-

process t h i n k i n g . P r i m a r y - p r o c e s s

thinking is said to be

impluse governed,

uncomfortable emotional

loadings,
adult.

heavily laden with

and in general repressed in the normally-functioning

In this mode of thinking,

have no place.

is held to be conscious,
ordinary rules of logic.
independent

logic and reality constraints

Secondary-process thinking,
goal-directed,

These two modes are by no means

of one another.

In fact,

"classical"

theory maintains that the primary process
all psychic

energy,

is a disguised

on the other hand,

and in conformity with

Freudian

is the source of

thus virtually all we say,

think,

(by the so-called ego mechanisms)

or do

expression

of the irrational desires of the primary process.
"^Freud's first and clearest expression of this view
is in D r e a m s . For more recent views concerning p sycho
analytic approaches to cognition consult David Rapaport, ed.,
Organization and Pathology of Thought (New York, 1951) and
George S. Klein, Perception. Motives and Personality (New
York, 1970).
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Freud's model,

the id,

ego,

superego relationship,

isn't a very good one by information-processing standards.
His constructs are so insubstantial that his "disciples" con
tinue to emphasize one over the others,
others.

delete,

or add still

Freud's theory is also far too heavily committed to

the notion that sex and aggression dominate the primary pro
cess.

Ulric IMeisser has attempted to maintain the basic

Freudian insight into transsummative multiple-mode thinking
within the framework of a more concrete,
Neisser's thesis,

like Freud's,

a multiple a c t i vity."55

is that

computer-based model.
"human thinking is

Applying computer programming t ermi

nology to human cognition,

IMeisser contends that cognition

may be divided into two modes,

sequential processing and

parallel processing.
The common core of all these theoretical dichotomies
seems to be the distinction between a relatively wellordered, easily describable, and efficiently adapted
thought process on one side, and a simultaneous and
superficially confused profusion of activity on the other.
Apparently there are two different modes of handling the
external and internalized information with which the mind
must deal.
It cannot be a coincidence that two corres
ponding modes have appeared as alternate possibilities in
the design of "artificially intelligent" systems— that is,
in programming computers to perform quasi-intellectual
tasks.
In that field, the two possibilities are often
called "sequential" and " parallel."56
Argumentation

over the merits and demerits of sequen

tial and parallel processing systems

has occurred most fre

quently in the area of computer simulation known as "pattern

5 5 "Multiplicity of Thought," p.

8.

5 5 I b i d ., p. 5.
See also Oliver 5efridge and Ulric
IMeisser, "Pattern Recognition."
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recognition."^

We take for granted that literate human

beings can distinguish an "A" from a "B" no matter whether
the letters are typed,

handwritten,

or chicken-scratched.

It is normally such an easy and automatic task that we s el
dom pause to consider by what means we distinguish one p at
tern from another.

Information-processing

have seized upon pattern recognition

theorists,

however,

and transformed the

process into a virtual prototype of human information p r o 
cessing.

Computers can be programmed to recognize or identify

patterns that humans

can also identify,

and a composite model

of human pattern recognition has emerged which is based upon
the computer models

(Figure 9).

A pattern or message is

received first at the sense organs,
of the eyes.

for instance the retinas

It then traverses neural pathways

to feature analysis,

which

and is subject

is a parallel process called

"pandemonium," illustrated in Figure 1 0 . ^
Selfridge has called the components of feature

analy

sis "demons"— a term which aptly characterizes their chaotic
id-like

activity.

of the pattern.

The image demons merely record the image
Each feature demon searches

for a particular

^ F o r an extensive sampling of the important pattern
recognition research consult Leonard Uhr, ed.. Pattern Recog
nition:
Theory, Experiment, Computer Simulations, and Dynamic
Models of Form Perception and Discovery (New York, 1966).
^^Dliver Selfridge, "Pandemonium:
A Paradigm for
Learning."
In The Mechanisation of Thought Processes (London,
1959).
There are other feature analysis schemes, notably
template matching, but see Neisser (Cognitive P s y c h o l o g y .
Chapter 3) for a critique of this and other alternative
theories„
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Figure 9.

A model of human pattern recognition.
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D ECISION DEMON

COGNITIVE
DEMONS

COMPUTATIONAL
DEMONS

DATA OR IMAGE
DEMONS

Figure 10.
Parallel processing
Cognitive P s y c h o l o g y , p. 75.)

(adapted from Neisser,
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characteristic of the pattern:
or lines.
pattern,

certain angles,

curvatures,

Each cognitive demon is capable of recognizing one
for example a letter in the alphabet.

demon looks for features which characterize
pattern.

Each cognitive

its particular

When it finds one it yells out and the more it

finds the louder it yells.
the pandemonium,

The decision demon,

listening to

selects the cognitive demon who is yelling

the loudest as the pattern most likely occurring in the environment.

59

It is a parallel program because there is no

logical sequence of steps to complete before the pattern is
recognized.

All the information pertinent to the pattern

bombards the decision-making apparatus
simultaneously.

"in parallel" or

No analyzer depends on the course or the out

come of processing by the others.
The parallel pandemonium feature analysis cannot,
however,

explain the remarkable diversity

perception.

If human pattern recognition

and speed of human
culminated in pande

monium it is likely that we should all drown in a din of
neural demons,
should

we should never recognize patterns and we

certainly never understand the meaning of them.

of the information associated with
what

Much

a signal is provided by

it ought to be rather than anything contained in the

signal itself,

that is,

by the context of the event.

The power of context is clear.
Rules can be used to
reduce the number of possible alternatives that are to be
59
Excellent discussions of the Pandemonium model may
be found in Lindsay and Norman, Human Information Proce s s i n g ,
pp. 115-131 and Neisser, Cognitive P s y c h o l o g y , pp. 71-76.
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considered at any moment.
This does not imply, of
course, that perception requires a conscious trial-anderror approach to determine the alternative that best
fits the contextual information . . .
It supplies the
rules underlying the construction of our perceptual world,
tells us what to expect, and gives plausible interpreta
tions of what we are p e r c e i v i n g . 60
It is much easier,

for instance,

to learn strings of words

which follow the familiar rules of English grammar than it is
to learn random arrays of w o r d s . ^
Our expectations of what will come next
noun,

verb,

etc.)

interpreted.

(e.g.,

a

change continuously as the information is

This process of moving

sequentially through or

across a pattern while revising expectations

is referred to

as " a n a l y s is-by-synthesis"; it is an active,

constructive,

s equential process that proceeds according to rules which may
or may not be consciously e l a b o r a t e d .^

Memory provides not

only the rules used in deriving the expectations,
knowledge of the recent sensory events.

but also

The sequential,

analysis-by-synthesis process in pattern recognition is r e pre
sented by a simple decision tree in Figure 11.
The combined parallel pandemonium and sequential
a nalysis-by-synthesis model of pattern recognition is very
appealing,
might

once one overcomes his modernist

appear to be a return to demonology.

^Lindsay
pp.

and Norman,

Human

aversion to what
Computers can be

Information P r o c e s s i n g ,

1 34-1 35.

^ G e o r g e A. Miller, "Decision Units in the Perception
of Speech," IRE Transactions on Information T h e o r y , 1 962, IB,
81-B3.

0

consult

^ n analysis-by-synthesis in pattern recognition,
Neisser, Cognitive Psychology, pp. 193-198, and
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Alternative

PIB

DAX

JIR

JUK

Outcomes

yes

Test
2a

yes

is the first letter

does the last

wider at the top than

letter contain

Test

at the bottom?

a closed loop?

2b

yes

does the first
T est

letter contain
a closed loop?

JUK

Figure 11.
An example of sequential processin in
pattern recognition (adapted from Neisser, Cognitive , p. 73.)
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programmed to recognize patterns according to this model and
human pattern recognition seems to progress
manner.

It does not,

however,

in a similar

adequately account for a p e r 

son's continued construction of a perceptual,
m emorial world into which perceived objects,

conceptual and
thoughts,

and

images are placed.
When we first perceive or imagine something, the process
of construction is not limited to the object itself.
We
generally build (or rebuild) a spatial, temporal, and
conceptual framework as well . . . little has been said
about this background; "construction" has meant c o n 
struction in focal attention.
But when you see a friend
across the street, you are not seeing only him.
H_e, a
person of a particular kind with a particular relevance
to your life, is appearing t h e r e , a particular place in
space, and t h e n . at a certain point in time.
Similarly,
a spoken
sentence is not just a string of words to be
identified, but it has a particular meaning, is spoken
by a particular person, at a particular time and place.
Human mental activity,

then,

mostly unconscious phase,
scious thought,

is characterized by a parallel,

a sequential stream of mostly c o n 

and "background processing"

of the rubrics

and categories which permit us to derive intimate personal
meaning from our percepts and images.

Man is a multiple-

processing organism.
The categories,
the background

often called schemas or schemata,

provide the labels

for the constructive,

in

s yn

thetic activity that constitutes human perception and think64
When the background is intact, as it is during normal

ing.

Lindsay and Norman,
1 48.
^Neisser,

Human

Information Proce s s i n g , pp.

131-

Cognitive Psy c h o l o g y , p. 286.

^ N e i s s e r ' s use of the term "schemata" derives from
F. C. Bartlett, Remembering and Thinking (New York, 1958). The
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waking consciousness,

events are said to be analyzed first

by the pre-attentive processes.

During this brief operation

stimuli are sorted out in a gross fashion.
ever set and strategy he employs,

In line with w h a t 

the individual then pro

ceeds to construct a more-or-less accurate copy of the
external or internalized
mechanisms.

stimuli with his focal-attentive

Much of the potential information,

that which is

not singled out for synthesis in focal attention,

fades

rapidly because it is not verbally encoded and hence is
unavailable to long-term memory.
phase,

During the pre-attentive

information is said to be processed

"in parallel,"

and

this chaotic activity is in many ways analogous to Freudian
primary-process thought or the syncretistic thinking of early
childhood.^

The focal attentive phase,

on the other hand,

is characterized by "sequential" processing which tends
follow the conventions

to

of logic and is similar to the Freudian

notion of secondary process.

While the content of sequentially-

processed information is contained in the conscious stream of
thought,

the information processed in a parallel manner forms

a semi-conscious to unconscious penumbra of vagueness around
the conscious object or thought.

Because of its immunity

most famous exponent of the importance of schemata is, how
ever, Jean Piaget; cf. The Construction of Reality in the
Child (New York, 1954).
(1936)
^ 5 e e Ernest G. Schachtel, Metamorphosis (New York,
1959) for a brilliant analysis of the unfettered thinking of
childhood and its transformation into the predominantly uni
dimensional, goal-directed thinking of adulthood.
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from logical
in

constraints

and

the mind, the information

because of its short duration
processed only by the parallel,

pre-attentive mechanisms

is often experienced as wispy images

or fleeting

Importantly,

"feelings."

and parallel modes function
unpredictable

in man these sequential

as a complex,

integrated,

mostly

unit.

. . . human thinking is a multiple activity.
Awake or
asleep, a number of more or less independent trains of
thought usually coexist.
Ordinarily, there is a "main
sequence" in progress, dealing with some particular
m aterial
in step-by-step
fashion. The main sequence cor
responds
to the ordinary
course of consciousness.
It
may or may not be influenced by the other processes
going on simultaneously.
The concurrent operations are
not conscious, because consciousness is intrinscially
s i n g l e .66
The principle function of this unconscious
according to Freud,

striving for expressing in our m i n d s . ^
"rational"

activity is,

to find discharge for emotions which are
Thus,

all conscious

activity is potentially or actually influenced by

unconscious

"emotional"

activity.

Under normal conditions a person encounters

a wide

variety of constantly changing but still relatively familiar
stimulation.

He uses various perceptual strategies to grossly

classify a broad spectrum of stimulation and he then actively
constructs his perception,
of his attention.
fades.

or that which occupies the focus

That which escapes

An important change occurs,

background processing

^Neisser,

is disrupted.

his attention rapidly

however,

when the ordinary

The environment may

"Multiplicity of Thought,"

p.

8.

^ C f . Dreams and New Introductory Lectures on Psycho
analysis (New York, 1933).
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become unusually redundant,
impoverished,
vation;

as in hypnosis;

it may be

as in some forms of mediation or sensory de p r i 

or an individual's will to categorize may be weak,

as when he is falling
tain drugs.

68

asleep or under the influence of cer-

Under each of these conditions the intensity

of the drive to Test-Operate-Test-Exist is diminished.

The

individual is simply more inclined to accept the world,

rather

than to grapple with it,
conquer it.

and eventually try to

He does not pay exclusive attention,

normally does,
he has,

organize it,

as he

to stimuli that are relevant to a plan because

as Miller et a l . put in,

"relinquished his plan."

69

Thus he may experience many classical symptoms of a "trance"
state,

such as visions,

hallucinations,

dreamlike imagery,

or strange and exotic ideas which normally lie outside his
narrow,

plan-oriented focus of attention.
All this abstract talk of an information-processing

model of the trance state may have led to the anticipation
that a new technique is about to be presented which

is

*^The best recent single source of empirical data and
theoretical speculation concerning all sorts of altered states
is Charles T. Tart, ed., Altered States of Consciousness (New
York, 1969).
The most coherent and colorful examination of
certain of these states, especially mystic consciousness and
religious conversion is still William James, The Varieties of
Religious Experience (New York, 1961).
69 P l a n s . pp.

103-116.

"^The most important theoretical work on the concept
of trance as a cognitive psychological phenomenon is that of
Ronald E. 5hor; see especially "Hypnosis and the Concept of
the Generalized Reality Orientation," American Journal of
Ps y c h o t h e r a p y . 1 959, H , 582-602.
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capable of hypnotizing a computer.
state,

whatever its origin,

usually unconscious,

Not quite.

emotionally-loaded

tion is obviously involved in conscious,
perception

and thinking.

Neisser contends,
this sort."

71

The trance

is simple a special case in which
"parallel" informa
sequential human

The important point is that,

as

"all directed thinking is an elaboration of

That is,

rational appearing,

goal-directed,

TOTE-type activity in humans draws much of its raw material
and insights from this vast storehouse of peripheral informa
tion,

and the evaluation of feedback is itself primarily a

function of barely-conscious or unconscious
siderations.
process

Freudian "ego psychologists"

irrational con
have called this

"regression in the service of the ego."

72

Conscious

and unconscious meld into the creative syntheses which charac
terize man's attempts to order and understand.

The Creative Unified Mind of Man
Nothing better illustrates the transsummative,
rational-emotive

unity of man's mental life,

perhaps,

than

the reflections of creative poeple upon the creative process.
Nearly all of them agree with Pasteur who contended that
chance favors the prepared mind.
covery,

Creative insight and dis

that which yields basic understanding,

requires considerable learning and preparation.
71
72

Cognitive P s y c h o l o g y , p.

See Ernst Kris,
(New York, 1 952) .

obviously
Yet nearly

303.

Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art
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every creative artist cr scientist who has taken the time to
reflect on the nature of creation has attached equal,
some instances,
and receiving,
where?

73
or w a i t i n g .

They wait,

A.

But waiting

of course,

formerly thought to be God,
been labeled,

or in

greater importance to "chance," to relaxing
for what;

and from

for insights whose origin was

but after Freud has generally

rather vaguely,

the unconscious.

The poet

E. Housman's recollection of his own creative waiting game

is a typical expression:
Having drunk a pint of beer at lucheon— beer is a
sedative to the brain, and my afternoons are the least
intellectual portion of my life--I would go out for a
walk of two or three hours.
As I went along, thinking
of nothing particular, only looking at things around me
and following the progress of the seasons, there would
flow into my mind, with sudden and unaccountable emotion,
sometimes a line or two of verse, sometimes a whole
stanza at once, accompanied, not preceeded, by a vague
notion of the poem which they were destined to form part
of.
Then there would usually be a lull of an hour or so,
then perhaps the spring would bubble up again.
I say
bubble up because, so far as I could make out, the source
of the suggestions thus proffered to the brain was an
abyss . . . the pit of the stomach.
When I got home I
wrote them down, leaving gaps, and hoping that further
inspiration might be forthcoming another da y . 74

Virtually every individual whom society has p r o 
claimed "creative" has expressed his own creative process in
these terms; see Brewster Ghiselin, ed., The Creative Process
(Berkeley, Calif., 1952) for a survey of the introspective
analyses of a broad range of creative individuals:
scientists,
artists, poets, novelists, and mathematicians.
For a general
theory of creative thinking which accommodates the notion of
a vacillating, active-passive creative process see Graham
Walls, The Art of Thought (London, 1926) and Herbert Crovitz,
G alton's Walk (New York, 1970).
74

York,

A. E. Housman,
1933), pp. 48-49.

The Name and Nature of Poetry

(New
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The only unusual aspect of Housman's

account is his lo c a l i z a 

tion of the source of his creative insights
stomach.

in the pit of his

In presenting this hypothesis to the world,

Housman

offered the raw material to his critics for some insights of
their own.

They might contend,

for instance,

that what Hou s 

man understood to be poetical insights were really unfortu
nate mental reactions to gas pains produced by his too rapid
imbibing

of beer.

His poetry,

in other words,

is the

equivalent of a belch.
Surprisingly,

Housman and most other reflective,

creative individuals would probably not object to a c o m p a r i 
son of their insights with a belch,

with

its sometimes un c o m 

fortably long waiting period and the emotional excitement and
renewal that accompanies the triumphant expulsion.

Rollo May has criticized Housman's analysis of the
creative process because of its emphasis on passivity.
May
believes that creativity is an active process and,in support
of this view, he quotes William B utler Yeats whom, claims
May, was a far greater poet than Housman; see "Creativity
and Encounter," in H. M. Ruitenbeek, ed., The Creative
Imagination (Chicago, 1965), pp. 2B3-291 . May misses the
point entirely.
In groping for support for his existentialist
views he ignores what he, as a reasonably-creative individual,
must know from experience:
Creativity is both proactive and
reactive.
Also, Yeats' greatness as a poet has been disputed
by scholars who probably know far more than May about poetry;
cf. Karl 5hapiro, "W. B. Yeats:
Trial by Culture."
In In
Defense of Ignorance (New York, 1960), pp. 87-113.
^ H o u s m a n himself compared it to "a morbid secretion"
(Name and N a t u r e , p. 48).
One of the clearest examples of
the emotional explosiveness of creating is Hart Crane's
method of writing poetry.
Crane, claims critic Malcom Cowley,
would get roaring drunk on hard cider, lock himself in a room
and finally
appear . . . his face brick-red, his eyes burning, his
already iron-gray hair bristling straight up from his
skull.
He would be chewing a five cent cigar which he
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Housman's

analysis of the events leading

and following

up to,

a creative explosion contains,

including,

in a nutshell,

a compelling portrait of an integrated proactive-reactive,
transsummative rational-emotive man.

Writing a poem is but

a special case of planned activity and man,
point out,

is always

is awake).

executing some Plan

From a cybernetic viewpoint,

between hammering a nail and writing

as Miller et a l .

(at least while he
the only difference

a poem is that the

farmer requires manipulation of a physical object while the
latter emphasizes the mental manipulation of ideas.

Housman's

plan to write poetry is presented in an adaptation of the
TOTE

unit

(see Figure 12).

Housman,

like any other creative individual,

more than drink and walk.
studying

and writing,

u npr oductive

and when found himself stymied or

he retired to his pub.

There he began the b u s i 

ness of reducing incongruity in his system;
activity by drinking and walking.
reactive:

he waits as he walks.

the waves

and his own footsteps,

he "tested"

The operation,

pro

however,

is

The rhythmic pounding of
combined with the alcoholic

sedation produce a very relaxed man who has,
rarily relinquished

did far

He undoubtedly spent his mornings

his original plan.

in fact,

tempo

His background

had forgotten to light.
In his hands would be two or
three sheets of typewritten manuscript, with words
crossed out and new lines scrawled in.
"Read that," he
would say.
"Isn't that the q rrrreatest poem ever
w r i t t e n !"
(Ghiselin, Creative P r o c e s s , p. 146).
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Needed:

Lines of Poetry

Completed
and

poem

Walk

Write down
and evaluate

"Sudden and
unaccountable
emotion

. . .

a line or two
of verse."

Figure 12.
A TOTE representation of A. E. Housman's
account of writing poetry.
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process of
faded;

(probably)

poetic rubrics and categories has

he has assumed a mild trance-like state.

The poetical

problems which confronted him earlier in the day now slip to
the back,

but not out of his mind."^

His attention broadens

and much external and internalized parallel information is
no longer ruled out of court because they do not serve the
purposes of a Plan or goal.
Suppose,

for instance,

that the poet had pondered

all morning over the last couple of lines of a poem.
matter how he altered the "line or two of verse"
sidering,

they simply would

after his luncheon beer,

not fit.

however,

No

he was con

While walking about

he would have the o ppor

tunity to survey many alternative lines as they bubbled
from

"the pit of the stomach."

alternative poetical
equal intensity
Figure 10).

demons would be shouting with relatively

(as illustrated in the pandemonium model,

On what basis,

then,

choose one verse over another.
rational,

up

Each of a large number of

conscious choice,

discard his Plan.

is a decision made to

It cannot be a strictly

since the poet has temporarily

The decision,

then,

must be a function of

unconscious or barely ve r b a l i z a b l e , esthetic considerations.
As Housman states,

"a sudden and unaccountable emotion"

accompanies the mysterious appearance of the verse.

The lines

seem suitable,

Later on,

or true,

because they feel that way.

"^5ee Shor, "Generalized Reality Orientation," for an
analysis of how and why customary objects of attention fade
to the background of awareness.
See also Neisser, Cognitive
P s y c h o l o g y , pp. 286-287.
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Complete
Poem

yes

is the meter
adequate?

yes

do they rhyme
properly?

Lines of
Poetry

Figure 13.
Some aspects of sequential .processing in
the construction of a poem.
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the felt insight must be elaborated,

altered,

constructed in the focus of attention.
Housman,

and actively

"Sometimes," laments

"the poem had to be taken in hand and completed by

the b r a i n . T h e

logical,

sequential integration of the

lines into a poem is illustrated in Figure 13.
The continued interplay of parallel and sequential
processes,

of the emotions and reason,

unique to the arts.

is certainly not

Scientists from Copernicus to J. D.

Watson owe their intial insights to unconscious,
esthetic sensibilities

in their discoveries.

79

emotional,
Virtually all

purposeful human activity can be understood within the con
text of the proactive-reactive,
processing model.

transsummative information-

Some relatively mechanical

like hammering a nail or getting out of bed,

activities,
require mostly

doing and little waiting for instructions from the uncon
scious.

Other more difficult endeavors,

or making a scientific discovery,
without a tire iron,

like writing a poem

or even changing a tire

require as much work but more patience.

Intense preparation and active integration surround

a lonely

wait for the solution that feels right.

^"Name

and Nature," p. 49.

79

It is well known that Copernicus's insight into the
heliocentric nature of the universe was founded primarily
upon the symmetrical beauty of the new conception rather than
upon its ability to predict the movement of heavenly bodies
more efficiently (Kuhn, Copernican R e v o l u t i o n ).
James D.
Watson was convinced of the accuracy of his double helical
DNA molecular model because it was "too pretty not to be
true"; see The Double Helix (New York, 1968).
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CHAPTER V

PROCESSING DIVINE

INFORMATION

Applying a model to history is a little like trying
on a new pair of shoes.

One must first put the shoes

securely on and then walk around to determine whether there
is discomfort caused by incongruities between the shape of
the shoes and the shape of the feet which
the new shoes don't feel right,
pair which

fits better is sought.

model must actually be applied,

inhabit them.

If

then they are rejected and a
Likewise,

a historical

tried on for size,

before the

fit of the model to the historical data can be evaluated.
But how much congruence between data and model constitutes a
fit?

In fact,

there are no objective guidelines to follow.

If the model does not seem to violate any basic assumptions
present

in the data,

and

if the model seems to place the

data in a useful new perspective,
must be judged worthwhile.
essay that
Edwards,

then the entire venture

It is a major contention of this

the basic p sychological assumptions of Jonathan

the data,

are precisely those of a much more

e xplicit contemporary theory,

information

processing.

This

"'Robert F. Berkhofer, in his groundbreaking Behavioral
A p p r o a c h , offers an intriguing chapter on model building and
historical inquiry (chapter 8).
Although he gets rather
bogged down in abstruse sociological theory, he apparently
favors the application of models to history.
Yet neither he,
nor anyone else, has determined exactly how this should be
done.
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chapter is an attempt to demonstrate that informationprocessing

theory is an intellectual " s h o e ” that Edwards can

wear comfortably and with pride.

Like any piece of fine

apparel this psychological model accentuates rather than d is
torts the underlying beauty of the wearer.
We have seen that much of the recent commentary upon
the thought of Edwards has emphasized that

the picture of

man which emerges from his writings is complex and seemingly
contradictory.
the various

5ometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly,

commentators have characterized the Edwardsean

model of man as both proactive and reactive;
summative,

rational-emotive

for a variety of reasons,
remained very mysterious.
function?

and as a trans-

unity.

We have also seen that,

Edwards'

psychological system has

How might such a complex man

The psychological concepts and jargon of Edwards'

era were incapable of accomodating

the Edwardsean

notions

and scholars have been seemingly ignorant of any other psy
c hological scheme which

can maintain the spirit of Edwards'

thought while at the same time elaborate

it and give it

generality.
In order to fill some gaps in Edwards'
theory,

and to trace his psychological

he has been place into a context:

psychological

ancestry and posterity,

the synthetic tradition in

psychology which has culminated in contemporary informationprocessing theory.
Edwards,
ciples,

This approach to psychology,

like that of

holds to proactive-reactive and transsummative prin
and it provides some computer-based models which
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describe

how such a complex man might carry on his day-to-

day activities,

or how he might think and behave.

Conversion,
Edwards,

the phenomenon which most interested

is both a human activity and more than a human

activity.

It involves the interaction of a human mind with

a supernatural spirit.
self who,

According to Edwards,

under the appropriate conditions,

it is God Him

can be creatively

discovered at the fringe of human consc i o u s n e s s .
emerges

What

from this chapter is an information-processing

explanation of conversion that might satisfy most contemporay cognitive theorists.

Remarkably,

the information-pro-

cessing model provides only a new perspective through the
structuring of the chapter,

and some descriptive detail in a

number of figures and analogies.
principles,
Edwards.

the theorizing,

He once acknowledged that

perhaps as manifold
version]."

All else,

and the data,

the synthetic

are derived from

"there is a vast variety,

as the subjects of the operation

He quickly added,

however,

there is a great analogy in all."

2

[of con

that "in many things

While the details of the

"great analogy" were beyond his grasp,

its main themes were

not.
2
A Faithful Narrative of the Surprising Work of G o d .
In C. C. Goen, ed., The Great Awakening (New Haven, Conn.,
1972), p. 160.
In his "Editor's Introduction" to the
Religious A f f e c t i o n s , John E. Smith claims that Edwards empha
sized the "vast variety," while Goen, in his "Editor's Intro
duction" to The Great Awakening and A. V. G. Allen, in
Jonathan Edwards hold that Edwards emphasized the "great
analogy."
The latter point of view is probably closer to the
truth.
Edwards often paid lip service to individual di f f e r 
ences as he casted about for an all-encompassing scheme that
would describe everyone.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1 85

Incongruity;

Creating a Need

for Conversion
The "great analogy" or morphology of conversion was
presented most clearly and positively in Edwards'
Narrative.

This remarkable work,

Faithful

an elaboration of a letter

to his fellow minister Benjamin Colman of Boston,

reveals

a

side of Edwards that is seldom visible in his adult writings.
It contains an array of first-and secondhand
with Edwards'

theoretical commentary,

the early days of the Great Awakening
Valley.

accounts,

3

along

of conversions during
in the Connecticut

Edwards organizes his evidence,

bit by bit,

and

emerges with a composite formula for conversion which is not
so much a "how to do it" manual as a simple

generalization.

The colorful anecdotes and enthusiastic lack of defensiveness
easily differentiates this work from his later,
cold,

abstract,

relatively

argumentative tracts like Original Sin and

Freedom of the W i l l .^
In those early days of the Awakening,
1736,

in 1735 and

Edwards was convinced that the Holy Spirit had taken up

temporary residence in the Connecticut Valley.
prizing conversions"

Many "sur

had been accomplished and he was eager

to tell the world exactly how the wonderful work had occurred.
In the Faithful Narrative he had only to describe what he had
^See Goen, "Editors Introduction," pp. 32-46,
textual history of the Faithful N a r r a t i v e .

for a

^Goen says that Isaac Watts and John Guyse, who
collaborated on a preface to the first edition of the Faithful
N a r r a t i v e , found it to be too colorful.
They carefully
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seen and organize that data as coherently as possible.

He

could thus discuss with feeling and in great detail the
series of events which usually led up to the cataclysmic co n
version.

After he became an apologist rather than a simple

participant-observer of the Great Awakening
emphasis.

he altered his

He pointed out repeatedly that since the devil

can imitate all the fears,

behavioral changes,

of the immediate pre-conversion period,

and despair

this period should be

ignored because it contains no sure signs of grace.
the Faithful N a r r a t i v e , then,

It is to

that we must turn for E d w a r d s ’

views on the first phase of the conversion sequence.
According to Edwards,
felt by creating
fied with,

People who are satis

or uninterested in the state of their soul,

not be motivated to seek God,
Him.

God first makes His presence

a need for conversion.

will

and hence they will never find

Edwards believed that most of the inhabitants of his

own town of Northampton,
the Awakening,

in the period immediately preceding

were typical of the complacent,

corrupt,

degenerate type who has no room in his life for God.
Licentiousness for some years greatly prevailed among
the youth of the town; they were many of them very much
addicted to night-walking, and frequenting the tavern,
and lewd practices, wherein some, by their example
exceedingly corrupted others.
It was their manner very
frequently to get together in conventions of both sexes,
for mirth and jollity, when they called frolics. . . .5

omitted some passages and apoligized for other which might
offend readers ("Editor's Introduction," p. 39).
^Faithful N a r r a t i v e , p. 146.
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The validity of Edwards rather stern judgment of the worth of
"frolicking," while easily debatable,
The point is that Edwards believed

is not at issue here.

such complacent i n d i v i d 

uals could never be receptive to the Holy Spirit because they
perceived

no incongruity between their current state and some

ideal or desired condition.
spiritual inadequacy,

the

Until they felt a sense of

"licentious" citizens of Northampton

would continue to frolic rather than organize a plan to seek
their salvation.

Seen through Edwards'

cold Calvinist eyes,

his parishioners were spiritually asleep,
and women

are frightfully

surround them.

Clearly,

the spiritually slumbering towns

people would have to be awakened,
inadequacy,

and sleeping men

unaware of imminent dangers which

made aware of their own

before they would begin to plan for salvation

rather than frolics.
During the period of what Edwards calls "first awak
enings," smug self-assurance is transformed

into nervous

..
insecuri
t y .6

Persons are first awakened with a sense of their mi s e r 
able condition by nature, the danger they are in of
perishing eternally, and that it is of great importance
to them that they speedily escape, and get into a better
state.
Those that before were secure and senseless, are
made sensible how much they were in the way to ruin in
their former c o u r s e s . 7
This is the rudest awakening
himself,

imaginable.

or actually perceives himself,

One suddenly finds
out of favor with God

6 I b i d .. p. 164.
7 I b i d .. p. 160.
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and in imminent danger of burning forever in the d e v i l ’s
fiery pit.

A wide gulf separates an "awakened" individual's

sorry spiritual status quo and his goal of saving grace.
Clearly,

there is serious business to attend to.
By what means does God create the

seek conversion?

What,

Northampton youths
Edwards,

fear.

for example,

to religion?

Chiefly,

In the Connecticut Valley,

violent death of a youth in Pascommuck
"much affected many young people."8
death of a young woman who,
on the means to grace.

sense or need to

moved the degenerate
according to
for instance,

the

in the spring of 1734

This was followed by the

on her deathbed,

counseled others

"This," claims Edwards,

"seemed much

to contribute to the solemnizing of the spirits of many young
g
persons."
There was also fear of a more abstract sort in
the form of Arminianism,
Man."

1□

Edwards,

8 Ibid.,

the traditional New England

"Bogy-

and many of his ministerial colleagues

p. 147.

9 I b i d .. p. 148.
^ " A r m i n i a n i s m , " remarked Clyde Holbrook, ". . . is a
complex of notions involving an elevated confidence in free
dom of choice, a sharply upward revised estimate of human
nature, and a form of common sense moralism . . . " ('Editor's
Introduction" to Jonathan Edwards, Original S i n . New Haven,
Conn., 1970, p. 4).
There is a good deal of controversy con
cerning whether or not "Arminianism" was a real and powerful
enemy of the congregational way or merely a straw man.
Goen,
("Editor's Introduction," pp. 4-1 8). makes a strong case for the
reality of the Arminian threat, while the straw-man hypothesis
is advanced by Edmund 5. Morgan in his The Gentle Puritan;
A
Life of Ezra Stiles. 1727-1795 (New Haven, Conn., 1961), pp.
15-19, and Gerald J. Goodwin, "The Myth of 'Arminian-Calvini s m ' in Eighteenth Century New Enqland," New England Quarterly,
1968, 41, 213-237.
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forcasted the decline of the New England Congregational way
into chaotic heterodoxy if Arminian principles were not uni
laterally renounced.
claimed,

If Congregationalism declined,

it was

the awful fate of all New Englanders would be sealed.

The point was

that all concerned had better act quickly

the devil and

his Arminian army were to be defeated.

if

Although fear was an especially effective method of
motivating complacent frolickers to act in behalf of their
souls,

Edwards also saw God creating spiritual incongruity in

another manner.

God sometimes saw fit to convert a few

renowned sinners,

thereby focusing attention on the practical

benefits of coming to grace.

If one person's life could be

miraculously transformed from a miserable existence into a
vital,

useful, secure one,

then

duplicate that transformation.

many people would be moved to
They would be motivated

by

attraction to the godly life in addition to being repelled
by the prospect of becoming an eternal cinder.
ful Narrative Edwards describes
of God" which,

he claims,

had a profound positive impact on

the progress of the Great Awakening
Valley.

In the Faith-

just such a "surprizing work

in the entire Connecticut

It involved the apparent conversion of

a young woman, who had been one of the greatest company
keepers in the whole town.
When she came to me, I had
never heard that she had become in any wise serious, but
by the conversation I then had with her, it appeared to
me that what she gave an account of was a glorious work
of God's infinite power and sovereign grace; and that God
had given her a new heart, truly broken and sanctified.
I could not then doubt of it, and have seen much in my
acquaintance with her since to confirm i t .11
1 1

Faithful N a r r a t i v e , p. 149.
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According

to Edwards,

this remarkable event helped open the

spiritual floodgates in Northampton and surrounding c o m m u n i 
ties.

It was

"the greatest occasion of awakening to others,

of anything that ever came to pass in the town."
convincing

12

She was

and her behavior had changed remarkably.

Seeing

this about face in the "company keeper," many others became
convinced that God was among them.
to seek

grace,

They quickly made plans

to reduce the incongruity between their own

sinful ways and the saintly life as exhibited by the reformed
"company keeper."
Edwards supports these generalizations concerning
God's Modus Operandi with two case studies drawn from his
Northampton parish.
God's

One of these,

Phebe Bartlet,

illustrates

use of the technique of fear to create the need for con

version.

Phebe,

a child of four,

seemed to be growing up in

quite an ordinary fashion until her "hopefully converted"
eleven year old brother
great

"seriously talked to her about the

things of religion."

13

After these discussions with

her brother she became withdrawn and began spending much time
alone in her room praying.

Then one day,

when the child had done prayer, she came out of the
closet, and came and sat down by her mother, and cried
out loud.
Her mother very earnestly asked her several
times what the matter was, before she would make any
answer; but she continued exceedingly crying, and w r e a t h 
ing her body to and fro, like one in anguish of spirit.
Her mother then asked her whether she was afraid that God
would not give her salvation.
5he answered, "Yes, I am

12 Ibid.,

p. 149.

13 I b i d .. p. 199.
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afraid I shall go to hell!"
Her mother then endeavored
to quiet her, and told her she would not have her cry;
she must be a good girl, and pray every day, and she
hoped God would give her salvation.
But this did not
quiet her at all. . . .14In Edwards'

view,

God,

working perhaps through Phebe's brother,

had frightened the youngster into an awareness of her need
for salvation.
In the case of Abigail Hutchinson,
same need in quite a different manner;
the

"company keeper."

Abigail was a frail young woman who was

dying from some sort of esophogeal blockage.
ity,"

Edwards quickly adds,

"But her infi r m 

"had never been observed at all

to incline her to be notional or fanciful,
thing of religious melancholy."
fore,

God created the

He made her envious of

15

or to occasion any-

It was probably God,

not the "melancholy" which caused her reaction to

th e r e 
"the

news of the conversion of the young woman before mentioned
[the

'company keeper']

. . . . "1^

This news wrought much upon her, and stirred up a spirit
of envy in her towards this young woman, whom she thought
very unworthy of being distinguished from others by such
a mercy; but withal it engaged her in a firm resolution
to do her utmost to obtain the b l e s s i n g . "17
"If God sees fit to transform the heart of such

a woman,"

14 I b i d .. p. 200.
1 5 I b i d ., p. 191 .
^ ^ I b i d ., p. 192.
On Edwards and the notion of m e l a n 
choly see Gail Thain Parker, "Jonathan Edwards and M e l a n 
choly," New England Q u a r t e r l y , 196B, £1_, 193-212.
^ Faithful N a r r a t i v e , p.

192.
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Abigail must have said to herself,
reap the benefits of grace."

"then surely

I too can

Her next step would be to plan

a strategy for reaching her goal;

that is,

to determine more

p recisely the nature of "her utmost."
This,
grace:

then,

is how God begins

by motivating

but have gone astray,

in order that they eventually escape

the eternal fires of the Evil One.
act,

according

his dispensation of

those who were created in His image

to Edwards,

Man begins to plan and

only when he perceives an in c o n 

gruity between here— his current c o n d ition— and there— his
goal.

18

God does not createa new imbalance;

"awakens" the individual by providing
accurate pictures of both
becomes

"here"

He simply

him with clearer,

and "there."

more

The person

fearfully aware that he is in sad spiritual straits

and if he doesn't do something about it he will burn forever
in hell.

That is his unfortunate status.

The pre-convert

also becomes increasingly aware of the nature of the goal
through

his observations of inspired demonstrations,

the "company keeper."
covers

about his

The more the awakening

actual and ideal self,

between them seems to widen.
unbearable,
initiates

the more the gulf

When the discrepancy becomes

the equilibrium is destroyed,

a plan,

or a group of plans,

eliminate the perceived

such as

person d i s 

and the person

which

are designed to

incongruity in his spiritual system.

The proactive search for God and His grace begins.

18See Figure 8, p. 159 (the TOTE Unit)
representation of the function of need.

for a pictorial
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Test^:

The Fruitless Search

for

God and Salvation
After being awakened to his precarious spiritual
state,
ing,

a person begins casting about in every direction tr y 

so it appears,

pious busy-body,
church often,

to make up for lost time.

reading

and doing

good.

going to

During this frenzied period of

what he called "legal strivings,"
ened persons expend

He becomes a

scripture voraciously,

Edwards observed that awak

nearly all their physical and p sycho

logical energy in pursuit of their salvation.

This sudden

shift from careless complacence to earnest performance of
good works had ,certain practical advantages,

as Edwards,

minister of an often raucous frontier settlement,

was eager

to point out.
These awakenings when they have first seized on per
sons have had two effects:
one was that they have brought
them immediately to quit their sinful practices, and the
looser sort have been brought to forsake and dread their
former vices and extravagancies.
When once the Spirit of
God began to be so wonderfully poured out in a general
way through the town, people had soon done with their old
quarrels, backbitings, and intermeddling with other m e n ’s
matters; the tavern was soon left empty, and persons kept
very much at home; none went abroad unless on necessary
business, or on some religious account, and every day
seemed in many respects like a Sabbath day.
And the
other effect was, that it put them on earnest application
to the means of s a l v ation— reading, prayer, meditation,
the ordinances of God's House, and private conference;
their cry was "What shall I do to be saved?"
The place
of resort was now altered; it was no longer the tavern,
but the minister's house, that was thronged far more than
ever the tavern had wont to b e . 19

^ Faithful N a r r a t i v e , pp.

160-161.
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The awakened,

it seems,

for salvation which is,
ous sub-plans,

are consumed with their plan

as Edwards

notes,

comprised of numer-

or sub-routines like reading,

prayer,

etc.

20

Each of these sub-routines requires the expenditure of c o n 
scious

effort and each,

s equential process.
toward

21

therefore,

may be characterized

his goal as quickly as possible.

in his

no time to lose.

alone

"five or six times in a day" at the height of her
22

Phebe Bartlet,

There is,

view,

"legal strivings."

as a

The awakened person tries to proceed

for instance,

Abigail Hutchinson,

prayed

on the other hand,

undertook to educate herself.
. . . she thought she had not a sufficient knowledge
of the principles of religion to render her capable of
conversion; whereupon she resolved thoroughly to search
the s c r i p t u r e s ; a n d "accordingly immediately began at the
beginning of the Bible, intending to read it thro u g h . 23
This eventually-fruitless

decision clearly illustrates the

p hilosophy of the newly awakened:
thing

rather than do nothing.

though certainly goal-oriented
appears more like reflexive,
smooth

progression toward

on simultaneously,

it is better to do s o m e 

The planning and seeking,
and consciously directed,

spastic,

grace.

often

lurching rather than

Many activities are carried

in the hope that one or more will work.

“^ C o m p a r e this with William James' plan for rising
from bed in the morning (Figure 7, p. 158).
^ S e e above, pp. 161-165, for a discussion of s equen
tial processing.
Note especially Figure 11, p. 169 and
Figure 12, p . 178.
^ Faithful N a r r a t i v e , p. 199.
2 3 I b i d ., p. 192.
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Unfortunately,

according to Edwards,

elaborate plans and activities ever work.

none of the

The newly awakened

are destined for failure after failure until they become
wrung out,

exhausted,

disillusioned,

ever of their own worthlessness.
through such
Edwards'
gant man,
through

a frustrating,

view,

and more convinced than

Why does God lead men

hopeless ordeal?

Because,

God is not just there for the taking.

with his confident schemes and plans,

in
Arro

must learn

hard experience the humility that is appropriate to

one who is utterly dependent on another.
The drift of the Spirit of God in his legal strivings
with persons, has seemed most evidently to be, to make
way for, and to bring to, a conviction of their absolute
dependence on his sovereign power and grace, and universal
necessity of a Mediator, by leading them more and more to
a sense of their exceeding wickedness and guiltiness in
his sight; the pollution and insufficiency of their own
righteousness, that they can in no wise help themselves,
and that God would be wholly just and righteous in
rejecting them, and all that they do, and in casting them
off forever . . .24
The frustrating period of "legal strivings"
tion to man of an operational definition
felt in the initial awakening.
and searching

is God's p r esenta

of the need that is

The whole process of planning

for God is initiated by some perceived incon

gruity between one's present state and a state of saving
grace.

Ye this need is what Edwards often called

it involves only a sort of intellectual,

"motional";

detached assent to a

I b i d ., pp. 163-164.
Edwards made this point most
convincingly in an early, important sermon, "God Glorified
in the Work of Redemption, by the Greatness of Man's Depen
dence upon Him, in the Whole of It."
In Dwight, ed., Works
pp. 1 49-1 62.
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proposition.

The need felt by a person who has striven and

struggled and failed utterly is far more profound than this.
It is a need that is felt in the viscera and documented with
the data of his own wretched experience.
Hutchinson,

Like Abigail

all awakened seekers after grace must acknowl

edge that the absolute corruption of their hearts is such
"that the sin which

she brought into the world with her was

alone sufficient to condemn her."2 "’

The need to obtain

grace is thus transformed into a need to receive it;

all

human plans must be relinquished in favor of God's Plan.
The discovery of God always comes on God's terms.
After the awakened person concludes that he cannot
save himself,

he lays his fate at God's doorstep.

The fra n 

tic phase of proactive seeking gives way to patient,

reactive

waiting.
. . . a general hope arises that some time or other God
will be gracious, even before any distinct and particular
discoveries of mercy; and often they then come to a co n 
clusion within themselves, that they will be at God's
feet and wait his time, and they rest in that, not being
sensible that the 5pirit of God has now brought them to
a frame whereby they are prepared for mer c y . 26
This is the "frame" of mind in which,
"gracious discoveries

as Edwards put it,

. . . are given.

But what kind of "frame" is it that leads to important
"discoveries,"

such as when one discovers

^ Faithful N a r r a t i v e , p.
^ Ibid . , pp.
2 7 I b i d ., p.

"mercy"?^

Edwards

193.

1 69-1 70.
1 71 .

^®At various times Edwards referred to the essence
of conversion as "mercy," "the divine and supernatural
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didn't know,

and James and Starbuck,

160 years later,

only say that converts usually "relax"

could

just before the con

version experience.
What then must the person do?
"He must relax," say Dr.
St a r b u c k — "that is, he must fall back on the larger
power that makes for righteousness, which has been well
ing up in his own being, and let it finish in its own
way the work it has begun. . . . The act of yielding, in
this point of view, is giving one's self over to the new
personality, and living, from within, the truth of it
which had before been viewed objectively."
. . . To state it in terms of our own symbolism:
When the new center of personal energy has been s ub
consciously incubated so long as to be just ready to open
into flower, "hands off" is the only word for us, it must
burst forth u n a i d e d . 29
Information-processing theory describes such a "frame," or
what Starbuck
information

calls

"the act of yielding,"

is processed in p a rallel.30

as one in which

One relaxes his

characteristic planning and executing and lets his focus of
attention wander into the emotionally-laden pandemonium at
the fringes of his stream of consciousness.
circumstances,
plans

for instance,

for those of another,

Under certain

an individual may relinquish his
as in hypnosis,

or the result

may be some other kind of trance state in which information
from the unconscious

and the environment bombards the person

in no apparent logical sequence.

light," "divine love,"
p r i n c i p l e ."

31

"grace," and

Many aspects of trance

"a vital,

indwelling

29

William James, V a r i e t i e s . p. 175.
James quotes
from Edwin D. Starbuck, The Psychology of Religion (London,
1901), p. 115.
^°5ee above, Figure 10, p. 166, and pp. 163-167 for a
discussion and model of parallel processing.
^ For an acute analysis of the trance state,

consult
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p henomena are present in Edwards'

detailed description of

Abigail Hutchinson's

In the early phases of her

conversion.

conversion experience,"
darkness before her."
fainted"

at the mere

she saw nothing but blackness of
In the midst of her ordeal,

"she almost

sight of "three persons who were thought

to have been lately converted."

Finally,

she "continued whole

days and whole nights in a constant ravishing view of the
glory of God and Christ."
"frame"

32

Clearly,

or state in which conscious,

Abigail had entered a
goal-directed planning

and depositing of information into rubrics and
had given way to direct,

emotional "ravishing"

categories
communication.

What is the result of relinquishing a plan or plans?
If the relinquishment is preceded by vigorous planning,

as it

clearly must for Edwards'

a

creative insight,

converts,

the result is often

a new way of looking at t h i n g s . ^

Recall

5hor, "Generalized Reality Orientation," and "Three Dimensions
of Hypnotic Depth," International Journal of Clinical and
E xperimental H y p n o s i s , 1 962, 1_0, 23-38.
IMeisser has attempted
to present trance phenomena in the language of information
processing; see Cognitive P s y c h o l o g y , Chapter 11.
See also
Ernest R. Hilgard, "The Domain of Hypnosis:
With Some Com
ments on Alternative Paradigms," American Psyc h o l o g i s t , 1973,
2 8 , 972-932, for a discussion of trance versus non-trance
theories of hypnosis and the classic analysis by Martin Drne
demonstrating the reality of "trance logic":
"The Nature of
Hypnosis:
Artifact and Essence," Journal of Abnormal and
Social P s y c h o l o g y . 1959, 58, 277-299.
^ Faithful N a r r a t i v e , pp.

1 92-1 95.

33

□n trance and creativity see Stanley Kripper, "The
Psychedelic State, the Hypnotic Trance and the Creative Act."
In Tart, ed., Altered S t a t e s , pp. 271-290.
A very influential
theory of the creative process is that of Graham Wallas.
In
his view, the process traverses four stages:
preparation,
incubation, illumination, and revision.
This theory is sim i 
lar, in its basic aspects, to the cybernetic model and to
Edwards' description of conversion.
See Art of Thought (Lon
don, 1 926).
a--
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that man,

according to information-processing theory,

characterized by multiple processing:
train of thought and a parallel,
laden intruder.

most unconscious,

here,

is
conscious

emotionally-

It is now common to attribute creative

insights to a fusion of emotional,
logical,

a sequential,

conscious considerations.

unconscious needs with
It is here,

that Edwards and information-processing

company altogether.

For Edwards,

and only

theory part

the intrusions

came not

from some unconscious mind or from peripheral aspects of the
environment but from his Calvinist God.
muscians and artists make discoveries.
Edwards,

however,

discoveries

. . . are g i v e n ."3^
and ye shall find,"

according to Edwards,

incredibly arduous and complex.
initial incongruity,
cerned

scientists,

When Jesus invited men to "seek
he had in mind,

"gracious

Poets,

To the converts of

after a person becomes awakened and con

about his spiritual estate,

problem which

a search that is

After God establishes some

he is confronted with a

he cannot possibly solve.

unaware of his incompetence

Unfortunately,

ning and activity bring only frustration and anxiety.
these frustrated,

he is

and his elaborate proactive pla n 
Finally,

humiliated people give up as they are

"brought to the borders of despair,

and it looks as black as

midnight to them a little before the day dawns in their
souls."

35

34

They wait,

quietly,

desperate and hopeless,

Faithful N a r r a t i v e , p.

3 5 Ib i d ..

p.

for the

171, my italics.

162.
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rays of an unknown sun to enlighten their minds.
dawn comes,

When the

unexpectedly and in a lightening flash,

their

minds will be fundamentally altered by "gracious discoveries."
This profound psychological alteration brought by spiritual
"dawn"

is the heart of Edwards'

psychological system,

and it

is his explanation of this remarkable phenomenon that we shall
now examine,

armed with a few contemporary concepts.

Some Organizing Concepts:

A Preface

to the Operation of the Spirit
in Conversion
Reduced to its lowest terms,

Edwards'

version condenses to a remarkably simple,
alteration of the mind.

view of con

though

fundamental,

In order to appreciate the impor

tance of the psychological change wrought by conversion,
ever,

how

it is necessary to understand the essential attribute

of the Edwardsean mind:
we shall make a brief,

unity.

In this section,

but vitally necessary,

Edwardsean mental mechanics.

therefore,

digression into

We will examine his transsumma-

tive concept of mind much more thoroughly than we have thus
fa r .
Thinking,
view,

feeling,

and willing are not,

in Edwards'

isolated human activities which reflect a set of dis

crete mental entities which are the "seat" of each.
had been right.

Augustine

The mind is more like a New Worldmelting pot

than an Did World ghetto.

The constituents have lost their

identity through intermarriage and the sharing of
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responsibilities.

To Edwards,

the most significant mental

miscengenation is between reason and emotion.
t r a n s s u m m a t i v e , rational-emotive unity,

Man is a

and it is this union

which makes him appear disarmingly simple in theory,

and

hopelessly complex in practice.
Perhaps man's most characteristically

"rational"

activity would appear to be consciously weighing two or more
alternative actions,
others.
claimed

and

eventually choosing one over the

From Edwards' day down to the present,
that man has a "free will"

tance of man's capacity

those who have

have emphasized the i m p o r 

for rational judgment and choice.

course,

if there is such a thing as an absolutely rational

choice,

or act,

false.

He had to prove,

then Edwards'

Of

transsummative poisition is

therefore,

that

The will, and the affections of the soul, are not two
faculties; the affections are not essentially distinct
from the will, nor do they differ from the mere actings
of the will and inclination of the soul, but only in the
livliness and sensibileness of exercise.36
If he could demonstrate that every act of will,
choice,
undercut

has an emotional component,

any effort to treat them as independent

If willing and the affections always

every rational

he would effectively
"faculties."

appear together,

it is

very misleading to consider them as anything other than c om
pletely integrated and unified.
Keep in mind that Edwards undertook to defend two
extremely unpopular notions:

^ ^A f f e c t i o n s . p.

the determination of "the will,"

97.
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and the fundamental importance of man's

irrational capacities.

Faced with a very similar dilemma 150 years later,

Freud's

strategy was first to ingratiate himself with a hostile
audience and then slowly and subtly destroy their basic
assumptions.
course,

37

Edwards

he agreed,

coercion,

followed the same strategy.

the course of action they will take.

decides to take a walk then,
both free and r a t i o n a l . 38

in one sense,

His motive,

perhaps,

the attraction to walking.

without

If a man

his decision

according

position is the physical object in view:
or,

Of

men weigh alternatives and decide,

is

to this

the need to walk
Thus far Edwards had

nothing threatening or objectionable to the Arminians;

he

simply summarized their position.
Edwards never actually disagreed with the Arminian
analysis of will.
and irrelevant.

Instead,

he discarded

it as superficial

The rational or "free will"

position failed

to notice a common denominator among the infinite number of
"motives"

that impell men to action.

39

It failed to recog

nize that
. . . the will is as the greatest apparent good is, . . .
that volition has always for its object the thing which
appears most agreeable; it must be carefully observed,

York,

37
Cf.
1968).

A General

Introduction to Psychoanalysis

(New

38W i l l , p. 147.
39
On Edwards' re-definition of motive, see Haroutunian,
Piety versus M o r a l i s m . pp. 220-229.
On the same topic, but
emphasizing the influence of Locke on Edwards' concept of
motive, see Paul Ramsey, "Editor's Introduction" to Edwards'
Freedom of the W i l l , pp. 47-64.
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to avoid confusion and needless objection, that I speak
of the direct and immediate object of the act of volition;
and not some object that the act of will has not an imm e 
diate, but only an indirect and remote respect to.^U
In Edwards'

view,

the particular choice--to walk,

is of secondary importance.

talk,

etc.,

Whatever the supposed goal,

there

is an incontrovertible law of human nature which necessitates
a person to always choose that alternative which seems to
provide the greatest good or pleasure or least pain.
are no exceptions.

There

Thus,

. . . the will is determined by the greatest apparent
good, or by what seems most agreeable; because an a p pear
ing most agreeable or pleasing to the mind, and the
mind's preferring and choosing, seem hardly to be properly
and perfectly distinct. 41
Paradoxically,

man chooses between alternatives,

but he has

no alternative other then choosing that which he likes.
Edwards'

level of analysis,

therefore,

Unlike the conscious,
rect"

object,

considered choice of an "indi

the selection of likes and dislikes is usually

made unconsciously.
conscious

On

man has no choice.

choice,

Edwards acknowledged that

"reason,"

is sometimes instrumental in determining

whether an abject appears agreeable or disagreeable.
however,

it is not,

noficant

restatement of the dilemma of St.

Often,

as Edwards notes in a ponderous but sigPaul:

When it [reason] concurs with other things, then its
weight is added to them, as put into the same scale; but
when it is against them, it is as a weight in the o ppo
site scale, where it resists the influence of other
things:
yet its resistance is often overcome by their
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greater weight, and so the act of the will is determined
in opposition to it.42
"Other things" often determine a course of action.
is made,

symmetry or asymmetry,
smell or pungent
"other things,"
if at all,
later,
laden

A choice

an object is sought for its beauty or ugliness,
harmony or discord,

stench.43

Each of these,

aesthetic considerations,

for its sweet
and an infinity of
usually register,

as vague but vitally important f e e l i n g s .

Much

Freud would deal specifically with these emotionally"other things."

Edwards was content merely to note

their existence and importance.
Like Freud,
motivation.

44

Edwards re-defined the usual concept of

A motive is not that which is consciously

desired or "in the view of the mind,"
Rather,

as he often put it.

a motive is a group of affectionate,

emotional c o n 

siderations which either attract us toward or repell us from
some

"rational"

alternative.^

We see the world of mankind to be exceedingly busy and
active; and the affections of men are the springs of the
motion:
take away all love and hatred, all hope and
fear, all anger, zeal, and affectionate desire, and the
world would be, in a great measure, motionless and dead;
there would be no such thing as activity amongst mankind,
or any earnest pursuit w h a t s o e v e r . ^
42

I b i d ., p. 14B.

Dn St. Paul,

43

see above,

See W i l l , pp. 145-146, for Edwards'
why objects appear agreeable or disagreeable.

p. 133.

list of reasons

44
This may have been what Perry Miller had in mind
when he made his cryptic remarks about Edwards and Freud; see
above, p. 72.
45W i l l , p . 141.
46
Af f e c t i o n s . p. 101.
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Every human action is a complex mixture of reason and emotion.
This simple fact represents to Edwards a kind of phenotypic
expression of the underlying,

genotypic,

psychological

reality.
I humbly conceive that the affections of the soul are
not properly distinguished from the will, as though they
were two faculties in the soul.
All acts of the aff e c 
tions of the soul are in some sense acts of the will,
and all acts of the will are acts of the affections.
All exercises of the will are in some degree or other,
exercises of the soul's appetition or aversion; or which
is the same thing, of its love or hatred.
The soul
wills one thing rather than another, or chooses one
thing rather than another, no otherwise than as it loves
one thing more than another; but love and hatred are
affections of the soul:
and therefore all acts of the
will are truly acts of the a f f e c t i o n s .47
Edwards made his point convincingly.
are in some measure
love and hatred,

All our plans and acts

a function of our likes and dislikes,

of our own peculiar sense of what is bea u t i 

ful and what is ugly.
The Puritan and neo-Platonic churchmen from whom
Edwards inherited the faculty psychology drew a psychological
portrait of man that was theoretically complex but practically
quite simple.
resulting

A stimulus would be passively received and its

"phantasm" was said to leapfrog through a host of

independent faculties
faculty,

"Reason."

of the affections.

until it reached a kind of executive

It could make its decisions independently
Man was thus seen as a piece of compli

cated machinery whose conduct,

however,

was a rather simple

function of the choices made by his rational faculty.

In

^ 5ome Thoughts Concerning the Present Revival of
R eligion in New England, in Goen, e d ., Great Awakening, dd.
291-530, p. 297.
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spite of an ornate,
thinking

byzantine mental arrangement,

human

and behavior was rendered quite explicable and even

predictable.^®

Edwards,

however,

inverted this arrangement.

His conception of the mind was starkly simple;

he a c k nowl

edged only understanding and w i l l - a f f e c t i o n s , and then only
as convenient fictions rather than physiological

entities.

Furthermore,

the struc-

by uniting the will and affections,

turally-simple Edwardsean man emerges as one whose thinking
and behavior is caused mostly by complex,

uncontrollable,

even unknowable unconscious emotional forces.
Thus

far we have considered only what might be called

experiential indices of Edwards'

transsummative view of man.

Since rational acts of will like planning,
ing are motivated

by emotional needs,

choosing,

and act

then it may be inferred

that man's mental structure is a rational-emotive unity.
Edwards was not fond,
make inferences.

however,

Readers,

not infer properly.

of permitting his readers to

being sinful and corrupt,

might

He therefore undertook to analyze the

precise nature of the relationship between the two mental
functions

(not structures)

which he acknowledged,

u nderstand

ing and w i l l - a f f e c t i o n s .
When
soul,

itself,

first focusing his microscope on the mind,
Edwards sound respectably traditional,

for the poverty of "faculties"

or

except

and the integrated will-

af f ections .
48
See Miller,
Nature of Man."

Seventeenth C e n t u r y , chapt.

9,

"The
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God has indued the soul with two faculties:
one is that
by which it is capable of perception and speculation, or
by which it discerns and judges of things; which is
called the understanding.
The other faculty is that by
which the soul does not merely perceive and view things,
but is in some way inclined with respect to the things
it views or considers . . . either as liking or disliking,
pleased or displeased, approving or rejecting.
This
faculty is called by various names:
it is sometimes
called the i n c l i n a t i o n : and, as it has respect to the
actions that are determined and governed by it, is called
the w i l l : and the m i n d , with regard to the exercises of
this faculty, is often called the h e a r t .49
Some commentators
that this statement

have jumped to the hasty conclusion

"proves" that Edwards was only a modified

"faculty psychologist"

who had honed Occam's razor to an

uncommonly sharp cutting e d g e . ^
simply failed to read

These misinterpreters

on and discover what Edwards

about the relationship

between these

have

had to say

"faculties."

Edwards distinguished between two kinds of u n der
standing.

A person can possess a "mere notional understanding,

wherein the mind only beholds things in the
speculative faculty."

51

exercise of a

This level of understanding,

implies a minimum of personal participation
is held by Edwards to be inadequate at best,
representative of serious

pathology.

and at worst

A person who refuses to

get involved with the object of his attention,
position with regard to it, to experience it,

49

Af f e c t i o n s , p. 96

5°Cf.
51

Fay,

(Edwards'

which

and involvement,

to take
has,

a

according

italics).

American P s y c h o l o g y , and Roback,

History.

Af f e c t i o n s . p. 272.
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to Edwards,

useless knowledge.

52

It can never lead to con

structive action because emotional involvement,
"notional understanding," motivates the will.

absent in a

So-called

"rationalists,"

therefore,

tions

are guilty of denying a basic human function.

in check,

This useless

those who seek to keep their e mo

"notional understanding" must be c o n 

trasted with the understanding which Edwards called

"a sense

of the heart."
I say a sense of heart; for it is not speculation merely
that is concerned in this kind of understanding:
nor can
there be a clear distinction made between the two fa c u l 
ties of understanding and will, as acting distinctly and
separately, in this matter.
When the mind is sensible of
the sweet beauty and amiableness of a thing, that implies
a sensibleness of sweetness and delight in the presence
of the idea of it:
and this sensibleness of the amiable
ness or delightfulness of beauty, carries in the very
nature of it, the sense of the heart; or an effect and
i mpression the soul is the subject of as a substance
possessed of taste, inclination and w i l l . 53
Scholastic distinctions must be discarded in light of the
evidence.

It cannot be denied,

has perceived
it,

than

Edwards,

that

heat and light:
Knowledge

"he that

knows much more about

he who has only looked upon and felt of it."

sense of the heart"

about.

claims

the sweet taste of honey,

54

"A

implies a simultaneous dispensation of

the receiving of information that is cared
about and knowledge,

in other words,

are

52
For a modern and rather complete analogue to this
aspect of Edwards' "Sense of the Heart," see Schactel's c on
cept of "allocentric perception" in M e t a m o r p h o s i s .
53

A f f e c t i o n s . p. 272.

5 4 I b i d . . p. 272.
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not equivalent.
man's

In the latter Edwards found evidence that

psyche is meant to function as a fully-integrated,

rational-emotive unity that transcends the artifical bounda
ries which traditionally distort discussion of these aspects
of human functioning .
Edwards had built his case for the singular impor
tance of the affections.
basic

understanding

In all our plans and acts,

and perception of the world,

considerations play a vital role.
reasonable creature,
" enlightened"

But Man is a rational,

or so the argument ran among the more

of Edwards'

colleagues

in an age that was

eventually to be called the Enlightenment,
son.

In Edwards'

illusion;

in our

emotional

view,

however,

or the Age of Rea

man's rationality

is only an

a substratum of emotional needs determines

every

act we commit,

every direction that we look,

and every infer

ence we make.

The tran s s u m m a t i v e , multiple-processing

hypoth

esis could hardly have been presented more forcefully than
this.
But why labor to the bone in order to demonstrate the
superordinate

significance of the emotions?

there to construct

What reason was

an elaborate psychological theory that was

virtually incomprehensible but apparently in opposition to
nearly every "enlightened" view of the day?
this:

It was simply

Edwards believed the affectionate outpourings of the

Great Awakening represented

Delatte,

a valid work of God and not a

^^□n Edwards and the integrity of the "self,"
Beauty and Sen s i b i l i t y , pp. 1-11.

see
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dance of lunatics,

as some would have it.

It was true that

there had been many emotional excess which could hardly be
interpreted

as works of the Holy Spirit.

Yet he resolutely

refused to believe that the emotional blandishments were
unnecessary,

even harmful,

artifacts.

Emotion must be an

i ntegral component of coming to grace.
beneath the raving and ranting,
speaking in tongues,
truth:

Somewhere,

the shouting,

far

sweating,

and

Edwards thought he discerned a profound

"true religion,

in great part,

consists in holy

affections .
The entire psychological
to

system of Edwards reduces

a justification for equating true religion with emotional

involvement.

He had said that man is a creature whose every

act and ever perception is emotionally motivated,
true understanding,

therefore,

and that

consists in a sense of the

h e a r t — a total grasp involving not only speculative
but loving and/or hating.

manner can come to know God,

then,

in only one way, with

total commitment of all his intellectual
Spiritual understanding

judgment

A person constructed in such a
a

and emotional resources.

is but a very special case of a sense

of the heart.
Spiritual understanding primarily consists in this
sense, or taste of the moral beauty of divine things; so
that no knowledge can be called spiritual, and further
than it arises from this, and has this in it.
But s e con
darily, it includes that all discerning and knowledge of
things of religion, which depends upon, and flows from
such a sens e . 5/
56

Aff e c t i o n s . p. 95;

see also p. 101.

5 7 Ibi d .. p. 273.
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Both before and after conversion

a person is

attracted to that which he likes and repelled by that which
he dislikes.
natives but,

He is "free" to consciously choose among alter
at a deeper level,

he must choose that which

appears more attractive or lovely to him.
due to his originally sinful nature,

Before conversion,

a person can have only

a "notional understanding" of "divine things,"

at best.

He

does not love or relish God and the beauty of divine works in
such a way that he can do no other.
Edwards,

He needs,

of God Himself so that his thinking,

perceiving,

more closely approximate the manner in which
accomplish these tasks.
during the

This occurs,

discoveries"

Operate;

The Discovery of Divine

On the surface it would

lost

and saved.

of conversion.

Love

appear that the conversion

It neatly divides

life into two discrete units;

and acting

God might

as we shall now see,

"gracious

experience has no analogue.

born,

according to

to have his affections made more congruent with those

a person's

sinner and saint,

dead and re

In this before and after montage,

spiritual weakness is miraculously transformed into spiritual
strength.

An individual may believe he is so fundamentally

different after conversion that,
residence,
devastating

his occupation,

like St.

effects of conversion,

sized supernatural origins,

Paul,

and even his name.

he changes his
These uniquely

combined with its hypothe

have generally discouraged investi

gation into the precise nature or essence of the event.

Even
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the great James called off his investigation of conversion
far short of trying to isolate its essence.
If the grace of God miraculously operates, it probably
operates through the subliminal door, then.
But just how
anything operates in this region is still unexplained,
and we shall do well now to say good-by to the process
of transformation a l t o gether— leaving it, if you like, a
good deal of a psychological or theological m y s t e r y — and
to turn our attention to the fruits of the religious con
dition, no matter in what way they may have been p r o 
duce d . 58
How,

it might be asked,

can the mental operations of c o n 

version be explained when the mind,
can never be known directly,
cannot be known at all?

the conversional arena,

and the supernatural

stimulus

Edwards rushed in where James and

most other psychologists of religion have feared to tread.

59

In his attempt to describe and explain the precise psycho l o g i 
cal change incurred at conversion,
courageous,

profound,

yet

Edwards culminated

ultimately frustrating

his

descent into

cognitive psychology.
To Edwards,
logians,

as well as most other Protestant t h e o 

it was baldly obvious that sinners and saints behave

differently.

Edwards was merely re-stating what seemed to be

an ancient truism when he drew the obvious conclusion from
this .

□f course, many "faculty" psychologists offered
opinions on conversion.
These were hardly explanations, how
ever.
They usually stated merely that certain mythical
entities ("faculties") had somehow been miraculously t r a n s 
formed.
The question, of course, is how does this occur; and
how is it reflected in perception and behavior?
Edwards
addressed himself to all these questions.
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Hence it will fallow, that the sense of things of
r eligion that a natural man has, is not only not to the
same degree, but nothing of same nature with that which
a true saint has.
The reason why natural men have no knowledge of
spiritual things is because they have nothing of the
Spirit of God dwelling in th e m . 60
The converted person,
within

him,

he who has the Holy Spirit dwelling

differs in some absolutely fundamental way from

the person who lacks the Spirit.
But wherein,
monopoly?
converted?
5pirit

exactly,

lay the saintly psychological

How does the Spirit interact with the mind of the
Edwards usually refers to the presence of the

in conversion as a "principle,"

times an

"principles" or some

"indwelling vital prin c i p l e . " 6 ^

holy principle in the heart,"
and sum of all grace,
every k i n d . " 63

he said,

the root and source of all holy acts of

The establishment

affair of the heart,

"There is some one

"that is the essence

of the new principle is an

which is Edwards way of saying that it

has something to do with the affections.

Moreover,

the

emotional re-orientation represented by the spiritual pri n c i 
ple is no simple usurpation by God of human functions.
Nothing in the mind is replaced,

yet the entire mind is

reorganized and given a new d i r e c t i o n . 63

Although he admitted

6 °Treatise on G r a c e , ed. by Paul Helm

(London,

1971),

p. 29.
Cf. A f f e c t i o n s . pp. 200-207, G r a c e , and "Divine
Light," for dozens of examples of Edwards' use of the term
" p r i n c i p l e ."
^ G r a c e . p. 40.
^Cf.

Affections,

p. 206,

and "Divine Light,"

p. 179.
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the vagary and inadequacy of his notion of "principle,"
Edwards left no doubt that it is a cognitive structure of
some sort.
I use the word "principles," for want of a more d e termi
nate signification.
By a principle of nature in this
place, I mean that foundation which is laid in nature,
either old or new, for any particular manner or kind of
exercise of the faculties of the soul:
or a natural
habit or foundation for action, giving a person ability
and disposition to ex e r t the faculties in exercises of
such a certain kind; so that to exert the faculties in
that kind of exercises, may be said to be his nature.
So
this new spiritual sense is not a new faculty of u nder
standing, but it is a new foundation laid in the nature
of the so u l . 64
The "natural habits or foundations" in the soul
now commonly called

(or mind)

cognitive structures or s c h e m a s . ^

are

These

cognitive constructs represent mental categories or rubrics
which permit us to interpret

and organize our experience.

seems clear that the Edwardsean "principle"

It

accomplishes a

fundamental alteration and organization of the experience of
the convert.
The cognitive realignment accomplished by the i ndwell
ing vital principle

has an effect similar to reversing the

poles on a magnet.

Former attraction become repellant and

vice versa.

The magnet,

the matter.

After the reversal,

like the convert,

has no choice in

the magnet interacts with the

^ Affections , p. 206.
^ F o r a good general introduction to the concept of
schemas and cognitive structures, see Ezra Stodtland and
Lance Cannon, Social Psychology:
A Cognitive Approach (Phila
delphia, 1972), chapt. 1.
A more technical introduction to
the topic, but one which is more pertinent to the present
discussion, may be found in Neisser, Cognitive P s y c h o l o g y .
pp. 286-292.
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world in a manner which is fundamentally different from before
the change.

For the convert,

behavioral changes are a fun c 

tion of his new Im a g e ; his cognitive picture of himself and
his place in the universe has changed.
coveries"

The ’’gracious d i s 

of God's beauty and the love of Him are accompanied,

quite literally,

by the discovery of a world which seems

startingly new.

The world is now seen,

the

eyes of God.

significant psychological statements
Edwards

as it were,

In the following passage,

through

one of the most

he ever made,

we see

struggling desperately to describe the psychological

significance of the newness,
inherent in conversion.

the sense of creative discovery,

The vital indwelling principle emerges

as a principle of cognitive reorganization.
If grace be . . . an entirely new kind of principle; then
the exercises of it are also entirely a new kind of exer
cises.
And if there be in the soul a new sort of exer
cises which it is conscious of, which the soul knew noth
ing of before, and which no improvement, composition or
m anagement of what it was before conscious or sensible
of, could produce, or anything like it; then it follows
that the mind has an entirely new kind of perception or
sensation; and here is, as it were, a new spiritual sense
that the mind has, or a principle of new kind of p er
ception or spiritual sensation, which is in its whole
nature different from any former kinds of sensation of the
m i n d .6 6
The

"new kind of exercises"

imparted by the "principle"

thus interpretive and organizational
The discoveries of conversion,
coveries,

are

exercises of the mind=

like all other creative d i s 

consist not in the novel manipulation of the physical

environment,

but in mental reorganization of information.
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Like cognitive psychologists of all eras,
was frustrated by the invisibility of the mind.
nor

Edwards
Neither he

his readers had a frame of reference with which to e valu

atea discussion of

mental functioning.

nor would they ever see,

No one had ever seen,

a mind in operation,

and certainly

none had directly and objectively observed the operation of
the Edwardsean "principle."

When he attempted to describe

the actual activity of the "principle,"

therefore,

Edwards

resorted to that historically unreliable but uniquely avail
able device of cognitive psychologists— a n a l o g y . ^

In all the

analogies which Edwards draws between the mysterious co n 
version

"principle"

and familiar,

stresses the fundamental
the

essence,

observable

phenomena,

nature of the change.

or the core of a convert is altered.

acts and thinks differently

than before,

he

Something in
He not only

he literally is

different.
"The word of God," Edwards remarked

"abides in the

heart of a regenerate person as a holy seed,
ple there,
But,

though it may be but as a seed,

he reminds us,

plant,

"the seed is a very small, part of the

and is its first pr i n c i p l e .

Edwards,

knew nothing of modern genetics but,
carried the analogy even further.
"principle"

is like giving

675ee above,

a Divine princi

a small thing."

if he had,

of course,
he might have

The infusion of the divine

a person a new set of genes.

The

pp. 133-134 and 136-137.

^ G r a c e . p. 32.
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"principle" represents no mere face-lift which gives the
appearance of youth;

the convert is literally transformed

into a spiritual babe,

vigorous,

clean,

and new.

evangelists have long been found of saying,
another place,

living water,

or fountain of water,

converts

".

. . don't

but this living water becomes a well

in the soul,

and everlasting l i f e . " ^
remarked:

as
In

Edwards referred to the principle as a "divine,

supernatural spring of action" in which
only drink

He is,

born again.

springing up into spiritual

In still another analogy,

Edwards

"The light of the Sun of Righteousness don't only

shine

upon them,

also,

and become little images of that Sun which shines upon

t h e m . " 7*"*

but is so communicated to them that they shine

Converted persons

are not like the parasitic planets

which derive their energy from elsewhere,
resemble something like comets,

but rather they

each containing the vital

glow of the energy source which spawned it.
The conversion

"principle"

is utterly fundamental.

It

therefore must involve or influence the most basic aspects of
man's

nature.

Recall that Edwards,

held to the hypothesis
thinking

a synthetic psychologist,

of multiple processing:

and action begins with the affections,

and hating.

all human
with loving

We see and do that which we like and avoid that

which does not please

us.

The "principle" of grace,

therefore,

must accomplish a revolution in the affectional system,
must redistribute a person's deepest loves and hates.

it
Further-

^ A f f e c t i o n s . p. 200.
7 ° I b i d ., pp.

200-201.
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more,

since it is the Holy Spirit of God which is united to

the faculties of the soul," the basic motivating love of the
convert must,
all his works.

in Edwards'

view,

be redirected toward God and

71

That principle in the soul of the saints, which is the
grand Christian virtue, and which is the soul and essence
and summary comprehension of all grace, is a principle of
Divine l o v e .72
Divine love, as it has God for its object, may thus
be described.
'Tis the soul's relish of the supreme
excellency of the Divine nature inclining the heart to
God as the chief g ood.73
Whereas before the infusion of the divine light an individual
might be inclined toward card playing,
and other debaucheries,
inclined

toward God and Godliness.

inclined.

drinking

"frolicking,"

the heart of the reborn convert is
That is,

he is necessarily

After conversion a person has a deeply-felt

of God's beauty;

he must yearn for,

relish,

"sense"

and love God

simply because he is now constructed that way.

If we can

assume that God loves Himself and all His perfect works,
a convert and God,

according to Edwards,

then

have similar tastes;

they organize their experience in a singular fashion.
Although the divine
from God,

human mental

"principle"

activity,

is passively received

according to Edwards,

normally an active and strenuous operation.

is

The laborious

"exercises" which he postulates are now generally referred to

71 I b i d ..

p.

2D0.

^ G r a c e . p. 40;
7^ I b i d . ,

pp.

Edwards'

italics.

48-49.
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as information p r o cessing— the sorting,

selecting,

and

depositing of information into categories or cognitive s t ruc
tu r e s — background processing.

Each new experience is in t e r 

pretable only within the context provided by the cognitive
background of past experience.

Potential experience

can never

become actual until the appropriate cognitive structure
been created.

Consider the following

importance of cognitive structures.
the following

You are asked to connect

set of dots with four straight lines without

lifting your pencil from the paper

(Figure 14).

suppose that you try to solve the problem,
and conclude that it is insoluable.

however,

Let us

fail repeatedly,

You inform your neighbor

of your difficulty and seek his sympathy.
consolation,

has

simple example of the

Instead of offering

he takes your pencil and solves the

problem with four deft strokes
at your neighbor's brilliance

(Figure 15).

You are amazed

until he tells you that he remem

bered the solution for a psychology class he took years

ago."^

Even after your amazement dissipates,

still

however,

you will

possess a fundamentally different view of the problem than you
did before.

You have discovered the areas outside the "dot

box" which escaped your notice initially,

and in any future

74

This is a simple example of the Gestalt principle of
"functional fixedness."
Solving difficult problems often
involves reorganizing the entire field, or gestalt; i.e.,
looking at the problem in a way which is fundamentally d iff er
ent from the original approach.
To the extent that one is
incapable of such cognitive flexibility, he is functionally
fixated.
For applications of the principle to animal p s y 
chology, consult Wolfgang KBhler, The Mentality of Apes (New
York, 1925).
For applicat ions to human problem solving, see
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Figure 14.

The dot problem.
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Figure 15.

Solution to the dot problem.
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encounters with the problem the solution will seem as obvious
to you as it does to your neighbor.

The addition of a c o g n i 

tive structure has opened up an entirely new,

if trivial,

realm of experience.
Cognitive structures are for structuring;

they pr o 

vide each individual with a conglomerate device for inter
preting
words,

his raw experience.

They permit each person,

to construct his reality as he develops.

in other

Nowhere is

this more apparent than in the mental development of early
childhood.

Jean Piaget,

the Swiss psycholog i s t - p h i l o s o p h e r ,

has given scientific respectability and precision to a bit of
folk knowledge which any parent can substantiate:
children do not view the world as adults d o . ^

young

Many r e mark 

able discoveries— the acquisition of cognitive structures— are
required before the child's reality becomes congruent,
essential

respects,

with the reality of the adult.

in its

Two of

Piaget's interpreters have summarized his position as follows:
The acquisition of a new structure of mental operations
is a . . . form of learning which . . . Piaget feels, is
the only stable and lasting type.
It is only when the
child has the prerequisite mental structure to assimilate
new experiences that true learning takes place, and the
possibility to generalize to novel situations becomes
feasible.
In other words, genuine learning occurs when
the child has available the necessary mental equipment to

Karl Duncker, "On Problem-solving," trans. by L. 5. Lees.
Psychological M o n o g r a p h s , 1 945, 5_8, Whole No. 270.; N. R. F.
Maier, "Reasoning in Humans.
I.
On Direction," Journal of
Comparative Psy c h o l o g y . 1930, JMD, 115-143; and Max Wertheimer,
Productive T h i n k i n g .
"^See especially Piaget's Construction of R e a l i t y .
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make use of new experiences.
When the requisite cog n i 
tive structure is present, he can learn from the world
and come to understand reality; when the structure is
absent, new experience has only superficial e f f e c t s . 76
When the child acquires some new "mental equipment," the
mind's

"exercises,"

as Edwards called them,

will permit a

new and exciting apprehension of a tired old world.
time this occurs,

and Piaget believes there

Each

are a number of

these fundamental discoveries in each normal child's d evelop
ment,

the child's conception of the world moves one stage

closer to that of the adult.
The acquisition of the "permanent object concept"
one of the most fascinating discoveries
If an adult places
leaves the kitchen,
another room,
oven.

a cake in an oven,

is

of early childhood.

closes the oven door,

and perhaps even shuts himself up in

he has no doubt that the cake is still in the

It is a very simple matter to conjure up a mental image

of a cake inside an oven.

For the young child,

however,

objects do not seem to exist independently of his perception
of them.

Until a child attains the age of approximately

twelve months,

for instance,

he will not search for toys which

have been placed under a cloth.
sight,

it seems,

Once an object leaves

his

it ceases to exist.

Piaget has carefully demonstrated a number of stages
through which a child must pass before he acquires a mature

"^Herbert Ginsburg and Sylvia Upper, Piaget's Theory
of Intellectual Development:
An Introduction (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J., 1969), pp. 175-176.
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object concept somewhere between eighteen months and two
years.

The final,

dramatic discovery in the object-concept

sequence is illustrated by two of Piaget's daughters:
Lucienne,

age fourteen months;

and Jacqueline,

age twenty

months.
Lucienne is seated on a bed, between shawl A and cloth B.
I hide a safety pin in my hand and my hand under the
shawl.
I remove my hand closed and empty.
Lucienne
opens it at once and looks for the pin.
Not finding it
she searches under the shawl and finds it. . . .
But with a beret, things become complicated.
I put
my watch in the beret and the beret under pillow A (on
the right); Lucienne lifts the pillow, takes the beret,
and removes the watch from it.
Then I place the beret,
again containing the watch, under cushion B on the left;
Lucienne looks for it in B but, as it is hidden too far
down for her to find it at once, she returns to A.
Then, twice, I raise cushion B so that Lucienne sees
the beret obviously containing the object; both times she
resumes looking in B but, not finding the watch right
away, she returns to A!
5he searches even longer in A
than in B after having seen the object in B!77
At this

stage the infant is incapable of inference;

infer movement of an object which he cannot see.
of the object,

therefore,

he cannot

The existence

is still dependent on the child's

perception of it.
Jacqueline is seated opposite three object screens, A, B
and C (a beret, a handkerchief, and her jacket) aligned
equidistant from each other.
I hide a small pencil in
may hand saying "Coucou, the pencil."
The child had p r e 
viously found it under A.
I hold out my closed hand to
her, put it under A, then under B, then under C (leaving
the pencil under C); at each step I again extend my closed
hand, repeating, "Coucou, the pencil."
Jacqueline then
searches for the pencil directly in C, finds it and
l a u g h s .78

"^Piaget, Construction of R e a l i t y , pp. 76-77; also
quoted in Ginsburg and Opper, Piaget's T h e o r y , pp. 62-63.
"^Piaget, Construction of R e a l i t y , pp. 79-80; also
quoted in Ginsburg and Opper, Piaget's T h e o r y , pp. 65-66.
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The child inferred that the object was moved from A to B to C ,
even

though she did not see it move.

Like an adult,

formed a mental image of the object.

For her,

Jacqueline

the pencil

exists independently of her direct perception of it.
Every child eventually learns that there is some kind
of a real permanent world out there.
ther any noise is made by a falling

We may never know wh e 
tree in a vacant forest,

but we know that trees can indeed fall even if no one is p r e 
sent to record the event.

We can imagine it.

The discovery

of object permanence does not alter the raw information con
tained in Piaget's moving watch or pencil,

but the acquisition

of this cognitive structure revolutionizes

the manner in which

the information

is organized and interpreted.

This profound

discovery significantly and irrevocably alters the life of
each child.
Edwards claimed that the infusion of the "principle"
of divine love led the mind to a "new sort of exercises"
which permit
before.

a person to perceive things he has never seen

Yet the world itself changes little;

intrapsychic.

The "gracious discoveries,"

tion of the permanent-object
refocus

cause a person to

his attention and reorganize familiar information.

For infants,
stable.

concept,

conversion is

like the acquisi

a plastic and ephermeral world becomes solid and

For Edwardsean converts,

Godly beauty and truth are

eagerly received into their appropriate,

valid,

and newly

acquired categories.
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Persons after their conversion often speak of things
of religion as seeming new to them; that preaching is a
new thing; that it seems to them they never heard p reac h
ing before; that the Bible is a new book:
they find there
new chapters, new psalms, new histories, because they see
them in a new l i g h t . 79
We see,
to maximize
much

think,

and act,

according to Edwards,

our pleasure and minimize our pain.

human activity is rational,

conscious,

we are always attracted to that which
that which we hate.

so as

Although

and goal directed,

we love and repelled by

This is the essence of the transsummative

h y p othesis— man is a rational-emotive unity.
indwelling principle,"

of mental reorganization,
tion of the emotions.

The "vital,

a new cognitive structure or principle
is rooted ultimately in a reor i e n t a 

A convert thinks,

and acts,

the world differently because he feels differently;

and views
he is

drawn by his love of God inexorably toward Godliness.

When

this occurs,

a

Edwards says that God is apprehended with

"sense of the heart," with the total commitment of his c om
bined rational and emotional resources.
look

He takes a closer

at some things which formerly did not interest him,

he is amazed at what he finds.

This is

and

the essence of most

discoveries.

2

Test :

Evaluating the Validity of the
C onversion Experience

After traversing

the initial stages of the conversion

sequence the concerned seeker quite naturally wishes to know

“^ Faithful N a r r a t i v e , p. 1 81 .
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whether his "experience"

has been a genuine conversion or a

melancholic trauma or even a work of the devil.
to what Edwards calls
thought,

He reverts

"reason," or sequential goal-directed

as he attempts to evaluate the validity of what he

hopes has been a true conversion.
The evaluation of conversion validity presents

some

extraordinary difficulties which do not arise in most f e e d 
back loops.

In the familiar nail-hammering

in chapter three,

for example,

example described

one need only look at the nail

to determine if the head of the nail is flush and the goal has
thus been achieved.®^

Anyone with fair eyesight and a modicum

of manual dexterity can make a speedy and more or less gra c e 
ful exit from the loop.
valid conversion is,
phenomenon.

Unlike hammering a nail,

in Edwards'

view,

The mental realignment resulting

sion obviously cannot

however,

a

strictly a cognitive

be observed directly,

from a con v e r 

and therefore it

must be inferred indirectly from external signs.

Unfortunately,

estimating changes in hypothetical constructs like "mind" or
"cognitive structures"
of dealing with

tain circumstances,
iorist.

If,

is a risky b u s i n e s s . ^

rarified mental entities

under ce r 

to transform anyone into a modified behav-

for example,

®^See above,

The uncertainty

is enough,

pp.

my daughter has been scolded for

155-157.

^ On the definition of "hypothetical constructs," and
the difficulty of using them in explanations, see Kenneth
MacCorquodale and Paul E. Meehl, "On a Distinction between
Hypothetical Constructs and Intervening Variables," Psvcholoqical R e v i e w . 1 948, 55_, 95-1 07.
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wrongdoing and then tells me of her love for me,
her to

I might ask

"prove it" by exhibiting some behavior which can be

interpreted

as a function of an internal essence,

Love.

But what are the signs of a valid conversion?
Edwards viewed

5ince

the cognitive alteration in conversion as

fundamentally a revolution in the affections,

an individual's

emotional responses probably contain the most important
insights into his experience.

In particular,

Edwards believed

that the "sense of the heart" was most reliably exhibited
what he called
".

"religiou s affections"

. . There is no true

is no religious

religion," he claimed,

affectio n . " ^

version is valid , then,

in

or "holy affect.i o n .
"where the:

The surest sign that a con-

is an emotional outpou:ring of lovi

God and godliness.
The equation between valid conversion
tions did not,
ful,

however,

provide the ultimate,

and the af f e c 
or even a u se

criterion against which conversions might be measured.

It merely focused

attention on the affections by contending

that in the absence of "raised affections,"
intensity,

a conversion

or emotional

cannot have occurred.

Yet it was

obvious to all but the most rabid enthusiasts that the pr e s 
ence of emotional disturbances
of the Holy Spirit.
many reasons,

hardly guaranteed the presence

People become emotionally aroused

for

most of which are unrelated to conversion or

even to religion.

Sex,

guns,

^ A f f e c t i o n s , p. 120;

food,

earthquakes,

see also pp.

politicians

100-124.
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and thousands of other things are all capable of raising the
affections to an extraordinary degree.
fanatical ministers,

So, it appeared,

as the infamous Rev.

v ividly demonstrated one evening in July,

are

James Davenport
1741:

Divers women were terrified and cried out exceedingly.
When Mr. Davenport had dismissed the congregation some
went out and others stayed; he then went into the broad
alley [aisle], which was much crowded, and there he
screamed out, "Come to Christ! Come to Christ!
Come
away!"
Then he went into the third pew on the women's
side, and kept there, sometimes singing, sometimes pra y 
ing; he and his companions all taking their turns, and the
women fainting and in hysterics.
This confusion continued
until ten o'clock at night.
And then he went off singing
through the stre e t s . 83
That God should operate in such a fashion was,
unthinkable.

to Edwards,

Raving and ranting are no sure signs of grace.

Bizarre episodes like those involving Davenport,
m erely discredited all raised affections.
religion,"

said Edwards,

. . . tends greatly to

and weaken the cause of vital religion

was a desperate need,

in fact,

. . false

"consisting in the counterfeits of

the operations of the Spirit of God
wound

".

in other words,

. . ."

84

There

to distinguish between

the affections.
There are false affections and there are true.
A man's
having much affection, don't prove that he has any true
religion:
but if he has no affection it proves that he
has no true religion.
The right way, is not to reject all
affections, nor to approve all; but to distinguish between
affections, approving some and rejecting others; separating
between the wheat and the chaff, the gold and the dross,
the precious and the v ile.85

^^The Diary of Joshua Hempstead, of New London, Con
necticut (New London, Conn., 1902), p. 379; quoted in Goen,
"Editor's Introduction," p. 52.
Devils."

®^"True Grace Distinguished from the Experience of
In Dwight, ed., W o r k s , Vol.
, pp. 232-261, p. 259.

85Affect i o n s ,

p.

121.

6
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A set of decision rules was needed which could establish a
causative link between the essence of conversion— the
restructuring of the m i n d — and its behavioral and experiential
i ndices— certain aspects of emotional arousal.
The Calvinist hell is an awful place,

and most New

Englanders believed it to be the eternal residence of the
unconverted.

One could not sleep peacefully until he was sure

that his alleged conversion was valid.

Until the feedback

from his own conversion experience was absolutely congruent
with some criteria,
loop.

Often,

there would be no exit from the conversion

Edwards believed,

final assurances through

the minister must provide the

a favorable interpretation of that

affectional feedback.
Many continue a long time in a course of gracious exer
cises and experiences, and don't think themselves to be
otherwise; and none knows how long they would continue
so were they not helped by particular i n s t r u c t i o n . ^

6

It was impossible to instruct people concerning the state of
their immortal soul,

however,

until a checklist of observable

holy affections had been constructed.
were distinguished,

Until the affections

the minister could offer only moral sup

port to tormented but hopeful parishioners.

"Particular

instruction" to an aspiring convert without particular inst ruc
tions for the minister would constitute an irresponsible

and

dangerous game.
Although certainly less important than the removal of
the tortuous anxiety associated with individual conversions,

a

^ Faithful N a r r a t i v e , p. 175.
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set of signs,

or rules,

would also help make life more f u l 

filling for the ministers.

Edwards and his "New Light"

colleagues were in the business of bring
that was,

in theory,

souls to Christ;

their primary f u n c t i o n . ^

While each

individual in the congregation agonized over the state of his
own soul,

the minister was often right beside him,

lamenting

his own inability to tell his parishioner the joyous words he
d esperately wanted to hear.
pale,

thin-lipped,

Even Jonathan Edwards,

the tall,

epitome of ruthless Puritanism yearned to

relax and celebrate the accomplishment of his goal:

salvation

for members of his congregation.
Yet I should account it a great calamity to be deprived of
the comfort of rejoicing with those of my flock when there
seems to be good evidence that those that were dead are
alive

.88

Edwards,

like his "flock," was in an uncomfortable situation.

What would it be like to labor so long and hard and have
true converts?

He needed

"the comfort of rejoicing"

fruits of his labor and God's mercy,

no

over the

and for this he needed

"good evidence," which might be obtained only after the af f e c 
tions had been distinguished.
his own ministerial loop

Only then could he exit from

(Figure 16).

In the period of the Great Awakening
therefore,

(ca.

1736-1746),

a set of criteria for evaluating the validity of

®"^This was especially true in Northampton, where
Edwards' grandfather and predecessor in the pulpit had been
c onducting revivals, or "harvests," for fifty years.
Stoddard's
relationship to Edwards' psychological views is dealt with, in
a peripheral fashion, by John E. Smith, "Editor's Introduction,"
pp. 57-60, and more specifically by James G. Blight, "Solomon
S t o d d a r d ."
^ Faithful N a r r a t i v e , p.

176.
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Need:

To Bring Souls
to Christ

Isolate Those
in Need of
Grace

Sainthood
“>■

for
Parishioners

Marks
Signs
(Decision
Rules)

Preac h i n g ,
Writing,
Counseling

Figure 16.
minister.

The ministerial feedback loop of

evangelical

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

233

the conversion experience was needed for a variety of rea
sons.

Many people thought they had been converted but they

needed to know for sure.
like

Edwards,

unwitting
interest
tions.

Conscientious

also needed to be sure,

soul into hell.

Edwards,

in distinguishing

evangelical ministers,

lest they mislead an

in addition,

had a unique

between holy and spurious affec

He was the acknowledged leader and spokesman of a

group of minister-theologians who sought to defend a middle
position
Boston,

against rationalists led by Charles Chauncy of
on the one hand,

Davenport on the other.

89

and fanatical enthusiasts like
Both sides needed to be shown that

the acceptance of emotion as the core of religious experience
need not degenerate into animal-like excesses.
Edwards'
reliable,
possible.

initial task was to demonstrate that valid,

and observable signs of conversion
For this assignment,

transsummative doctrine:
said,

90

"...

are theoretically

he was well armed with
all acts of the will,"

"are truly acts of the affections." 91

his
he

Human functioning

□ther important "New Lights" were Gilbert Tennet
and Jonathan Dickinson, both of New Jersey.
An analysis of
their views may be found in Sweet, Revivalism in A m e r i c a ,
and excerpts from their writings are in Heimert and Miller,
Great A w a k e n i n g .
90
The religious aberrations of the awakening were
catalogued by Charles Chauncy in his Seasonable Thoughts on
the 5tate of Religion in New England, a Treatise in Five
Parts (Boston, 1743).
Two thirds of this large book (424
pages) is devoted to the documentation of seizures, faintings,
etc., resulting from New Light preaching.
See Caustad, Great
Awakening in New E n g l a n d , pp. 80-101; Goen, "Editor's Intro
duction," pp. 80-83; and Miller, Jonathan E d w a r d s , pp. 165-195.
Some T h o u g h t s . p. 297;
and W i l l , pp. 141-148.

see also A f f e c t i o n s , p. 96,
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consists in a unified rational-emotive process which
with conscious
directed,
terms,

and unconscious feeling

volitional activity.

begins

and culminates in goal-

Conversion,

reduced to lowest

is the fundamental reorientation of the affections;

God and godliness is loved and relished above all else.
direct,

immutable,

and instantaneous causative sequence

begins,

therefore,

with

conversion

(Figure 27).

the infusion of the Divine Light in
The convert loves Divine things,

c onceptualizes the world differently,
and behaves in a saintly fashion.
Edwards,

A

and finally he thinks

Most assuredly,

for

there must be visible evidence of conversion which

can be traced directly to the invisible essence of the p r o 
cess:

the reorientation of the affections,

of God with a "sense of the heart."

Nervous

the apprehension
New Englanders

could breath a temporary sigh of relief.
What is the nature of this evidence,
allows one to label certain affections
spurious?

then,

which

as holy and others as

Edwards elaborated the distinctions between the

affections twice,

once during the heat of the Awakening in

the Distinguishing Marks

(1741),

and again shortly after the

spiritual furor had subsided in the Religious Affections
(1746).

92

A summary of the reliable evidence of conversion

92
Of course, many of Edwards' other treatises and
sermons are concerned with this problem; cf. Grace and True
Grace D i s t i n g u i s h e d . The Distinguishing Marks and Religious
Af f e c t i o n s , however, are devoted almost entirely to the syste
matic distinction between the affections.
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Edwards'
sequence in conversion.

conception of the psychological
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TABLE 4

RELIABLE MARKS AND SIGNS OF A
VALID CONVERSION

"Distinguishing M a r k s

1

1.

Raised esteem of Jesus Christ as Son of God and Saviour

2.

Turning away from corruptions

of the world.
and lusts to the righ-

tiousness of God.
3.

Increased regard for Holy 5cripture.

4.

Minds are established in the objective truths of
revealed religion.

5.

Genuine love for God and man.

1.

Influences and operations on the heart are s p i r i t u a l ,

2.

The Divine is loved for itself.

"Positive Signs"

s u p e r n a t u r a l , and d i v i n e .

3.

An appreciation of the moral excellency of divine things.

4.

The mind is enlightened,

rightly and spiritually to

understand divine things.
5.

A certainty of divine things.

6.

A sense of evangelical humiliation.

93
All the "distinguishing marks" and "negative
instances" in Tables 1 &, 2 are adapted from Goen, "Editor's
Introduction," p. 54.
All the "positive signs" and "negative
signs" in these tables are taken directly from the A f f e c t i o n s .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

237

7.

A change of nature.

8.

Meekness and mercy.

9.
10.
11.

A Christian

tenderness

of

spirit.

Beautiful symmetry and proportion.
The higher the affections are raised,

the greater the

longing that they be increased.
12.

The

exercise

and

fruit

of

Christian

practi ce.
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TABLE 5

UNRELIABLE MARKS AND SIGNS OF
A VALID CONVERSION

"Negative
1.

Instances"

The work is carried on in an unusual or extraordinary
way.

2.
3.

5trong effects are produced in the body.
A "great deal of noise about

religion"

is occasioned.

4.

Lively impressions are induced on people's imaginations.

5.

The work is promoted too much by the influence

of exam 

ple .

6.

Imprudent and irregular conduct.

7.

Errors in judgment and "delusions

8.

Professed converts

9.

Preachers insist too much on God's wrath.

1.

High affections.

2.

Bodily effects.

3.

"Talking of the things of Religion."

falling

of Satan."

into scandal.

"Negative Signs"

4.
5.

Persons did not contrive affections.
"Texts of scripture

are remarkably brought to mind."

6.

An appearance of love in the affections.

7.

Many kinds of affections.

8.

The affectionate

joy seems to follow a certain order.
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9.

Persons are much

engaged in worship

and church

duties.

10.

Much praising and glorifying God.

11.

Confidence in the validity of the conversion experience.

12.

Godly,

charitable behavior.
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is presented in Table 4, while the potentially spurious evidence is found in Table 5.

94

Most of these "signs,"

"marks," and "instances"

are

derived from scripture and from orthodox Puritan commentary.
Theologically,

Edwards'

quite unexceptional.

position on conversion evidence is

Psychologically,

however,

his dis

cussion of the indices of a valid conversion is most peculiar.
As tools for evaluating the truth or falsity of conversion,
the lists are utterly worthless.

In the first place,

the

distinguishing marks and positive signs are so vague and s u b 
jective that they are innocuous.
esteem of Jesus Christ
mark)?

How high,

have to be raised

for instance,

How tender is a Christian tenderness of spirit

positive sign)?

does

(first distinguishing
(ninth

Even if it is granted that all the reliable

marks and signs are true,

that is they occur if and only if

they are accompanied by a valid conversion,

their importance

is still restricted to theological disputation and Biblical
interpretation.

There is virtually no way for an aspiring

convert to measure the extent to which his experience approxi
mates a valid conversion because no rules or criteria are
provided.

Edwards has,

in other words,

might be called an untestable theory.

provided what today
There is no common

94
Edwards seems to have derived these lists chiefly
from I John 4:1 and from Thomas Shepard's The Parable of the
Ten Virgins (London, 1660).
For an analysis of the marks,
see Eoen, "Editor's Introduction," pp. 52-56.
On the signs
in the Affections see Smith, "Editor's Introduction," pp. 2443, and pp. 53-57 for a discussion of Shepard's influence on
Edwards.
On Shepard and the signs in the Par a b l e , consult
Michael McGiffert, God's Plot:
The Paradoxes of Puritan
Piety (Amherst, M a s s ., 1972), p p . 3-32.
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ground where theoretical criteria and data can meet.
science,

of course,

In

untestable theories are i n a d m i s s a b l e , but

then Edwards was no scientist.

An eighteenth-century Cal

vinist did not test the claims of his God.

The ultimate

result of arid theorizing was much the same for Edwards,
ever,

as it is for the modern scientist.

ignore theories which have no behavioral referents.
wise,

a thoughtful,

if less eloquent and well-

method for evaluating his experience.

absence of testable
or perhaps

Like

aspiring convert would be forced to turn

elsewhere for a more useful,
reasoned,

how

Scientists tend to

In the

criteria he would proably ask his minister

even his friends for a simple

A second difficulty with Edwards'

"yes" or " n o . " ^
marks and signs lay

in the confounding of reliable and unreliable evidence.
might well be the case that the negative instances and

It
signs

could act as imperfect vehicles for the expression of the
positive marks and signs.
increased regard
for example,

sign)
sign).

(third distinguishg mark),

he is very likely to make a great deal of noise

about religion
exercise

If a person experiences an

for Holy Scripture

(third negative instance).

and fruit of Christian practice

includes Godly,

charitable behavior

Without question,

And certainly the
(twelfth positive
(twelfth negative

Edwards had demonstrated that

"there are undoubtedly sufficient marks given to guide the
95
This is precisely the approach taken by many of
Thomas Shepard's parishioners; see George Selement, ed., The
Confessions of Thomas Shepard
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church of Gcd in this great
The

"church of God,"

affair of judging of spirits."

however,

constitutents

did little to assist them
of their conversions.
tions can,
fact.

in theory,

Unfortunately,

6

is an abstraction which is

spared paralyzing anxiety concerning
the worried

9

its immortal soul.

of that church,

Edwards'

For

categories

in their evaluation of the validity

He had demonstrated that holy a f fec
be distinguished from polluting ar t i 
Edwards did not provide instructions

for accomplishing this delicate distillation in practice.
His hands were tied,
Devil.

The Evil One played

chology,

as he would have it,

by the

a vital role in Edwardsean p sy

for it was he who effectively frustrated

any attempt

to successfully evaluate the validity of a conversion.
That

97

"he can't imitate divine operations in their nature" was

small consolation.

98

All other aspects of conversion,

those

which

are susceptible to introspective analysis and o b s e r v a 

tion,

can be flawlessly reproduced by the Evil One.

Edwards pointed out,

. . the devil can counterfeit

saving operations and graces of the Spirit of God
effects of God's Spirit which are special,
fying."

99

Like God himself,

96Marks,

"First,"
all the

. . . those

divine and sancti-

the devil can infiltrate

a person,

p. 228.

" A f t e r his fall from heaven, the devil was alleged
to have retained most of his former powers because, as
Edwards put it, "sin destroys spiritual principles but not
the natural faculties."
(True Grace D i s t i n g u i s h e d , p. 237).
98

A f f e c t i o n s . p.

159;

Edward's italics.

" i b i d . . p. 158.
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"possess"

him,

and produce any or all of the conversion

effects that also follow the infusion of the Divine light.
"Secondly,"

admitted Edwards,

the things themselves,
another,

".

. .if

Satan can imitate

he may easily put them one after

in such a certain order."'' ^

the conversion sequence,

then,

Progression through

from need to seeking to d es

pair to apparent discovery is no guarantee of a valid c on
version.

The devil can imitate the exact order as well as

all the effects of a valid conversion.
concludes,

"Thirdly,"

Edwards

"we have no certain rule to determine how far

God's own spirit may go in those operations and convictions
which in themselves
wheat and the chaff,

are not spiritual and saving."
alas,

are inextricably mixed;

1 01

The

the d is

tinguishing marks and positive signs must be negated in order
that the devil be paid his due.
Not all of Edwards'

ministerial and theological

colleagues were so pessimistic.
Davenport,

For radical enthusiasts like

the overflow of emotion is evidence enough that the

Lord is at work.

To rationalists like Chauncy,

a much more reasonable enterprise,
university examination.

1 02

conversion is

something like passing a

Edwards'

peculiarly generous

^ ^ I b i d ., p. 159; see also Edwards' most elaborate
exposition of the devil's prowess in True Grace D i s t i n g u i s h e d .
1 01

pp.

A f f e c t i o n s , pp. 159-160; see also Some T h o u g h t s ,
458-459, and True Grace D i s t i n g u i s h e d , pp. 323-254.
1 02

In an often-quoted passage Chauncy remarked, "an
enlightened mind and not raised affections ought always to
be the guide of those who call themselves men; and this in the
affairs of religion as well as others things" (Seasonable
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respect for the ability of the devil to camouflage success
fully the nature of religious experience is rooted in his
transsummative doctrine and in his conception of the c o gni
tive principle contained in the divine light.
version,

he maintained,

corner of the soul;

In a true c on

God's divine light illuminates

every

the convert cannot doubt its divine o ri

gin .
When there is an actual and lively discovery of this
beauty and excellency, it will not allow of any such
thought as that it is the fruit of man's invention.
This
is a kind of intuitive and immediate evidence.
They
believe the doctrine of God's word to be divine, because
they see a divine, and transcendent, and most evidently
distinguishing glory in them; such a glory as, if clearly
seen, does not leave room to doubt of their being of God,
and not of m e n .103
Edwards is saying

here that the truth of the light must be

inferred immediately and be intuitively o bvious— that is the
test of its validity.

The implication in this remarkable con

tention is that if the inference is immediate,

and the con

vert concludes that the divine light principle which is fused
with the mind _is true,
sary J ^

then no further examination is neces

The decision rules contained

in the Distinguishing

T h o u g h t s . p. 327).
It was Perry Miller, I believe, who first
clearly demonstrated that Chauncy's psychological viewpoint,
as shown in the above quote, does not refute Edwards, as it
was meant to.
Chauncy was an orthodox "faculty psychologist"
while Edwards was not.
It has since become fashionable to
deride Chauncy for his inability to comprehend Edwards' true
meaning; cf. Miller, Jonathan E d w a r d s , pp. 175-185, Gaustad,
Great Awakening in New E n g l a n d , chapt. 6, Goen, "Editor's
Introduction," pp. 80-83.
Historians might have spent their
time better getting their own house in order.
Who among us
yet really understands what Edwards was trying to say?
^^Divine

Light," p. 178.

^ ^ T h e o l o g i c a l l y , this position is quite ordinary; it
corresponds to one of the five tenets of Calvinism contained
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Marks and the Religious Affections are therefore superfluous.
Recall that,
an objective,

according to Edwards,

one can never be

" rational” observer of his own experience or

the behavior of another.
delightful must also,

This which

appears beautiful or

and immediately,

be-perceived as true.

A "sense of the heart" implies that reason and the emotions
are one.

Thus,

if the divine light is beheld in the way

Edwards suggests,

with

a transsummative

"sense of the heart,"

than no amount of negative feedback afterward

is likely to

convince the hopeful convert that his experience was invalid.
He knows he is saved.

Furthermore,

since we have also seen

the devil can imitate every phase of the conversion sequence
except the divine principle of cognitive reorganization,
rules for evaluating feedback
for three reasons:

any

from a conversion are useless

(a) the data to which they apply may be

unaccountably spurious;

(b) the event to which they apply is

strictly cognitive and thus too private to be evaluated by an
outsider;

and

(c) the event to which they apply is a p pre

hended in such a way as to make it impervious

to objective

evaluation even by the person who has experienced it.

If a

person is not convinced totally and immediately that his
experience was a valid conversion then,
been converted.
Edwards'

logically,

he has not

But even extreme confidence is insufficient.

eleventh negative sign is unmistakably clear on this.

in the W e s t minister C o n f e s s i o n , namely irresistable grace.
Psychologically, however, this doctrine has a number of
remarkable and seemingly unarguable consequences.
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'Tis no sign that affections are right, or that they
are wrong, that they make persons that have them, exceed
ingly confident that what they experience is divine, and
that they are in a good e s t ate.105
The devil is quite capable of inducing a haughty confidence
even in the basest hypocrite.
Edwards faced a stark reality that was the product of
his own ingenuity.

He had conceived of man as a complex,

dynamic being who is always motivated by an array of mostlyunconscious emotions.
then,

In order to transform the whole man,

a true conversion must consist in an absolutely inward,

cognitive,
ation.

reorientation that is not subject to direct evalu

The existence of the new,

divinely-oriented cognitive

structure must always be inferred from signs which,
nately,

the devil can also produce.

advantage,"

Edwards admitted,

" . . .

with respect to the

inward experiences of Christians themselves;

and

. . . with

respect to the external effects of exper i e n c e s . " ”' ^
weaker moments

u nfortu

"The devil has special

In his

he must have complained to his God that it was

a grossly unfair advantage,

unfair to hopeful converts and

unfair to well-meaning ministers.
As an individual initiates his sequential,
evaluation of his conversion

experience,

proactive

he is confronted

in the Westminister C o n f e s s i o n , namely irresistable grace.
Psychologically, however, this doctrine has a number of
remarkable and seemingly unarguable consequences.
1 05
A f f e c t i o n s , p. 167;
g u i s h e d , p. 245.

see also True Grace Di s t i n 

' ^ Some T h o u g h t s , p. 458.
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Probably Converted

Probably Unconverted

Probably
Probably

Turning Away From

Turning Away From

Corruptions?

Corruptions?

Probably
Probably

not

Raised Esteem of

"Conversion"Experience

Figure 1B.
The Edwardsean "Decision" tree:
The evaluation
of conversion validity using the first two "distinguisning
m a r k s ."
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with an impossible task
there is both a "yes"

(Figure i B ).

and a "no."

At every choice point

This or that sign which he

has observed in his own experience may be a reliable index of
a valid conversion,
giving a man rules,"

and then again,
said Edwards,

ble objects in the dark."

1 07

it may not.

It is impossible to reach

conclusion concerning any apparent conversion,
on the

"It is like

"how to distinguish visia

based strictly

"evidence."
Edwards faced squarely the principal problem of all

cognitive psychologists:
experience and action,
tive theorists,
behavior,

the mind,

the great organizer of

is inscrutable.

like Edwards,

Contemporary c o gni

are necessarily interested in

and with Edwards they believe that behavior is only

a very rough

and unreliable indicator of human functioning.

Generative grammarians,

for instance,

competence and p e r f o r m a n c e .

distinguish between

People are said to be far more

competent in a language than their performance can ever indi
cate.

We can,

in theory,

grammatical sentences,

construct an infinite number of

the vast majority of which we have

neither heard nor spoken before.

This remarkable and uniquely

human ability is usually attributed to transformational rules
which are embedded in "deep structures" of the m i n d . ^ ^

^ ^ A f f e c t i o n s . p. 195.
^ ^ 5 e e Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of 5yntax
(Cambridge, Mass, 1965) and his much more readable Language
and M i n d , rev. ed. (New York, 1972).
The postulation of airy
constructs like "deep structures" irks behaviorists like
B. F. Skinner.
His behavioristic account of language may be
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If Jonathan Edwards had been a contemporary cognitive
psychologist,

he would probably have attached statistical

p robabilities to his distinguishing marks and positive signs.
"If all behavioral and experiential indices are considered
together,"

he might jargonize,

i ndividual

exhibiting all these traits without the presence

"than the probability of an

of the divine light is less than one in a hundred."
devil would become the capricious
vening,
In fact,

uncontrolled,

chance factor,

The

the inter

but sometimes effective causative agent.

Edwards was trying to accomplish a similar result.

In spite of his conviction that true religion is an inner
phenomenon,

he knew about

Anne Hutchinson and a n t i n o m i a n i s m ,

and about the Quaker "inner light."
those controversies were,

1 09

He knew how chaotic

with everyone deciding for themselves

whether they had veen visited or not.

How he must have wished

to discover some way of discriminating true religion from
false which has some

specifiable

reliability.

His own set of

valid criteria could not accomplish this because his ultimate
dependent variable

(entrance into heaven)

as his independent variable
divine light).

-

was as inaccessible

(presence or absence of the

He could observe neither cause nor effect.

found in Verbal Behavior (New York, 1958).
See also Chomsky's
now classic, vituperative rebuttle to Skinner in La n g u a g e ,
1959, 35, 26-58.
1 09
On the "enthusiast" challenges to Puritan o r tho
doxy in the seventeenth century, see Emery Battis, Saints and
Sectaries:
Anne Hutchinson and the Antinomian Controversy in
the Massachusetts Bay Colony (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1962), and
Perry Miller, Orthodoxy in Massachusetts (Cambridge, Mass.,
1 933).
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Edwards needed to know the unknowable.
in which

he faced this predicament,

The manner

over a frenzied period

where the need became increasingly acute,

is a case study of

the interaction between an abstract psychological theory and
social upheaval.
full swing,

In 1734,

before the Great Awakening got into

Edwards delivered and published

his brilliant ser

mon on "The Divine and Supernatural Light."

In it he

announced that he would "show what this divine light is."
This is clearly a misstatement of purpose;

Edwards,

attempted to examine the effects of the divine light.
effects,

he noted in 1734,

110

in fact,
These

are purely cognitive.

. . . he unites himself with the mind of a saint, takes
him for his temple, actuates and influences him as a new
supernatural principle of life and action . . . .
The
Holy Spirit operates in the minds of the godly, by uniting
himself to them, and living in them, and exerting his own
nature in the exercise of the f a c u i t i e s .111
It was enough,

at this point,

nitive effects of conversion:

to elaborate

the principle

the acquisition

of the lovliness and beauty of that holiness and grace."
Although this
"action,"

cog

of "a sense

112

"sense" would undoubtedly be reflected in

as Edwards called it, all that need be said about

it is that it is "godly."
Edwards,
Stoddard,

and before him his grandfather Solomon

had long urged that

1 ^°"Divine Light," p.
111

emotionalism

was not an

273.

I b i d ., p. 1 74.

^ ^ I b i d ., p. 177;

Edwards'

italics.
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undesirable

artifact in conversion.

113

The sudden and com

plete reorientation of a person's emotional system toward
love of an awesome

God is a shattering experience which might

easily be accompanied by fainting,
By 1741,

however,

shrieking,

had spread and was engulfing all the American
turmoil.

and sweating.

what had long been the rule in Northampton
Colonies in

Davenport was laying seige to New England and

George Whitefield was preaching to enthusiastic thousands
from Maine to Georgia.

1 14

Many envisioned the entire British

empire in America disintegrating in the spiritual smoke of
burning religionists.
that Edwards,

It was in part to allay these fears

the acknowledged leader of the new-light su p 

porters of the Awakening,

produced the Distinguishing M a r k s .

It is a curious document,

exceedingly confident in the

beginning,

but ending in apparent contradiction and confusion,

□n the second page he stated his goal.
My design therefore at this time is to shew what are the
true, certain, and distinguishing evidences of a work of
the Spirit of God, by which we may proceed safely in
judging of any operation we find in ourselves or see in
o t h e r s .115
Yet in his conclusion to this treatise,

after carefully p re

senting the distinguishing marks and negative instances,
Edwards implicitly acknowledged his impossible dilemma.
113

See this chapter,

In

footnote 87.

114

The career of Whitefield is traced in Joseph
Tracy's classic, The Great A w a k e n i n g , and by Whitefield him
self in Whitefield's Journals (London, 1960).
1 15

M a r k s , p. 227.
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order to achieve his stated goal,

he would

have to either

embrace an alternative system of psychology and conception
of conversion or,

alternatively,

hopeful converts.

He admitted,

the scriptures to stand good,
saint,

that

that

"we must allow

speak of everything in the

that belongs to the spiritual and divine life,

hidden."
point,

give false assurances to
finally,

116

as

Though he adroitly chose not to emphasize the

he saw clearly that there are no marks of God's grace

which ordinary mortals can distinguish.
As leader of the supporters of the Awakening,
was in a difficult situation.

dampen the fires of the Awakening.
that the

117

Spirit

of God."

never

a n y diplomat,

matter of factly,
is come

His intuition told him

"uncommon concern and engagedness

things of religion is,

Edwards

He would do nothing to directly

undoubtedly,

of mind about the

in the general,

To the enemies of the Awakening,
was disarmingly blunt.

Edwards,

He remarked

as though it could be proven,

down from heaven into this land,"

from the

that "Christ

and he reminded

them of the Bible's clear warning that they who do not aid in
the work of the 5pirit

"should take heed that they ben't

guilty of the unpardonable sin against the Holy Ghost.
In other words,

opponents of the Awakening

116I b i d ..

should count

p. 285.

11 7
1I b i d ., p. 260.
118

I b i d .. p. 270 and p. 275.
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themselves

among the unfortunate majority of humanity who are

destined for the eternal torments of hell.

Qn the other hand,

he admonished preachers who were supporters of the Awakening
to practice

"humility and self-diffidence,

dependence on our Lord Jesus Christ."

119

and an entire
Thisds the most

important message in the Distinguishing M a r k s , though it
appears as but a whisper next to the marks themselves.
"Trust my psychological analysis of the operation of the
divine light,"

he might have said,

the distinguishing marks."
thing of the kind.
doubt.

"not in the reliability of

Yet he did not actually say any

The Lord should be given benefit of the

He provided a number of distinguishing marks;

all

should pray earnestly that He grant His earthly disciples His
power of discernment.
One of the basic postulates of Edward sear, psychology
is that people selectively attend to that which please them
and avoid

that which appears painful.

knew that hopeful converts

Edwards undoubtedly

and New Light ministers would focus

their attention on the marks at the expense of his muted
pleas for humility and moderation.
a new order might be at hand.
bers of the Enfield,

Connecticut congreation

upon hearing one of his sermons,
deliberate manner.

1 20

In 1741,

it seemed as if

Edwards himself had seen m e m 
shriek and faint

delivered in his usual calm,

And when Whitefield

addressed

his

1 1 9 Ti • I
I b i d ., p . 277.
1 20

Rev. Eleazar Wheelock reported that "there was
such a breathing of distress, and weeping, that the preacher
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Northampton c o n g r e t a t i o n , it is recorded that even Edwards
wept uncontrollably from beginning to end.
seemed to be in retreat.

1 21

The devil

In his more sober moments,

however,

Edwards quietly offered the devil his profound respect.

The

preservation of his psychological system in the D i s t i n g u i s h 
ing M a r k s , the maintenance of conversion as an absolutelycognitive event,

represents nothing less than a courageous

and grudging tribute to the power of the Evil One.
By 1746,
was spent,

the Great Awakening was over.

the millennium had eluded

and bitter controversy prevailed.

The energy

New England once again,

God seemed to have f o r 

saken his flock when needed him most.

Robert Lowell has

transformed Edwards'

bitter disappointment

prising conversions"

into verse.

"after the s u r 

. . . At Jehovah's nod
5atan seemed more let loose amongst us:
God
Abandoned us to Satan, and he pressed
Us hard, until we thought we could not rest
Till we had done with life.
Content was gone.
All the good work was quashed.
We were undone.
The breath of God had carried out a planned
And sensible withdrawal from this lan d . 122

was obliged to speak to the people and desire silence, that
he might be heard." (Benjamin Trumbull, 'A Complete History
of Connecticut, Civil and Ecclesiastical, 1 6 3 0 - 1 7 6 4 . 2 Vols.
(New Haven, Conn., 1818), II, p. 145.
Whitefield 's J o u r n a l ' s , p. 477.
1 22

"After the Surprising Conversions" originally
appeared in Lord Weary's Castle (New York, 1944), and may
also be found in David Levin, ed., Jonathan Edwards:
A Pro
file (New York, 1969), pp. 252-253.
For overviews of the
psychological, political, ecclesiastical, and theological c o n 
troversy which accompanied the Awakening, see Heimer, Religion,
and Goen, Revivalism and Separatism in New England, 1 7 4 0 - 1 8 0 0 .
nd e d . (Hamden, Conn., 1969).

2
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From all the disappointment and charges
of enthusiasm,

chicanery,

and countercharges

and hard-heartedness,

Edwards

extracted one implication of overriding significance:
are capable of distinguishing

men

between charlatans and saints.

There can be no final exit from the conversion loop.

He pre

sented the positive signs in the Religious Aff e c t i o n s , there
fore,

not so much for their practical value,

but rather to

demonstrate that his psychological views are rooted in Holy
Scripture.
. . . I am far from undertaking to give such signs of
gracious affections, as shall be sufficient to enable
any certainly to distinguish true affection from false
in others; or to determine positively which of their
neighbors are true professors, and which are hypocrites.

^3

Furthermore,
No such signs are to be expected, that shall be
sufficient to enable those saints certainly to discern
their own good e s t a t e . 124
Those in search of a manual which would help them evaluate
the validity of their conversion experiences nead not have
read on.

Those who read on to the end of the Affections

find a boldly-stated

implicit assumption prior to the Awakening
afterthought in the heat of that remarkable
is a purely cognitive

would

conclusion which had been only an
and a surreptitious
event:

sainthood

phenomenon.

Christian or holy practice is spiritual practice; and this
is not the motion of a body, that knows not how, nor when,
nor wherefore it moves. . . . To speak of Christian
experience and practice, as if they were two things,

^ ^ A f f e c t i o n s . p.
1 24

Ibid..

p.

193.

193.
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properly and entirely distinct, is to make a distinction
without consideration or reason.
Indeed all Christian
experience is not properly called practice; but all
Christian practice is properly called experience. 125
All that is essentially Christian is the reorientation 'of the
mind toward love of the divine.^
If the Distinguishing Marks is E d w a r d s ’ tribute to
the power of the devil in a time when God seemed to be roam
ing the

New England countryside,

the Religious

Affections is

his acknowledgement of G o d ’s awesomeness in a period of
apparent

Godlessness.

lished sermon,

"God," Edwards entitled his first pub-

"is glorified in m a n ’s dependence."

127

In the

Affections Edwards attempted to demonstrate the absolute
nature and psychological basis of that dependence.
inscrutable,

The

emotional mind of man is where the battle

the forces of light and darkness takes place.

ology thus becomes rooted in synthetic psychology.
depend on G o d ’s benevolence not only for grace,
the assurance of grace.

In E d w a r d s ’ view,

human behavior can never be known.

between

Medieval t he
Man must

but also for

ultimate causes of

One hundred fifty-four

years after Edwards published his A f f e c t i o n s . another American
philosopher-psychologist brought this stark view up to date.
William

James,

having glossed over his Calvinist heritage with

125I b i d . ,

pp.

450-451.

126

Recall Joseph H a r o u t u n i a n ’s claim that Edwards was
a " b e h aviorist" (see above, pp. 63-6 7 ).
This must now appear
as one of the greatest miscarriages of justice in all of
American intellectual history.
127
chapter,

For the complete title of the sermon,
footnote 24.

see this
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a veneer of Darwinian biology and Heraclitean philosophy,
scoffed at the new experimental psychologists who promised
to reduce the "science of mental life"

to a few laws.

The

inevitable result of this flurry of optimistic activity,
believed,

is profound ignorance.

Thus

he

he concludes his

Pr i n c i p l e s :
No more . . . can we believe that the couplings of terms
within the mind are simple copies of corresponding cou p 
lings impressed upon it by the environment. . . .
Even in the clearest parts of Psychology our insight
is insignificant enough.
And the more sincerely one
seeks to trace . . . the steps by which as a race we may
have come by the peculiar mental attributes which we
possess, the more clearly one perceives "the slowly
gathering twilight close in utter n i g h t . "128
Were Edwards capable of a small bit of sacriledge,

it is safe

to predict that he would have uttered a hearty "Amen!" to
this assessment.

Exit:
Edwards'
holy and spurious
lating

The Saintly Life

inability to distinguish logically between
affections did not prevent him from s p ecu

upon the earthly fruits of a valid conversion:

saintly life.

In fact,

directly from the marks and signs.
example,
signs

the

his view of sainthood may be extracted
It would be possible,

for

to condense all the distinguishing marks and positive

into a composite,

abstract Edwardsean saint.

mythological saint would be pure,
detached,

loving,

completely analytic approach

of the saintly life would,

^ ^ P r i n c i p l e s . Vol.

however,

II,

p.

humble,

to Edwards'

This
etc.

A

conception

be lifeless and redundant,

688.
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and it would leave the utterly false impression that he
regarded sainthood as an unattainable abstraction.
contrary,

to Edwards,

experienced
teousness."

On the

every important aspect of sainthood was

embodied in his beloved wife Sarah.
has remarked,

1 25

She was,

as one scholar

"the supreme example of heartfelt religion

as ecstatic transport and lived in sober righ1 30

"true religion,

Edwards wanted to show once and for all that
in great part,

consists in holy affections,"

and that affectionate piety need not result in ranting
enthusiasm but rather in a quiet,
In 1742,

therefore,

serene,

131

at the height of what he called the

"enthusiastical season,"

Edwards presented Sarah

m ously described as "a person)

(anony

to the world in his treatise,

Some Thought Concerning the R e v i v a l .
Edwards'

saintly life.

T

o

paraphrase

description of Sarah's spiritual life is self-

defeating.
version,

He saw in 5arah the essence of the fruits of con

and he described

her concisely and with

feeling.

Although the selection which follows needs little
exegesis,

some general points might be noted.

First,

Sarah

1

29
Such a conglomeration would be difficult to a c com
plish.
John E. Smith has pointed out that Edwards never
ranked the signs in order of their importance.
It is i m p ossi
ble to determine, therefore, which signs, if any, can be
omitted and which ones are crucial; see "Editor's Introduction,"
p. 24.
1 30

Goen,

"Editor's

^ ^ Affections . p.

Introduction,"

p.

68.

95.

^ ^ S e e Goen, "Editor's Introduction," pp. 65-78 for
an analysis of Sarah's narrative and its relationship to Some
T h o u g h t s , in which it appears.
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is intoxicated with God.
direct,

While Edwards claimed that Sarah's

affectionate communication with God was accomplished

"without being in any trance,"

a contemporary evaluation of

Sarah's state of mind during her frequent swoons would
almost certainly affirm that we was often in a trance.
second aspect of Sarah's saintliness,
thetical to the first,

is the improvement

and her increased efficiency.

A

one which seems anti

Finally,

in her behavior

in spite of her

assurance concerning her spiritual condition,

she is e xceed

ingly humble.
. . . I have observed or been informed of, the follow
ing things have[ing] been united:
viz. a very frequent
dwelling, for some considerable time together, in such
views of the glory of the divine perfections, and Christ's
excellencies, that the soul in the meantime has been as
it were perfectly overwhelmed, and swallowed up with
light and love and a sweet solace, rest and joy of soul,
that was altogether unspeakable; and more than once con
tinuing for five or six hours together, without any
interruption, in that clear and lively view or sense of
the infinite beauty and amiableness of Christ's person,
and the heavenly sweetness of his excellent and t r ans
cendent love; so that (to use the person's own expres
sions (the soul remained in a kind of heavenly Elysium,
and did as it were swim in the rays of Christ's love, like
a little mote swimming in the beams of the sun, or streams
of his light that come in at a window; and the heart was
swallowed up in a kind of glow of Christ's love, coming
down from Christ's heart in heaven, as a constant stream
of sweet light, at the same time the soul all flowing
out in love to him; so that there seemed to be a constant
flowing and reflowing from heart to heart.
The soul
dwelt on high, and was lost in God, and seemed almost to
leave the body; dwelling in a pure delight that fed and
satisfied the soul; enjoying pleasure without the least
sting, or any (so far as the judgement and word of a per
son of discretion may be enjoyed in each single minute
of the whole space, which was many hours, was undoubtedly
worth more than all the outward comfort and pleasure of
the whole life put together; and this without being in any
trance, or being at all deprived of the exercise of the
bodily senses:
and the like heavenly delight and unspeak
able joy of soul, enjoyed from time to time, for years
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together; though not frequently so long together, to such
an height:
extraordinary views of divine things, and
religious affections, being frequently attended with very
great effects on the body, nature often sinking under the
weight of divine discoveries, the strength of the body
taken away, so as to deprive of all ability to stand or
speak; sometimes the hands clinched, and the flesh cold,
but senses still remaining . . .133
. . . the thoughts of death and the day of judgement are
always exceeding sweet to the soul.
This resignation is
also attended with a constant resignation of the lives
of dearest earthly friends; and sometimes when some of
their lives have been imminently threatened, often
expressing the sweetness of the liberty of having wholly
left the world, and renounced all for God, and having
nothing but God, in whom is an infinite fulness.
These things have been attended with a constant sweet
peace and calm serenity of soul, without any cloud to
interrupt it; a continual rejoicing in all the works of
God's hands, the works of nature, and God's daily works
of providence, all appearing with a sweet smile upon them;
a wonderful access to God by prayer, as it were seeing
him, and sensibly immediately conversing with him, as
much oftentimes (to use the person's own expressions) as
if Christ were here on earth, sitting on a visible throne,
to be approached to and converse with; frequent, plain,
sensible and immediate answers of prayer; all tears
wiped away; all former troubles and sorrows of life f or
gotten, and all sorrow and sighing fled away,excepting
grief for past sins and for remaining corruption, and
that Christ is loved no more, and that God is no more
honored in the world, and a compassionate grief towards
fellow creatures; a daily sensible doing and suffering
everything for God for a long time past, eating for God,
and working for God, and sleeping for God, and bearing
pain and trouble for God, and doing all as the servide of
love, and so doing it with a continual, uninterrupted
cheerfulness, peace and joy.
"Oh how good," said the per
son once, "is it to work for God in the daytime, and at
night to lie down under his smiles!"
High experiences
and religious affections in this person have not been
a t t e n d e d _with any disposition at all to neglect the neces
sary business of a secular calling, to spend the time in
reading and prayer, and other exercises of devotion; but
wordly business has been attended with great alacrity, as
part of the service of God:
the person declaring that it
being done thus, 'tis found to be as good as prayer.
These things have been accompanied with an exceeding c on
cern and zeal for moral duties, and thal all professors
may with them adorn the doctrine of God their Saviour; and

Some T h o u g h t s , pp.

331-332.
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an uncommon care to perform relative and social duties,
and a noted eminence in them; a great inoffensiveness of
life and conversation in the sight of others; a great
meekness, a gentleness and benevolence of spirit and
behavior; and a great alteration in those things that
formerly used to be the person's failings; seeming to be
much overcome and swallowed up by the late great increase
of grace, to the observation of those that are most co n 
versant and most intimately acquainted:
in times of the
brightest light and highest flights of love and joy,
finding no disposition to any opinion of being now pe r 
fectly free from sin . . . but exceedingly the contrary:
at such times especailly, seeing how loathsome and
polluted the soul is, soul and body and every act and word
appearing like rottenness and corruption in that pure and
holy light of God's glory:
not slighting instruction or
means of grace any more for having had great discoveries;
on the contrary, never more sensible of the need of
i nstruction than now.
And one thing more may be added,
viz. that these things have been attended with a pa r t i c u 
lar dislike of placing religion much in dress, and spe n d 
ing much zeal about those things that in themselves are
matters of indifference, or an affecting to shew humility
and devotion by a mean habit, or a demure and melancholy
countenance, or anything singular and supers t i t i o u s .134
Almost all of Edwards'

writing is didactic.

his descriptions of parishioners,

Even in

in his comments on the

tragic autobiography of his son-in-law,

Rev.

David Brainerd,

and in this lively narrative of Sarah's life style,

Edwards'

primary purpose is always to provide a convincing argument.
The accuracy of his portrayal of Sarah is, therefore,
less important than the point he wished to m a k e J
was

simply this:

the exit from a valid conversion,

pp.

ceeding Memoirs."
(Vol. X of Dwight,

135

far
The point

the saintly

339-341 .

"Reflection on the Pro
In Memoirs of the Rev. David Brainerd
ed., W o r k s ), pp. 414-452.

^ "^Whitef i e l d , however, confirmed Edwards' evaluation
of his wife.
So impressed was Whitefield that he asked the
Lord to send him a wife like Sarah (see Whitefield's Journals,
p. 477).
"
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life,

consists in an optimum balance between irrationality

and rationality or what generations of Puritan thinkers had
called piety and intellect.
his scholastic forbears

1 37

Unlike the ornate systems of

and descendents,

Edwards'

transsum-

mative doctrine made no absolute distinction between the
irrational,

or emotional,

relative terms,

and the rational.

They are only

aspects of the same unified process.

Christian life is, therefore,

well-oiled pendulum in an old grandfather clock.
insight and strength

in direct,

in his day-to-day a c t i v i t i e s . ^

and so well regulated,"

conversion,

experience

Edwards chose Sarah,

whom "the affections and high tramsports are

his point."' ^

One gathers

emotional communication with

God and then applies the fruits of his religious

unmixed,

The

somewhat like the swing of a

she in

. . . Pure and

to effectively illustrate

The earthly reward associated with a valid
then,

is a life of worldly mysticism.

The saint,

13 7
See Stow Persons, American Minds (New York, 1958)
for a good discussion of this traditional Puritan dilemma.
^ T h i s sort of cognitive style implies an easy o s c i l 
lation between parallel and sequential processing.
Neisser
believes this is the essence of creativity (Cognitive Ps y chology, pp. 302-305).
Most investigators in the field in
creativity agree that the creative person is one who achieves
a balance between relaxed playfulness and daydreaming on the
one hand, and highly-motivated, goal-directed activity on the
other; cf. Rogers, On Becoming a P e r s o n ; Kris, Psychoanalytic
E x p l o r a t i o n s ; Abraham A. Mawlow, Toward a Psychology of Being
2nd e d . (New York, 1968); and Cynthia Wild, "creativity and
Adaptive Regression," Journal of Personality and Social Psy
c h o l o g y , 1965, 2, 161-169.
Stripped of its Calvi nist theology
then, the Edwardsean saintly life is a creative, "selfactualizing" life.
^ ^ Some T h o u g h t s , p. 341.
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conversion,

then,

is a life of wordly mysticism.

in the words of a famous mystic,

Summary:
To conclude

The saint,

is "in the world,

The "Personal

but not of

Narrative"

and summarize this chapter,

we shall

listen to Jonathan Edwards interpret the events surrounding
his own conversion.

We shall introspect with the thirty-six

year old pastor as he reflects on the youthful experience
which changed his life.
Edwards'

For the "Personal Narrative,"

backward glance into his memory was clearly made

through synthetic psychological spectacles.

1 41

The entire

account is organized around transsummative and cybernetic
principles.

At least that is the position taken here.

have used the "Personal Narrative"

Edwards described Sarah's life in such detail:
tiate an argument by making

I

for the same reason that
to substan

concrete a point which might

o therwise remain unconvincingly abstract.

The point here is

1 40
This is the advice given in the "Nasrudin" stories
of George Gurdjieff; cf. Robert Ornstein, The Psychology of
Consciousness (San Francisco, Calif., 1972).
^ ^ T h e so-called "Personal Narrative" of Edwards first
appeared in Samuel Hopkins' The Life and Character of the
Late Reverend Mr. Jonathan Edwards (Boston, 1765).
This bio
g raphical classic has recently been reprinted in Levin, Jona
than Edwards:
A P r o f i l e , pp. 1-06.
All references to the
"Personal Narrative" are to this edition.
For a textual
history of the "Personal Narrative," and a comparison of it
with similar colonial documents, consult Daniel B. Shea,
Spiritual Autobiography in Early America (Princeton, 1968).
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that the synthetic principles that

I have attributed to

Edwards were so deeply embedded in his thinking that he saw
his own life in those terms.

He turned those common d enomi

nators inward onto himself and,

not surprisingly,

he found

that his life also could be reduced to them.

While at college Edwards was much caught up in d i s 
plays of religion and religious activity.
I used to pray four times a day in secret, and to spend
much time in religious talk with other boys; and used to
meet with them to pray together.
I experienced I know
not what kind of delight in religion.
My mind was much
engaged in it, and had much self-righteous pleasure; and
it was my delight to abound in religious duties. . . .
But in process of time, my convictions and affections
wore off; and I entirely lost all those affections and
delights, and left off secret prayer, at least to any
constant performance of it, and returned like a dog to
his vomit, and went on in ways of sin.
Indeed, I was at some times very uneasy, especially
toward the latter part of the time of my being at college.
'Till it pleas'd God, in my last year at college, at a
time when I was in the midst of many uneasy thoughts about
the state of my soul, to seize me with a pleurisy; in
which he brought me nigh to the grave, and shook me over
the pit of h e ll.142

In vivid

language,

development

Edwards here describes the origin and

of a spiritual need.

He perceived a vast i ncon

gruity between his actual "estate"

and the converted c ondi

tion which he once thought he had but now earnestly desired.
It was the conviction of his own worthlessness that
led him to act decisively.
1 42

"Personal Narrative,"

p. 24.
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. . . I was brought wholly to break off all former
wicked ways, and all ways of known outward sin . . .
made seeking my salvation the main business of my
l i f e .144
Edwards'

"inward struggles"

I

reached a conclusion of sorts one

day as he was reading scriptures.
As I read the words, there came into my soul, and was as
it were diffused thro' it, a sense of the glory of the
Divine Being, a new sense, quite different from any
thing I ever experienced b efore.145
This diffusion,
of course,

time,

"a wonderful

alteration in my mind,"

to the reorientation of the affections

refers,

accomplished

discovered God and apprehended him with a "sense of the

heart," with spiritual understanding and holy affections.
had then and
a conviction,

I have often since," Edwards remarked,
but a delightful conviction."

1 47

Whereas before

he had only what he usually referred to as a "notional"
standing of the Divine Being and Divine Love,
inward sweet

sense of these t h i n g s . H e

the divine psychological principle.
significant insights,
of the heart;

use Housman's metaphor,
feel it,

had discovered

This principle,

like all
sense

not merely in the brain but also,
in the pit of the stomach.

and as in any important creative discovery,

14 4 It,b i.d,.,> P*

under

he now had "an

is grasped with a transsummative

it lodges

"I

"not only

to

You can
the

25

1 45 T, . ,
Ib i d ..- P. 26

146ibid..- P.
147ibid..- P*
148ibid.., p.

25
26
26
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feelings may run amok.

If the conversion is a true one,

ever,

raving and ranting

being

overwhelmed by a delightful sense of divine love.

how

are holy affections— a function of

Edwards tells us virtually nothing of the conditions
s urrounding that first remembered insight except that it
occurred while reading the Bible.
ever,

that

study,

It is quite likely,

how

it happened within the context of the habits of

prayer,

his adult life.

and meditation that he maintained
Samuel Hopkins,

and first biographer,

Edwards'

throughout

student,

friend,

tells us something of his study habits.

He commonly spent thirteen hours a day in his study.
His
most usual diversion in summer was riding on horseback
and walking.
He would commonly, unless diverted by c om
pany, ride two or three miles after dinner to some lonely
grove, where he would dismount and walk a while.
At
which times he generally carried his pen and ink with him,
to note any thought that should be suggested, which he
chose to retain and pursue, as what promised some light
on any important subje c t . 149
The solitary walks in the woods,
meal,

to relax,

and to wrestle with the theological

consumed him.
shed

utterly alone and after a

must have helped him to clear his mind of distractions,

This method of obtaining

"light on any important

successful.

problems which

insights which might

subject" must have been very

One of the famous legends surrounding

has him returning from his trips into the woods,

Edwards

his coat

covered with little notes which he had pinned to i t . ^ ^
1 AQ

Like

Life and C h a r a c t e r , p . 40

15°Cf.

Robert Lowell's poem, "Jonathan Edwards in
Western Massachusetts,"
In Levin, ed., Jonathan Edwards;
P r o f i l e , pp. 253-256.

A
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the poet Housman,

Edwards worked long and hard to solve pro b 

lems that interested him,
and waiting for insights

but resorted to reactive walking
that failed to come in the study.

Edwards also used his forest excursions for the more
serious business of caring for his soul and

conversing with

God.
□nee, as I rid out into the woods for my health, Anno
1737; and having lit from my horse in a retired place, as
my manner commonly has been, to walk for divine contempla
tion and prayer; I had a view, that for me was e xtra
ordinary, of the Glory of the 5on of God . . . This grace,
that appear's to me so calm and sweet, appear'd great
above the he a v e n s . 151
Solitary walking,

therefore,

with spiritual discoveries
ones.

Edwards'

"first

appears to have been associated

and insights as well as mundane

conversion,"

have occurred in a solitary,

wooded

actually did or not is not crucial.
that Edwards'

as he called it, may well
setting.

narrative of his own life,

kin's description of his master's habits,
Edwardsean principle.
often contended,

Whether it

The important point is
combined with Hopconfirm a basic

Man must plan to seek God,

Edwards

but he must eventually forsake his arrogant

proactive attitude in order to passively accept the gracious
discoveries in conversion.
Edwards'

conversion

perceptual apparatus;

experience altered

his cognitive

he began to view all things differently

than he ever had before.
After this my sense of divine things gradually
increased, and became more and more lively, and had more
1 51

"Personal Narrative," pp.

35-36.
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of that inward sweetness.
The appearance of everything
was altered; there seemed to be, as it were, a calm,
sweet cast, or appearance of divine glory in almost e very
thing . . . in the sun, moon, and stars; in the clouds,
and blue sky; in the grass, flowers, trees; in the water,
and all nature; which used greatly to fix my m i n d . 152
This is clearly an insight of epic proportions.
which

"All nature,"

formerly perplexed and intrigued the young Edwards,

now seen in a new,

u
•
harmonious,

was

.•
153
perspective.

As proof of the validity of his conversion,

Edwards

offered a bit of his altered behavior which seemed to be an
obvious function of his cognitive reorganization.
I used to be a person uncommonly terrified with the
thunder:
and it used to strike me with terror, when I
saw a thunder-storm rising.
But now, on the contrary,
it rejoiced me.
I felt God at the first appearance of a
t h u n d e r s t o r m .154
Edwards believed that,
he perceived

following his conversion experience,

nature more in the manner of God himself.

He

"felt God" in thunderstorms rather than merely engaging in
detached discourse on God's awesome power.
his reaction was,
meditations;

uncontrollably,

to speak my thoughts in soliloquies,

with a singing voice."

1 55

then a great satisfaction
he often

He felt it and

"to sing or chant

argued,

He could at last state,

forth my

and speak
"I felt

as to my good estate" because,

as

no man can argue with his affections,

~7

1 52 T, . ,
I b i d ., p . 27 .
1 53

In his earlies known writings Edwards was f a s c i 
nated by nature; cf. "Qf Insects."
In Dwight, ed., W o r k s .
Vol. I, pp. 23-28.
^^"Personal

Narrative,"

pp.

35-36 .

^ ^ I b i d ., p . 28.
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regardless of their origin."'

The main business of his life

could not turn from seeking his own salvation to helping
others to seek theirs.

The plan which had structured his

behavior for so long could now be discarded.
The
earlier,

"Personal Narrative" does not,

constitute

thetic theory.

"objective"

as I stated

evidence for Edwards'

syn

It was written after his psychological views

were mature,and there is simply no way to determine the
extent to which the memory of his youthful conversion is
distorted by the rigid categories of maturity.
vide,

however,

the most concrete,

vivid,

It does pro

and readable example

of what Edwards labored most of his adult life to say.

It

is his most personal attempt to convey his synthetic view of
man and man's relationship to God's universe.

28

1 56 T, . ,
no
Ibx d . . p .
.
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CHAPTER VI

FROM JONATHAN EDWARD5 TO WILLIAM JAMES:
A SKETCH OF A PSYCHOLOGICAL JOURNEY

The purpose of this essay,
chapter,

as stated in the first

is to provide an "oasis of coherence" around the

psychological theory of Jonathan Edwards.

The achievement of

this goal is contingent upon the fulfillment of two separate
but related tasks:
meant

an explanation of what Edwards said and

and the insertion of Edwards'

thought into a historical

scheme of psychology that can accomodate him.

At best,

my

"oasis" must remain only half coherent because this study is
almost totally restricted to the decoding of Edwards'
chology.

Discussion of the "synthetic tradition"

psy

in the h i s 

tory of psychology has been concerned only with demonstrating
that the transsummative

and proactive-reactive themes have

somehow persisted for a long while.
however,

In this final chapter,

I would like to offer some suggestions concerning

the development of American psychology between Edwards and
James as a way of providing a thread of continuity between
the "nebulous colonial days,"

as Roback

the modern

psychology.

period in American

referred to them,

and

In keeping with the "experimental" nature of this
study,

alluded to in chapter one,

said to contain

the current chapter may be

"suggestions for future research."

For this
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study of Edwards is only a bare beginning,
it demonstrates the utility of applying
of synthetic psychology to Edwards.
fate of Edwards'

psychology,

his transsummative doctrine,

although

I hope

a contemporary model

We shall now examine the

chiefly the disintegration of
and in so doing

suggest that

the history of American psychology before William James can
be a vital topic when viewed through the synthetic model.

The Decline and Fall of Edwards'
Transsummative Doctrine
It its day,

the Edwardsean transsummative doctrine

was both too sophisticated and too threatening to attract
many devotees.

It simply did not make sense to deny the

efficacy and freedom of willing.

Furthermore,

the notion of

a totally unified rational-emotive cognitive process could
not be assimilated by Puritan thinkers who,
tic fashion,

were proud of their "reason"

their "affections."

Whatever influence Edwards had on psy

chological thought in America before
largely concerned the
freedom.

Edwards'

therefore,

its identity and its

contemporaries

gazed in scholastic

and/or Arminian disbelief at the implications of

position on the will.

restricted by what
not free.

James,

notion of w i l l :

Many of Edwards'

stupefaction

in good s cholas

and suspicious of

We have seen that if a man is

Edwards called

"natural necessity"

he is

A man is not free to leap over a tall tree because

certain natural

restrictions prohibit it.

situation in which

But what of the

nature does not seem to prohibit the execu-
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tion of an act;

cannot one choose between alternatives?

Edwards replied that,

indeed,

choices

are made,

butthose

choices are themselves determined by "moral necessity."
Though

1

a man may consciously choose to act in a given manner,

that choice is a function of man's universal adherence to an
underlying hedonistic

principle.

Men are constructed

such

that they must choose that which they perceive to be the most
pleasureable or least painful.

That perception,

in turn,

is

the result of the unified rational-emotive process of cog
nition.

What appears to consciousness to be willful volition

is what modern psychologists might call a pre-determined
response to a perceived

stimulus.

The infusion of grace in

the conversion experience thus becomes a reorientation of the
affectionate component of cognition such that human perception
coincides with God's perception.
So logical and forceful were the arguments of Edwards
that,

given his transsummative assumptions

of the heart,"

concerning

his contemporaries.

The only aoparent way to counter Edwards

successfully was to reject those assumptions.
was taken by numerous
Edwards'

assertion that man is,

pp.

This approach

individuals who were outraged by
to a large extent,

tional creature who has no free will.

1W i l l ,

a "sense

his conclusions seemed inevitable to most of

2

an irra-

One of the first to

1 56-1 62.

^Excellent treatments of the early controversy over
Edwards' notion of the will may be found in Gaustad, Great
Awakening in New E n g l a n d , and Miller, Jonathan E d w a r d s .
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adopt this strategy was Charles Chauncy of Boston.

He

resorted repeatedly to the traditional disjunctive faculty
psychology in order to buttress his attempt to reassert that
man is a reasonable being,
independent

and to establish thebelief in an

and sovereign will.

3

Somewhat later,

5amuel West

proposed a tri-partite division of the faculties into per4
ception,

propension,

(the affections)

and volition.

Perception and propension

were both said to be externally determined,

while volition was held to be free.
appealed to consciousness.

We are,

For evidence West
he stated,

"Conscious,

that many things take place in consequence of our acting . . . ^
West rejected

any underlying hedonistic

choices might be attributed.
man was held by certain

Thus,

"liberals" like

be both primarily rational and free.
made passible
Edwards'

principle to which our

by approximately 1800,
Chauncy and West to

These conclusions were

by the apparently unwitting dismantling of

transsummative cognitive process into the semi-

i ndependent operation of a number of segmented faculties.

It

was far easier to defend the freedom of the will when it could
be assumed,

using data from consciousness,

will does indeed exist,

and may operate

that an independent

independently of the

affections.

3

See especially Chauncy's Seasonable T h o u g h t s .

4
Essays on Liberty and Necessity
5

(Boston,

1793).

I b i d ., p . 26.
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Any doctrine of free will,
chological underpinning,
orthodox Calvinist.

irrespective of its p sy

was bound to be objectionable to an

In fact,

West's doctrine of free will

appears to have had little direct influence on American the o
logical psychology,

which was being written at this time p ri

marily by Calvinists.
ahead of his time,

Though in some respects West was far

he was laboring under the handicap of try

ing to establish freedom of the will in an era which,
the pervasive influence of Edwards,
independent will was questioned.

due to

the very existence of an

The alleged superficiality

of West's appeal to consciousness was soon enthusiastically
exposed by exponents of Calvinist orthodoxy who upheld God's
sovereignty and man's

absolute dependence upon Him.^

The transsummative doctrine remained a problem,
ever,

how

even after absolute omnipotence was once again attrib

uted to the Calvinists'
Asa Burton,

God.

It was especially troubling to

a Yankee parson from Thetford,

Vermont."^

Burton

Chief among this group were Jonathan Edwards, Jr.
and Nathanael Emmons.
Contrasting interpretations of their
positions and importance may be found in Frank H. Foster, _A
Genetic History of the New England Theology (Chicago, 1907),
and Haroutunian, Piety Versus M o r a l i s m . Foster characterizes
Edwards, Jr. and Emmons as villians responsible for the demise
of the will in American thought, while Haroutunian emphasizes
the continuity between their views and those of Edwards.
On
the whole, Haroutunian offers a much more balanced account.
"^Burton's one and only, but very important, book is
Essays on Some of the First Principles of M e t a p h y s i c k s ,
Ethicks, and T h e o l o g y . Intro, by James G. Blight (Albany,
N.Y., 1973).
(1824)
Burton's book, and those by Tappan,
Upham, and Taylor referred to below are filled with direct
and indirect references to Edwards.
In fact, as Herbert
Schneider has demonstrated, during the period 1770-1860, Ameri
can philosophers and theologicans spent much of their pro-
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appears to have been the first thoroughly deterministic
Calvinist to quarrel with Edwards'
ties.

Like Chauncy and West,

stood Edwards'
"faculty";

peculiar,

arrangement of the f a cul

he does not seem to have u nder

transsummative use of the term

he thought Edwards'two "faculties"

increased to three.
lowed Edwards.

In most respects,

should be

however,

Burton fol

With Edwards he maintained the distinction

between natural and moral necessity that made Edwards so
unpopular among those who were dedicated to demonstrating the
existence of a free will.
he contended,

"Were it not for moral necessity,"

"liberty would rest on an uncertain foundation.

For sometimes we might will as we wish,
not."^
which

and sometimes we might

The implication is that the strongest motive is that
is perceived as providing the greatest pleasure or

least pain.

There is not freedom of willing,

for Burton,

in

the sense that there are acts which are not motivated by one's
subjective estimate of the potential pleasure or pain that
can be derived from them.
Adherence to such a deterministic doctrine did not
lead Burton to the fatalistic position that human choices are
fessional energy engaging in a "psychological critique of
Edwards."
This critique, claims Schneider, provided the
impetus for the rise of Mental Philosophy in America.
The important outcome for philosophy of this psy c h o 
logical critique of Edwards was not the argument for free
will or the defense of orthodoxy, but the founding of a
faculty psychology and of an appeal to introspection. This
method of approach to "mental philosophy" dominated at
least two generations of philosophers, created a new "sci
ence," and profoundly affected the course of academic
studies in philosophy (History of American Philosophy, 2nd
e d . , _New Yotk,
962, p. TUT). ------------------The American psychology which preceded James, then, was in
large measure an attempt to deal with the difficult psychology
of Edwards.

1

B i b i d .. p. 126.
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inconsequential.

On the contrary,

like most Calvinists,

felt compelled to show that man is a "moral agent,"

he

i.e.,

capable of actions which might be considered right or wrong
in an absolute sense.

In this way man could be held responsi

ble for his acts and justifiably rewarded with everlasting
grace or punished with everlasting damnation.
chological explanation of moral agency,

In his psy

Burton made his most

significant departure from Edwards and his most important
contribution to the development of faculty psychology in
nineteenth-century America.

Edwards had said that there is

an intellectual and an affectionate component
ception,

hence to every resulting action.

to every p er

Burton countered

by formulating a system of three independently-functioning
faculties:

understanding,

taste,

and will.

Based

upon the

introspective evidence of consciousness he proposed that the
understanding perceives,
Taste,

the taste feels,

and the will acts.

a term which Burton claimed to have originated and

which he used interchangeably with

"heart"

was designated as the seat of moral agency.

and "affections"
In an important

passage he held that
Feeling is the spring of action.
If a moral agent were
deprived of the faculty of taste, and were as incapable
of pleasure and pain as material bodies are, he would be
as inert as t h e y . 9
It is obvious that Burton did not mean to re-establish man's
rationality or free will.
"taste."

In addition,

9Ib i d ..

p.

Man is essentially moved by his

"the will is only an executive faculty.

58.
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It is no more than a servant to the heart,
pleasure."^

to execute its

Burton retained his Calvinistic determinism and

the Edwardsean emphasis upon the affections.
i ndependent faculties,

His system of

unlike those of Chauncy or West,

strictly a function of his dependence

was

upon the date of c o n 

sciousness.
Burton's notion of tast,
to Edwards'
the

"faculties" of understanding

describe

a completely unified,

tive-motivational process.

it is sovereign.

and will,

Burton,

three independent faculties,

is wholly contrary

Though Edwards spoke of

indivisible,

longer speaks of a unified mind.

which

however,

transsummative doctrine.

he was trying to
p erceptual-cogni

on the other hand,

no

In his system there are

each with its own province within

In a strictly functional sense,

there

is little difference between the views of Edwards and Burton.
All human

acts,

they would have agreed,

often unknown affectionate desires.
imposed

an organizational

never intended.

are a function of

Yet structurally,

Burton

scheme on the mind that Edwards

The deterministic,

transsummative unity of

Edwards was replaced by the equally deterministic but d i s 
junctive
but

"common sense" view of Burton.

significant.

the "liberal"

Burton's

The change was subtle

faculty of will was not free in

sense,

but it had been isolated and given well-

specified functions.

Burton's relationship to the problem of

the will in pre-Jamesian

American psychology is represented

in Figure 19.
^ ^ Ib i d ., p . 91 .
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Early American Puritanism
Scholastic:

many faculties;
will bound by other
fa c u l t i e s .

Locke

Edwards

(1690)

Two faculties;
Understanding

(1746)

, Unified

___

understanding;

Two inseparable

and

"faculties.

Will

Burton

(1824)

Three sovereign faculties:
understanding,

taste,

and will.

Will absolutely bound by taste.
Founding of an American
f aculty psychology of
consciousness.

N. T aylor

(1859)

An independent will
w hich is free.

T appan

(1 838)

Upham

(1834)

Embraced Burton's

"Self
determining "

three

will

fa c u l t i e s .

American Academic Psychology
to James

(1890)

Figure 19.
The problem of the will in pre-Jamesian
American psychology.
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The significance 'of Burton's elaboration of an
acceptably deterministic tri-partite arrangement of the fac u l 
ties may be illustrated via an analogy with Descartes'
tion of mind and body,

Descartes'

separa

well known dualism held

that mind and body are utterly different but interactive
entities.

LaMettrie,

however,

then applied D e s c a r t e s ' per

suasive description of automata to man,

and was left with the

first modern vision of man as a thoroughly me cl-ran is tic organism.
Burton also emphasized the interactive nature of two inde
pendent constructs:

will and taste.

ance of his E s s a y s , however,

Soon after the appear

psychological thinkers influenced

by him and by the like-minded Scottish
summative,

school,

cut the tra n s 

Edwardsean knot which was said to bind under

standing,

will and feeling.

is free.

Without the dichotomy provided by a deterministic

Calvinist like Burton,
been a knot to cut,

They held that the will of man

it is unlikely that there would have

just as LaMettrie's mechanism would have

been inconceivable without the earlier believeable dualism of
Descartes.
Burton may have found independent support for his
views in the writings of the early members of the "Scottish
School,"
headed

especially Reid.

11

The Scots,

with their hard-

appeals to common sense and consciousness would have

^ B u r t o n ' s E s s a y s , though not published until 1 824,
appear to have been written much earlier, in the period 18001804.
Reid's Intellectual Powers (1705) and Active Powers
(1788) were known in America by 1B00, thus they could have had
some impact on Burton.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

280

found an appreciative
sense"
will,

audience in Burton,

repeatedly told

as he understood Edwards'

the only faculties.

whose "common

him that the understanding and the
use of those terms,

were not

The extent of the Scottish influence on

Burton is difficult to assess,

since he provides no references

and he states in his introduction that the Essays are more a
function of "his own powers"
French,

and German authors."

than of "the English,
12

This claim must,

contrasted with his naive realism,

Scotch,

however be

appeals to common sense,

and his frequent use of the data of consciousness to prove
that his particular tri-partite division of the faculties was
the correct one.

By the time Burton wrote his E s says, Reid

had already developed these three characteristics into cor n e r 
stones of the emerging

Scottish 5chool.

Burton's attempt to integrate

Edwardsean psychology

with the data provided by his own consciousness appears to
have had two important consequences.

First,

had been extricated from the affections
Edwards,

after the "will"

and understanding of

it was a relatively small step for others to dissolve

the link of moral necessity which was
merely an executive faculty.

said to render the will

This was accomplished princi

pally by Nathaniel Taylor in whose curious Calvinism the doctrine of the freedom of the will triumphed.

13

A second result

of Burton's efforts was what Schneider has called

"the founding

12r

Essays. p . 3 .

13

Lectures on the Moral Government of G o d , 2 Vols.,
(New Y o r k , 1859).
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of a faculty psychology of consciousness."

14

Soon after the

publication of Burton's Essays a number of textbooks
which

expounded the new three-faculty psychology.

influential of these volumes,

by T. C.

Upham and H.

appeared

The most
P. Tappan,

reveal the considerable influence of B u r t o n . ^
It is clear that Burton was a transitional figure in
pre-Jamesian American psychology.
in the past;

intrinsic interest.
because

One foot was rooted deeply

psychology for Burton was still of little
Rather he considered it useful primarily

"he who knows himself correctly may have just con

ceptions of G o d . " ^

Despite the undeniable theological focus

of the E s s a y s , Burton was also breaking new ground.
sistent

His per

appeals to common sense and to the data of c onscious

ness was to be reinforced by the Scottish

position which was

to dominate in America throughout much of the nineteenth
century.

His tri-partite

arrangement of the faculties seemed

more reasonable to Calvinists of his era than did the m y steri
ous transsummative

unity of Edwards.

was adopted and his

ton helped upon the door,
would have wished,

His

system of faculties

"will" was declared to be free.
to a greater extent

Asa B u r 

than he ever

for the development of a view of man's

mind which was vastly different from that which preceded him.
14

Herbert 5chneider,

H i s tory, p. 207.

^ T . C. Upham, A Philosophical and Practical Treatise
on the Will (Portland, Pie., 1 834), and H. P. Tappan, A Review
of Edwards's "Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will" (New York,
1838).

1Essays,

_

p . 7.
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The overthrow of the transsummative doctrine,
ated by Asa Burton,
cism,"

to textbooks in mental and moral

expounded

philosophy which

a Sears-catalogue approach to psychology.

were piled on top of faculties
unwieldy and sterile.

17

Faculties

until the systems became quite

John Locke was temporarily forgotten

and in his place came two new psychological imports,
Scots and Kant,

in i t i 

led to the "age of American scho l a s t i 

the

both of which were interpreted as proponents

of independent faculties in the mind.

The re-emergent domi

nance of the disjunctive psychologycaused the transsummative
doctrine to die a temporary death,
ground.

The will

(a noun)

or at least to go u n der

was certainly not held to be bound

by or integrated with the affections.
of Burton,

The innocent contention

a Yankee Calvinist who couldn't

subtle

Edwardsean distinctions,

pation

proclamation

for the will,

array of other faculties.
psychology,

understand some

was transformed into an e manci
and a numerically impressive

It was against this "spiritualist"

as James called the disjunctive,

faculty approach,

that he directed some of his sharpest barbs in the first
chapter of the P r i n c i p l e s .

On the so-called faculty of memory,

he remarked:
For why should this absolute god-given Faculty retain so
much better the events of yesterday than those of last
year, and, best of all, those of an hour ago?
Why, again,
in old age should its grasp of childhood's events seem
firmest?
Why should illness and exhaustion enfeeble it?
Why should repeating an experience strengthen our re c o l l e c 
tion of it?
Why should drugs, fevers, asphyxia, and
^ A survey of this often, but not always, dreary lit
erature may be found in Schneider, H i s t o r y , pp. 193-216.
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excitement resuscitate things long since forgotten?
If
we content ourselves with merely affirming that the facul
ty of memory is so peculiarly constituted by nature as
to exhibit just these oddities, we seem little the better
for having invoked it, for our explanation becomes as
complicated as that of the crude facts with which we
started.
Moreover there is something grotesque and
irrational in the supposition that the soul is equipped
with elementary powers of such an ingeniously intricate
sort.
Why should our memory cling more easily to the
near than the remote?
Why should it lose its grasp of
proper sooner than of abstract names?
Such peculiarties
seem quite fantastic; and might, for aught we can see _a
p r i o r i , be the precise opposites of what they a r e .18
The same sort of argument might have been directed at any or
all of the faculties.
mal epitaph because,
absolutely,

James'

analysis was actually an infor

as he put it,

but works

"the faculty does not exist

under c o n d i t i o n s ; and the quest of the

conditions becomes the psychologist's most interesting task."

19

The experimental lab was to become the arena where those con
ditions were investigated.

The Proactive-Reactive Doctrine

and

American Functionalism
A second result of the replacement of Locke by a
conglomerate of nativistic theorists was the apparent endorse
ment and refinement of the proactive-reactive principle beyond
that which even Edwards could go.

Edwards, of course,

his data almost exclusively from conversions,

drew

and we have

seen that he viewed the process as an- oscillating give-andtake relationship with the Holy Spirit.

^ ^ P r i n c i p l e s . pp.

In following

Augustine

2-3.

^ ^ Ibid . , p . 3.
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down the proactive-reactive path,

Edwards offered a subtle

but significant departure from the traditional Puritan c o n 
cept of the "reflex"

and from Lockean sensationalism.

Although gracious discoveries,
given to the convert,
of an active,

in Edwards'

view,

are indeed

the result is a radical transformation

constructive mind.

B. P. Bowne,

century faculty psychologist in goad standing,
typical application of the Edwardsean,

a nineteenthoffered a

proactive-reactive

principle to all human perception.
. . . by an entirely mysterious world-order, the speaker
is enabled to produce a series of signs which are totally
unlike [the] thought, but which, by virtue of the same
mysterious order, act as a series of incitements upon the
hearer, so that he constructs within himself the corr e s 
ponding mental state.
The act of the speaker consists in
availing himself of the proper incitements.
The act of
the hearer is immediately only the reaction of the soul
against the incitement . . . All communion between finite
minds is of this sort . . . Probably no reflecting pe r 
son would deny this conclusion, but . . . what is thus
true of perception of another's thought is equally true
of the perception of the outer world in general . . .
Nervous signs are the raw material of all knowledge of
the outer world according to the most decided realism.
But in order to pass beyond these signs into a knowledge
of the outer world, we must posit an interpreter who shall
read back these signs into their objective meaning.
But
that interpreter, again, must implicitly contain the m e a n 
ing of the universe within itself; and these signs are
really but excitations which cause the soul to unfold
what is within itself.
Inasmuch as by common consent the
soul communicates with the outer world only through these
signs, and never come nearer to the object than just such
signs can bring it, it follows that the principles of
interpretation must be in the mind itself, and that the
resulting construction is primarily only an expression
of the mind's own nature.
All reaction is of this sort;
it expresses the nature of the reacting agent, and knowl
edge comes under the same h e a d . 2 0

407-410;

^ B o r d o n P. Bowne, Metaphysics (New York, 1 882),
quoted in James, Pri n c i p l e s , I, pp. 219-220.

pp.
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This is one aspect of the faculty approach that James th o r 
oughly endorsed.
Some sort of signal must be given by the thing to the
mind's brain?, or the knowing will not occur— we find as
a matter of fact that the mere existence of a thing out
side the brain is not a sufficient cause for our knowing
it:
it must strike the brain in some way, as well as be
there, to be known.
But the brain being struck, the
knowledge is constituted by a new construction that occurs
altogether _in the mind. 21
In fact,
mental

the proactive-reactive principle was a funda

assumption of American

"Functionalist"

It was the Functionalists who emphasized
an adaptive function:

that the mind serves

it intervenes between environmental

stimulation and resultant behavior.
from the environment,

Man receives information

the functionalists held,

cise nature of that information is determined,
active goal-oriented selection.
the Functionalist
approach.

psychology,

but the p r e 
in part,

by

The historical analysis of

school has suffered from an oddly schizoid

It is at once held to be peculiarly American but

distinctly European in origin:
tion of Hegel's dialectic,

a pragmatic American applica

Brentano's doctrine of intentio-

22
Functionalism, however, was never a tightly-knit
school like Structuralism or Gestalt.
The most important
interpreter of Functionalism is Edna Heidbreder; see Seven
P s y c h o l o g i e s , pp. 152-253, and "Functionalism," in Mary Henle
et a l ., eds. Historical Conceptions of Psychology (New York,
1973), pp. 276-285.
^^Heidbredder seems to view- Functionalism this way; see
I b i d .; see also Boring, H i s t o r y , pp. 508-517 and 550-583.
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be denied that Dewey came to psychology via Hegelian ph i 
losophy and that James drew heavily upon Brentano
it must

and Darwin,

now be recognized that they were also the inheritors

of an American functional tradition which can be traced to
Edwards.

A discussion of the precise nature of the manner in

which the functional,

proactive-reactive position may have

been transmitted to Dewey,
alists"

James,

and the other "Function

is well beyond the scope of this essay.

That impor

tant continuity exists between Edwards and the "Function
alists,"

however,

is beyond doubt.

For starters,

only consult the organizational scheme of James'
of Religious E x p e r i e n c e , a work in which

one need
Varieties

Jonathan Edwards is

quoted more often than any other single author.

In chapters

6-13 James takes us on a conversional journey from the per
ception of evil

("The Sick

("The Divided Self),
A schematic of James'
for James'

Soul"),

to the depths of despair

to "Conversion,"

to "5aint l i n e s s .

view is presented in Figure 20.

Except

characteristic lack of concern over absolute cri

teria for the validity of conversion,
elicit an eerie de

Religious Aff e c t i o n s .
there before,

The Varieties can

ja vu if one has previously read Edwards'
Indeed,

before Darwin,

American psychology has been

before Wundt,

and before the

psychological laboratory moved from the church pew to the
24
While The1 Varieties is the only volume in which
James refers directly to Edwards, the Principles is also per
meated with the proactive-reactive view.
A particularly
charming and p e r s u a s i v e ‘illustration is James' famous "Romeo
and Juliet" example (I, pp. 6-7).
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SICK SOUL
DIVIDED SOUL

SAINTLINESS

NO
OBJECTIVE
PROOF

CONVERSION

Figure 20.
conversion.

William James'

proactive-reactive conception of
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university closet.
Edwards and James would both

have agreed with

N e i s s e r ’s proposal that beauty is neither in objects nor in
the eye of the beholder,
denied,

they claim,

reaction,

however,

but in the mind.

25

It can hardly be

that man reacts to stimulation.
consists

His

in pr o actively selecting aspects

of the stimulation which are relevant to his purposes,
c ombining the information contained

and

in the stimulation with

that in memory to construct his own r e a l i t y . ^

Man in an

inherently and basically creative organism.

According

Jonathan Edwards,

given in true

the

"gracious discoveries"

to

conversion permit a convert to create a reality which is
remarkably congruent with the reality.
this far,and

take such a metaphysical
is not

an age of faith,

leap of faith.

have emerged

have yielded a grasp of mental
surer than that of Edwards.

modern psychologists must
the

one of

like James',
skepticism.

from such

skepticism

activity which may appear

But then,

because our reach is so much shorter.

as we do,

Our era,

but rather it is

The rigorous methods which

pursuing,

James would not go

I know of no contemporary psychologist who would

of course,

it should

Compared to Edwards,

appear as psychological amputees

"art of the soluble."

27

Edwards'

art

^ Cognitive P s y c h o l o g y , p. 3.
^ S e e Figure 9, p. 165, for a pictorial representation
of the proactive-reactive principle operating on both inner
and external sources of information.
27
This well-worn phrase has been popularized by P. B.
Medawar in The Art of the Soluble (London, 1967).
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was that of the insoluble,

of ultimate if unknowable truths;

this alone is all the significantly separates the psychology
of Jonathan Edwards from that of James and from most modern
cognitive psychology.
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